"Forgotten Master": T.E. Lawrence and Asymmetric Warfare
by Evan Pilling
There have been few leaders in military history that have caught the popular imagination
more than T.E. Lawrence, or "Lawrence of Arabia." Books, movies, and recollections
of this enigmatic figure have served to cloud the reality of the man and surround
him with exaggerations and legends. Lawrence, an odd and eccentric figure by any
measure, himself did much to add to the air of mystery about his leadership ability
and what he actually accomplished during the First World War. These uncertainties
aside, what Lawrence did accomplish while serving as British liaison to the Arab
forces involved in the Arab Revolt (1916-18) against the Ottoman Turks was to conduct
an effective military campaign that is a dramatic example of asymmetric warfare,
one form of which is guerrilla or irregular warfare. He used his cultural understanding
of the Arabs and knowledge of the region, along with significant leadership skills,
to guide the Arabs in the conduct of an irregular campaign. Although at best a sideshow
in the overall conduct of the First World War, the operations that Lawrence led
produced effects disproportionate to the number of irregular troops that participated
and served as a supporting operation to the ultimate British victory in Palestine.
Lawrence's campaign demonstrated the potential effectiveness of irregular forces
against conventional troops and the difficulties that conventional armies face in
combating these forces.
In addition to his famous deeds, Lawrence wrote extensively after the war and clearly
expressed his philosophy of irregular warfare. While Lawrence is not as well known
as some of the great military philosophers, he did leave a written legacy that influenced
future military writers and generals. The principles of irregular warfare that he
articulated are still relevant today in the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Lawrence's successful waging of asymmetric warfare and his views on the requirements
for successful asymmetric operations make him worthy of a look as a "Forgotten Master."
Lawrence and his Irregular Campaign
Lawrence was serving as a British military intelligence officer in Cairo in 1916
when he was assigned to the Arab Bureau of the British Foreign Office. The Arab
Bureau was tasked with organizing and coordinating the sporadic Arab Revolt against
the Turks that had been ongoing for several years. The intent was that the Arab
irregular forces would operate in support of General Allenby's conventional military
operations in Egypt and Palestine that focused on defending the Suez Canal and eventually
pushing the Turks out of Palestine and capturing Damascus. Lawrence, who had extensive
experience in the Middle East, became the British political advisor to the overall
Arab field commander, Feisal, as well as serving as an active commander of Arab
forces himself. His personal relationship with Feisal gave Lawrence significant
influence and was the main reason that he was given the freedom to develop and execute
the irregular strategy that was to follow.
Lawrence convinced Feisal that his irregular troops should not engage the Turks
in fixed battles as they had been attempting. Feisal thought that, in order to defeat
modern armies, he had to fight them in conventional style. Lawrence immediately
perceived the folly of these tactics and the fundamental asymmetric nature of the
conflict. He convinced Feisal that the Arab irregular forces should instead conduct
hit-and-run attacks and raids using small, independent, mobile groups of fighters.
Lawrence realized that this style of warfare was in keeping with the traditional
Arab way of fighting: emphasis on the individual fighter over the unit, loyalty
toward family and tribe before army, and a disinclination to accept high casualties
-- there was no shame in retreating to fight another day. Lawrence's strategic
vision of his campaign was to threaten the important Hejaz railway, which ran 800
miles from Damascus into the Arabian Peninsula and was the key Turkish supply route
in the region (Map 1). A credible threat from the Arab irregular forces would force
the Turks to extend their flanks through the entire length of the railway in order
to provide security and require that their forces to be dispersed thinly to accomplish
this. This had the potential to severely reduce the Turkish advantages of massed
troops and heavy firepower while maximizing the Arab strengths of speed, mobility,
and expert knowledge of the desert environment.
Map 1 Source: http://nabataea.net/Hejazmap2.html
Lawrence began his operations in Arabia with a surprise assault on the coastal town
of Weijh in January 1917. The lightly defended town was taken with minimal casualties
to the Arabs and this success caused the British authorities in Cairo to realize
the potential of the Arab irregulars and to send additional arms, supplies, and
money to keep these operations going. It also gave the Arab forces confidence both
in themselves and Lawrence's leadership. Lawrence then began a prolonged assault,
consisting of repeated small-unit attacks, on the section of the Hejaz railway between
Medina and Damascus with the intent of neutralizing the Turkish forces garrisoned
there. His forces would appear on camel, with no warning, strike, and then retire
back into the desert where they could not be pursued. They required few supplies
and the speed and endurance of their camels gave them the ability to move rapidly
without detection, often between fifty and one hundred miles a day. Lawrence did
not want to destroy the railway or the Turkish garrisons. His aim was to force the
Turks to spend increasingly scarce resources on guarding the track, continually
making repairs to destroyed sections of railway, and supplying the large number
of troops spread along the route and garrisoned in Medina with food, water, weapons,
and equipment. These troops would be unable to advance to Mecca or retreat to Damascus.
They would be rendered immobile, of little use against the Arab forces but unable
to be employed in other areas. Through his strong leadership abilities and utilizing
deep cultural knowledge, Lawrence coordinated the operations of seven different
and independent Arab tribes against the Hejaz railway and launched often-simultaneous
multiple attacks at different places with little or no warning. In response
to the Arab attacks, the Turks had to deploy approximately 16,000 men in Medina,
another 6,000 along the key link between Medina and Maan, and a further 7,000 men
to guard Maan itself. These troops were not fighting -- they were essentially a
wasted force that was an increasing logistical drain to the Turks. The most strategically
important operation of Lawrence's campaign was the dramatic surprise capture in
July 1917 of the key port of Aqaba. This was also a more conventional type of attack,
but good intelligence, the element of surprise, and a small Turkish garrison, allowed
the Arab forces to succeed. The seizure of Aqaba allowed direct contact between
the Arab forces and the British forces in Suez and enabled more rapid and effective
communication and resupply. Aqaba became a base from which the Arab forces could
operate in direct support of Allenby and target the stretch of railway lines running
north to Damascus. The Arab attacks continued on the Turkish railway lines until
the end of the war, tying down large numbers of Turkish troops that would have been
more effective if employed elsewhere. Lawrence's mobile troops captured the key
town of Deera and then joined General Darrow's British Camel Corps for the conventional
final assault on Damascus in October 1918.
The overall impact of Lawrence's small force of irregulars was significant. During
the period of 1917-18, the Arab forces destroyed 79 railway bridges and hundreds
of miles of railway. The Turks had to constantly make repairs while knowing that
other attacks would come elsewhere along the line. Although playing only a supporting
role to the main British offensive, the 3,000-man Arab force compelled the Turks
to keep 50,000 troops east of Jordan to protect the Turkish flank. Another 150,000
Turkish troops were deployed in unsuccessful attempts to locate and destroy the
Arab forces. When the conventional British forces under Allenby made their final
assault on Damascus, only about 50,000 Turkish troops remained to oppose him.
Although Lawrence did not often seek direct combat with Turkish forces (indeed,
he sought to avoid it), the Arab forces killed approximately 35,000 Turks by war's
end and captured or wounded a similar number. By wars end, the Arab forces exercised
de facto control of over 100,000 square miles of territory. Although Great Power
realpolitik among the victorious allied nations prevented the creation of
an Arab state, the dramatically asymmetric results achieved by Lawrence's small
and lightly armed force demonstrated the potential strategic effectiveness of an
irregular campaign against a conventional army, given the right circumstances and
enough time. After the war, Lawrence wrote his philosophy of irregular warfare and
explained what factors had contributed to the Arabs' success.
Elements of Irregular Warfare
Lawrence was highly educated and well versed in the principles of Clausewitz. The
idea of overwhelming force at the decisive point, a battle of annihilation, was
well known to him. In the Middle East, however, Lawrence saw that the traditional
notions of conventional battle were inadequate. He came to the conclusion that his
original belief that irregular warfare was just another form of Clausewitzian warfare
was incorrect. Lawrence thought a great deal about irregular warfare during the
war and ultimately developed his own philosophy of this type of warfare. Lawrence
articulated his own "trinity," although it was not as thorough and detailed as Clausewitz's
version. He postulated that irregular warfare was composed of three "elements" that
he labeled "algebraical," "biological," and "psychological."
Lawrence saw the algebraic element as that part of warfare that was technical and
mathematical in nature. It included factors such as space and time, terrain, weapons,
lines of communication, and fortresses, to name a few. Lawrence applied this element
in the Arab Revolt by calculating that the Turks would require more than six times
as many troops as they had available to control the Arab territory through which
the Hejaz railway ran. The Arabs would utilize the immense space of the desert to
maneuver against key targets over a long period of time. Time was seen as a weapon
to use against the enemy, wearing down their will and sapping their strength. The
Turkish troops would not be able to achieve a decisive battle of annihilation over
the Arab forces. Lawrence rightly assumed that he would have the initiative and
that the Turks' superior numbers and firepower would be irrelevant given the massive
area of ground that they had to attempt to control and their inability to bring
the Arabs to battle.
The biological element applied to the human factor in warfare. Lawrence thought
that 90 percent of tactics was certain and could be taught; the other "irrational"
part was the true test of generals, a view similar to Clausewitz's concept of "genius."
Effective leaders had to have an instinct for the right method to use against the
best point of attack. The biological element also dealt with relative troop strengths.
Lawrence saw that the Turks could afford to lose troops, but not equipment along
a long supply line; the Arabs, on the other hand, could afford very few losses in
men. This confirmed his view that sudden, hit-and-run strikes against supplies and
lines of communication were essential, rather than direct battle against superior
troop strength. The Arab forces only needed to wear down the Turkish army, not annihilate
it. Surprise, based on accurate intelligence to avoid engaging superior forces,
was paramount in this type of warfare. Lawrence wanted nothing left to chance and
said, about his intelligence efforts, "We took more pains in this service than any
other staff I saw."
The third element of irregular warfare was the psychological factor that dealt with
the mind and will of both the combatant forces and the civilian population of all
countries involved. This is also similar to the "people" part of Clausewitz's trinity
of warfare. Lawrence viewed propaganda, or information operations, as essential
in irregular warfare. He saw the printing press as a key weapon of warfare and a
means of positively affecting friendly morale while attempting to demoralize the
enemy. Lawrence felt that the Arab troops had to have the idea that they were fighting
to eject a foreign power and to obtain an independent homeland (a goal not shared
by the European allies). This belief gave them the ability to endure the losses
and privations of the war and provided a psychological advantage over the Turks,
who felt increasingly isolated and demoralized, and was a key factor in the success
of the irregular campaign.
These three elements of warfare shaped Lawrence's view of asymmetric strategy. He
realized that his troops were incapable of defending positions against larger conventional
forces or of attacking heavily defended Turk positions. The strategy that Lawrence
developed and articulated was to wage a protracted irregular war that would ultimately
wear down and exhaust the Turks. Killing Turkish troops was not his main aim. Instead,
he saw the destruction of railways, weapons, and supplies as more important. These
materiel targets were the enemy's center of gravity, although Lawrence did not use
that term. After the war, in his major works Seven Pillars of Wisdom and Anatomy
of a Revolt, Lawrence discussed the main principles of his strategy in what
he referred to as his "thesis" of irregular warfare. The principles are outlined
essentially identically in each work and give a picture of the depth of thought
that Lawrence applied in his search for a winning irregular strategy. Although Lawrence
was well versed in Clausewitzian theory and the Arab Revolt could be seen as a "people's
war," his asymmetric strategy is more akin to Sun Tzu's indirect approach to warfare.
Lawrence's "Thesis" of Irregular Warfare
Lawrence discusses six principles for successful irregular warfare in his "thesis."
First, the irregular forces must have a secure and unassailable base from which
to operate. The Arab forces operated from secure desert camps and oases that the
enemy could neither locate nor attack. Second, the irregular force must be engaged
with a technologically sophisticated enemy, a conventional military force. The Turkish
army that the Arabs faced was a conventional European force that relied on conventional
training and modern weaponry and communications. Third, the enemy force must lack
sufficient numbers of troops to dominate the battle area from widespread fortifications.
The Turkish army only had sufficient numbers to guard important outposts and selected
areas of railway; they could not control the majority of the Arabian land area.
Fourth, the irregular force must have at least the passive support of the population,
where the local people would provide information on the enemy and also not betray
the irregular forces. Lawrence felt that a successful rebellion could be made up
of 2 percent of the population, if the other 98 percent was supportive. The population
in the Middle East was overwhelmingly supportive of the Arab irregulars who they
saw as leading a struggle for liberation against foreign invaders and for the establishment
of an Arab state. The fifth principle is that the irregular force must have speed,
endurance, presence, and independent lines of supply. Lawrence's irregular forces,
relying heavily on camels, demonstrated these characteristics and were able to gain
and keep the initiative in the war. The desert war was similar to war at sea. The
Arab forces could come and go where they pleased, without being tied down to supply
lines, roads, or railways. The final principle is that the irregular force must
have the technical ability to attack the enemy's logistics and communications vulnerabilities.
Lawrence's force used small arms, explosives, and mechanical methods to attack the
Turkish railway and telegraph infrastructure, providing some Clausewitzian friction
to Turkish operations and requiring the enemy to continually expend dwindling resources
to effect repairs. Lawrence summed up his irregular warfare thesis as: "In fifty
words: Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy),
time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory
will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive,
and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain."
Legacy and Significance
T.E. Lawrence is not as well known as many of the great military leaders or philosophers.
His Arabian exploits, while popular with the public, did not receive the same attention
of historians as the great battles on the European mainland. Lawrence was neither
the first nor the last to develop and implement a theory of irregular warfare. He
did not write volumes about military strategy and is not as well known as the greats
like Sun Tzu, Jomini, or Clausewitz. He did, however, have an impact on both the
public imagination and the study and practice of asymmetric warfare that continues
to the present day.
Lawrence's experiences and writings have influenced several commanders and military
theorists in the last 80 years. In a 1946 interview, Vo Nguyen Giap, the Vietnamese
general who orchestrated the insurgency that led to the military defeat of both
the French and the Americans, stated, "My fighting gospel is T.E. Lawrence's Seven
Pillars of Wisdom. I am never without it." The eminent British military
writer, Basil Liddell Hart, advocate of maneuver warfare and armored forces, was
Lawrence's biographer and friend and considered him a military genius. He saw Lawrence's
irregular strategy as a validation of his own notion of the "indirect approach"
to warfare and an indictment of the attritional methods used on the Western Front
during the First World War. The prominent American counterinsurgency writer,
John Nagl, was heavily influenced by Lawrence's writings and titles his book after
Lawrence's statement in Seven Pillars of Wisdom that for conventional armies,
making "war on rebellion was messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife."
Nagl also wrote the forward
to the new U.S. counterinsurgency manual (discussed below) and Lawrence's influence
is apparent throughout that document. Lawrence's significance is that he both conducted
and wrote about successful irregular warfare and developed and articulated clear
principles that can be applied to other asymmetric conflicts. His philosophy on
irregular warfare complements the writings of many others, such as Sun Tzu, and
is simple to comprehend and emulate.
Lawrence's primary legacy is the vivid demonstration of the potential effectiveness
of irregular troops in a protracted struggle against a conventional force. It is
true that Lawrence's exploits took place in a sideshow to a small campaign that
was part of a much larger war in Europe. The Middle East was never the point of
main effort for any of the great powers engaged in that war. Lawrence showed, however,
that small, mobile forces, deploying from and returning to safe havens, attacking
when and where they like, could have a significant impact against larger better-equipped
armies that relied on conventional weapons and tactics and were denied the chance
for a decisive battle. The longer the struggle persisted, the more effective the
irregular forces became. The Vietnamese, Communist Chinese, and other successful
insurgencies since the Arab Revolt have replicated and validated Lawrence's example
of asymmetric warfare.
Applicability for Present and Future Warfare
The principles of irregular warfare that Lawrence outlines are applicable in the
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations that are ongoing against insurgents and terrorists
in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Lawrence's principles and his experiences in the Arab
Revolt reveal several characteristics of irregular warfare that are relevant in
today's asymmetric conflicts.
The first of these is that, to the insurgent or guerrilla, time is a weapon. Irregular
operations will always be offensive and protracted. Insurgents are not inclined
to try to defend territory or seek quick victories. The insurgent usually has the
initiative, and a long campaign that erodes the will of the stronger force is in
his interest. This was demonstrated in the Vietnamese victory over France and the
United States and is an important aspect of the current struggles in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Democracies generally have a difficult time keeping public support for
a long, inconclusive war. Americans, especially, desire a quick, decisive, and relatively
bloodless conclusion to military operations. Successful insurgents know this and
use it to their advantage.
Secondly, the international media is a potent weapon that irregular forces can use
to support their struggle, shaping popular opinion both home and abroad, and also
serving as a means to recruit, obtain financial support and erode the enemy's will.
This is especially true in the age of rapid high-quality electronic media such as
television, the Internet, mobile phones, etc.
Third, irregular forces are more effective when they operate in small groups rather
than large formations. If insurgents or terrorists operate in large formations,
they are easier for conventional forces to locate and destroy; they are playing
to the stronger forces' advantage. The Taliban experienced this in Afghanistan when
they attempted to operate as company-size military formations against coalition
forces and suffered high casualties as a result. They have since returned to the
tactics of using smaller, more stealthy units.
Another characteristic of irregular warfare is the importance for the stronger power
to have enough "boots on the ground" to effectively exert control over an area.
Lawrence understood this as part of the "algebraical" element of the insurgency.
The importance of adequate numbers for COIN operations was vividly demonstrated
by the U.S. troop surge in Iraq. Although other factors were involved, the increase
in the number of troops in the contested areas during the surge was the main reason
that the insurgency was, for the most part, broken.
The current irregular conflicts demonstrate the reality that the insurgents will
usually have more precise and accurate intelligence about the occupying force. They
are usually part of the population in the area in dispute and have intelligence
sources and local knowledge. This allows the insurgents to attack at a time and
place of their choosing and then withdraw. The larger force will rarely have this
amount of timely and accurate intelligence and will often be reactive as a result.
The applicability of Lawrence's principles of irregular warfare to current and future
counterinsurgency operations is reflected in the recent U.S. Army and Marine Corps
COIN field manual, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. This was the first major manual
of its kind published for the U.S. military in decades and is indicative of the
importance of COIN conflicts to the United States currently and of Lawrence's influence
on this type of warfare. This manual directly refers to Lawrence in several instances
and describes the nature of insurgencies in terms that he would recognize. The manual
outlines several important aspects of insurgencies. These include the asymmetric
nature of irregular or insurgent forces, the difficulties of conventional forces
to deal with insurgents, the importance of the support of the population and use
of the media, and, most importantly, that the insurgents seek a long campaign that
will exhaust the stronger forces. The manual also illustrates the importance
of the host nation's role in multinational COIN operations by Lawrence's admonition
to a fellow British liaison officer to "not try to do too much with your own hands.
Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and
you are to help them, not to win it for them." The applicability of this view
to recent criticism of the new Iraqi and Afghan government security services is
Irregular warfare will likely be a reality that conventional armies have to face
in the near to medium term. Throughout history, asymmetric warfare has long been
a tool of the weaker side in a conflict. As traditional nation-states undergo traumatic
change and old balances of power erode, conventional war between states will become
less likely and non-state actors such as insurgents, terrorists, and smugglers will
emerge in increasing numbers. These groups, while growing in power and sophistication,
will not usually be able to face conventional armies in open battle and will have
to adopt asymmetric tactics, including irregular warfare. Insurgent forces will
use the principles that Lawrence described and followed, as they have been proven
effective in many campaigns since his battles in the desert. Large armies, like
those of the United States, are trained and equipped primarily to wage conventional
warfare against similar forces. They are, in many ways, like the conventional Turkish
army that found itself trapped in Arabia, trying to destroy a smaller force that
it could neither locate nor engage. While changes can, and are, being made to allow
armies to reconfigure and adapt for counterinsurgency and other asymmetric operations,
modern armies face the dilemma that they cannot be focused on countering asymmetric
warfare only. They still must retain the capability to fight and win "normal" wars.
Asymmetric struggles rarely pose an existential threat to a major power. The threat
of conventional ground, air, or naval warfare, including weapons of mass destruction,
will not disappear, and military planners must ensure heavy forces are available
to address that threat. The challenge for the United States and other countries
will be to determine the correct balance, or "force mix" between conventional and
unconventional forces to meet all likely scenarios, both conventional and asymmetric.
It is clear, however, that asymmetric warfare will continue as a significant threat
to the United States and other nations for the foreseeable future. Asymmetric forces
will steadily increase in numbers and military capability. In this environment,
both regular and irregular forces alike will be well served by an understanding
of Lawrence's principles of irregular warfare and the means to counter them.
The legend of T.E. Lawrence, or "Lawrence of Arabia," was a creation of both his
real exploits and extensive media exposure, much of dubious accuracy. Lawrence's
eccentric personality and behavior added to the mystery about what really happened
in the desert from 1916-18. The reality is that Lawrence, assisting the Arab forces
facing the Turks, conceived and executed a two-year irregular warfare military campaign
that is a dramatic example of effective asymmetric warfare. His cultural and personal
qualities gave him influence and motivated the Arab fighters to follow an outsider.
In a difficult and harsh operational environment, he seized and maintained the initiative,
capitalizing on his advantages of speed and mobility. He caused the Turks to expend
huge amounts of resources and allocate numbers of troops to guard fixed outposts
and lines of communication out of all proportions to the personnel that Lawrence
employed. More importantly, he prevented those forces from being used elsewhere
in a more effective manner. The irregular Arab forces were essentially pinning down
the Turks through an asymmetric strategy. Although his operations were only a small
supporting piece in the overall conduct of the First World War, Lawrence's campaign
demonstrated the potential effectiveness of irregular forces against conventional
troops and the difficulties that conventional armies face in combating these forces.
In addition to his military accomplishments, Lawrence wrote extensively after the
war and clearly expressed his philosophy of irregular warfare. While Lawrence is
not as well known as some of the great military philosophers, he did leave a written
legacy that included simple and insightful principles of irregular warfare, principles
that irregular forces around the world are applying today. His writings influenced
future military writers and generals and the principles of irregular warfare that
he outlined are still relevant for insurgent and counterinsurgent alike in the ongoing
asymmetric conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although not as well
known as some, except for inaccurate movie portrayals, Lawrence's successful waging
of asymmetric warfare and his principles for successful asymmetric operations make
him a "Forgotten Master" whose relevance will continue to be significant for the
small scale conflicts that are currently part of our world and appear to remain
so in the near and medium term.
Show Footnotes and Bibliography
. W.D Maxwell-Mahon, “Lawrence of Arabia – The Damascus Campaign,” Military History Journal (Vol. 9, No. 2),
http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol092mm.html (accessed November 24, 2008), 2.
. Michael Asher, Lawrence: The Uncrowned King of Arabia (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 182.
. Asher, 198.
. James Barr, Setting the Desert on Fire: T.E. Lawrence and Britain’s Secret War in Arabia, 1916-18 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006), 115-116.
. Maxwell-Mahon, 5.
. John C. Hulsman, “Lawrence of Arabia and the Perils of State Building,” Heritage Lectures, (October 6, 2005), http://www.heritage.org/research/middleeast/Iraq/hl900.cfm (accessed November 21, 2008), 1-2.
. General Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 168.
. T.E. Lawrence, “The Evolution of a Revolt,” Combat Studies Institute Reprint (Combined Arms Center, U.S. Command and General Staff College),
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Lawrence/lawrence.asp (accessed November 19, 2008), 7.
. Lawrence, 8.
. Lawrence, 9.
. Lawrence, 10.
. Lawrence, 11.
. James J. Schneider, “T.E. Lawrence and the Mind of An Insurgent,” Army (July 2005), http://www3.ausa.org/webint/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/KCAT-6DSP6Y (accessed November 10, 2008), 34.
. Lawrence, 22.
. Schneider, 32.
. John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War,” Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 832.
. Peter Maas, “Professor Nagl’s War,” New York Times (January 11, 2004), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.htm (accessed December 2, 2008), 1.
. Schneider, 36.
. Department of the Army Field Manual, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006), http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf (accessed December 04, 2008), 1-2 to 1-3.
. Department of the Army Field Manual, 1-28.
Copyright © 2013 Evan Pilling.
Written by Evan Pilling. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Evan Pilling at:
About the author:
Evan Pilling is a retired naval intelligence and surface warfare officer currently employed as a civilian antiterrorism intelligence specialist with the US Army Reserve Command. He has a Master of Science in National Security Affairs from the US Naval Postgraduate School and lived and worked in the Middle East for over a decade.
Published online: 10/13/2013.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO.