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vpatrick
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Forgive me thread is from 1939 but this has always intrigued me. In 1938 The Czechoslovakia had a million man army with decent equipment and fortifications and at the same time the German army was not ready for offensive operations, it was a bluff by the Germans for their attempt at the Sudetenland. From what I have read the Germans had about 500 thousand troops facing between 800-to a million Czechoslovaks fortified army. On the Western border of France at the same time Germans just had about 11 divisions facing 100 French divisions in 1938. France had a treaty to defend Czechoslovakia, Russia was involved as well not sure to what extent, That was the bulwark into southern Eastern Europe its hard to believe that the French and English were that dumb, Hitler wrote a book about his intentions (Mein Kampf) anybody in British intelligence should have passed on this information, its a manifesto to Hitler's intentions.
My questions are why did the British and French not read "Mein Kampf" it seems they didn't their aggressor wrote a book about how he going to invade? What was the extent of intelligence of the Bristish and French of German forces on the Western Border of Germany? France could of just walked in even in 1938
with 100 divisions against 11 German ones. The Czechs were not a walk over, did they give up so easily because of the similar reason why Austro-Hungary gave up, no patriotism to many ethnic groups to keep even a massive army together, or was it the betrayal of the Brits and French which was horrific. So many moving parts hard to figure out.
If you look at it now the Czechs had enough to push the Germans back, and if the French invaded Germany from the west and honored thier commitments to the Czechs they would have crushed Hitler. I can understand though the hesitancy to release war after WW1 who the hell would wnat war again and maybe the thought was that after that even the Germans didnt.
vpatrick
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Phil Andrade
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Many share your view, Vin : even at the time there were voices of dismay at the way Czechoslovakia was betrayed, and that conviction remains strong to this day.
The Czech forces were , as you say, formidable in both quantity and quality.
There was also a hysterical dread of another war after the nightmare of 1914-18, although it’s interesting that the strongest anti appeasers in the British government were men who had served in the trenches.
Perhaps the British were playing for time, worried that their empire was too vulnerable if it was attacked, especially if the war extended to the Far East.
In the event, they lost that imperial role anyway when Singapore, Malaya and Burma fell after humiliation and expulsion from the European continent at Dunkirk, not to mention Greece.
The French, having suffered up to five million casualties 1914-18, were understandably reluctant to face up to anything like that again.
But it’s too often forgotten that Germany had taken hideous punishment in WW1 too : more than seven million casualties, and they dreaded a war no less than their Anglo French counterparts.
It does look like a pretty disgraceful loss of nerve: one has to wonder how many millions, even tens of millions, of lives would have been saved if more resolve and fortitude had been summoned up in 1938.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Brian Grafton
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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VP, some good questions. Phil, a sound response. I am amongst those who find it difficult to forgive the actions of Britain and France, or at least of Chamberlain and Deladier and their advisors. That said, there are a variety of issues which have been forgotten over time, and which allow a much more complex issue to emerge.
Before anything else, however, let me say that IMHO there is no basis to think leaders and thinkers of the largest European democracies (i.e., France and Britain), let alone leaders of other nations of Europe (even Soviet Russia, if we’re to see them as European), were unaware of Mein Kampf. From my reading of that volume, there was no direct threat to Western European nations. In fact there were no threats to nations at all, but rather to cultures and capabilities: this was the central value upon which Hitler’s scattered value system were based. And whatever the may have outlined in Mein Kampf, his expansionist policies to 3 Sept 1939 were presented on the basis of reuniting and securing germanic lands and “Kulture”. The Austrian Anschuss was accomplished by plebicite. Yes, the thread of armed intervention was there. But the Austrians collapsed under the propaganda of the Austrian Nazis and the German military thread. The Czech crisis was focused on the Sudetenland, a western area with large germanic population. That Sudeten also contained the majority of Czech industry and a large proportion of Czechoslovakian basic ores was handy, of course. And at least part of the pre-invasion Polish question focused on the Freistadt of Danzig, a largely germanic Free City surrounded by Poland and governed with little germanic input allowed. For Germans, it seems as if Hitler had some legitimate beefs – many of them stemming from the decisions leading to the Treaty of Versailles.
I agree with both you and Phil that Hitler was up against formidable national armies. I don’t know the numbers for France, Czechoslovakia, Poland or other nations such as Britain or Italy, but standing armies for such nations ran to a potential million. Most were not at arms at any given time, but all were required to report, to bear arms when needed. Two major points:
• calling up the reserves of any land army did not mean a nation could feed, house, equip, arm or integrate them for active duty. Nor did it mean they would be effective.
• the ability of any army, let alone any reserve forces called to the colours, will only be as capable as their leaders’ values – both military and political – might be.
There is a massive argument connecting national values about waging war v. living in peace. Phil puts his finger squarely on it: “There was also a hysterical dread of another war after the nightmare of 1914-18, “ with an important rider: “…although it’s interesting that the strongest anti appeasers in the British government were men who had served in the trenches.” This was a reality, and it lasted – it blossomed – in Britain even after Chamberlain’s conduct at Munich. There was a Peace Pledge which collected many many thousands of signatories. I think Phil’s right: in Britain the cost of WW1 lead to a fear of WW2. I sense the same thing applies to France.
But this was not a universal response to WW1. Other nations found grounds to laud their warriors, and to see a future based on the continued bravery, honour and power of their warriors. I submit Germany was such a nation; I suggest Italy may have been the same.
Phil also argues, “Perhaps the British were playing for time, worried that their empire was too vulnerable if it was attacked, especially if the war extended to the Far East.” This may be so, though it suggests a view of Britiish Imperial control vastly different from what was presented as normal in 1938. It wasn’t their empire that was vulnerable. Not yet. The war would make it more vulnerable and less stable. But in 1938, this argument doesn’t draw true. Britain’s time between the wars was not easy, either economically or socially (or, for that matter, fiscally). Government military policies, based to a large extent on 10-year needs assessments, were often manipulated and sold short. Such misuses lead to bad weapons not nearly capable of functioning as designed by Ten-Year Plan (thing, just as one egregious example, of the so-called Fairey Battle bomber, built to meet the need for more bomber production).
I could go on. My point, however, is that Munich had little to do with Hitler’s values or commentary. The British and French weren’t ignorant of his comments, but had other things on their minds. They didn’t sell Czechoslovakia down the tubes in ignorance, but with full cognisense of their actions. The signing of the Munich Pact (without, remember, a single Czech representative attending) was a disgusting display of traditional European partisanship at least, and at worst an demonstration of British and French disdain for an entire nation.
I could go on. Lots of subtle side stories here. But for now, got a casserole to prepare!
Cheers
B
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"We have met the enemy, and he is us." Walt Kelly.
"The Best Things in Life Aren't Things" Bumper sticker.
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Phil Andrade
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Brian,
How right you are when you state But this was not a universal response to WW1. Other nations found grounds to laud their warriors, and to see future based on the continued bravery, honour and power of their warriors. I submit Germany was such a nation; I suggest Italy may have been the same.
Look how the Nazis banned Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front, with its anti war message, and cherished Ernst Junger’s Storm of Steel, which appealed to them . Junger made no attempt to conceal the horrors of his frontline experience: his description of the Somme fighting in 1916 is harrowing. But it glorified martial qualities and the camaraderie achieved thereby.
Dad left school in 1936 when he was fifteen, and chose to cycle across Belgium for a week or two with his close friend Bernard. You can imagine how thick on the ground the debris of 1914-18 was, and the impact of the monstrous memorials to the missing and the vast cemeteries was profound. Yet, four years later, both Dad and Bernard volunteered to serve, and fought in North Africa and Italy together, first as gunners and then as infantrymen.
The inspiration imparted by the generation before- decimated ( or worse) though it was - left them in no doubt as to their proper course.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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George
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Quote: The inspiration imparted by the generation before- decimated ( or worse) though it was - left them in no doubt as to their proper course.
I daresay that they would have approached this mission with far less of the bravado and cheering and flag waving that accompanied the declaration of war in 1914. Rather, if I may trust my father on this one, there was an air of resignation that a job had to be done; an evil to be stopped. For some who cared to think about it, it may have been a job that was not completed in 1918.
Interesting posts, Vin, Phil and Brian.
George
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Phil Andrade
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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It’s a poignant thing to reflect on : my Dad as a kid cycling through Belgium with his pal, Bernard, who was five or six years older . What a big disparity in years for two youngsters ! Bernard married Dad’s sister after the war : it became almost a case of brothers in arms. Something that you know all about, George, with your family history.
The impact of those old battlefields on them was sobering, especially since, even in 1936, large numbers of dead were still being discovered.
“ We got the flavour of that old war”, Dad told me.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Brian Grafton
Victoria
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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And, Phil and George, consider some other experiences such travellers between the wars might see. One Ted Walker, my sorta father-in-law, spent many vacation time in Germany. He was, IIRC, and apprentice electrician and a great lover of Nazi Germany. I have read some of his travel diaries. He stayed in Hitler Jugend hostels, finding them clean and inexpensive; he travelled with young Germans, finding them personally kind and friendly and open. He detested returning to the squalor of the Dutch trains on his way home, and found French, Belgian and Dutch petty officials arrogant and unhelpful. He was not blind to what was happening, and speaks of seeing a military unit returning to barracks after executing a person. He was close friends with British Unionists in England, though not himself a member. Yet he joined the RN when wore broke out.
More in a second post which might be closer to VP’s original questions.
Cheers
Brian G
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"We have met the enemy, and he is us." Walt Kelly.
"The Best Things in Life Aren't Things" Bumper sticker.
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vpatrick
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Thanks for all your comments very interesting guys,
I do wonder about the Czechoslovak troops, Czechoslovakia was a made up country mostly part of the former Austo-Hungarian Empire where those empire troops were not very effective in WW1 as they did not really understand what country they were fighting for. Would have those Czech/Slovak troops fought if invaded by Nazi Germany if ordered to defend the country? Was that a factor why the country was surrendered so easily? Hard to find information about the morale of the Czech/Slovak troops in 1938. They had ammo and numbers but did they have the will? Hitler was new in 1938, Hitler became the lesson later for future politicians and Hitler was an amazing liar, he lied to achieve his goals, say one thing to distract and then do another thing to achieve his aims. I wonder if politicians and diplomats at the time were used to liars and charlatans in 1938 maybe why they took him at his word, it used to be a huge insult to be a liar at one time by politicians today its commonplace. I believe Hitler was shocked when Great Britain declared war after invading Poland, at that point he was getting cocky and was eventually his downfall. Fascinating stuff.
edit: just a note, Hitler demanded the Sudetenland and all the ethnic Germans there be returned to Germany, fact was the German speaking inhabitants of the Sudetenland were never part of Germany they were part of Austria.
vpatrick
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Brian Grafton
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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VP, you’’re right, it’s hard to get much detailed information concerning Czech troops, though it is accepted (I believe) that the Czech political decisions following the Munich Pact were opposed by the military. But a look at a map of pre-WW2 Europe tells a tale. In the west, with the Austrian Anschluss of March 1938, the bulb of western Czechoslovakia was surrounded by Germany. To the east, Poland had eyes on small areas of the country. Add to that rather frightening situation, add the fact that there were some 3 million ethnic Germans living in the Sudeten region, the loyalty of a large number of which would be torn or in favour of joining Germany. Point: this was not a potential one-front war led by a patriotic government of a united people.
The western part of Czechoslovakia did have much heavy industry, all of which fell into Germany’s hands. Skoda was but one example. And I believe that the Pkw Mark III was largely built in Czech factories, though I admit that is based on rather flimsy evidence (i.e., my memory!  ). With the German occupation of the Sudeten area, the Czech rump was increasingly vulnerable both to German and other nation’s pressure. In hindsight, its collapse was inevitable.
As to your comments about liars in whatever guise, the Europeans had a term for that, before WW1 and in the inter-war years as well. It was known as “diplomacy”. There was a rather wry definition for “diplomacy” at one time – “the ability to lie for one’s country”! It is standard practice to talk about the hidden terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact, and how both Hitler and Stalin were lying to each other. But to some extent, the treaties between the French and British, whether to protect Czechoslovakia or (separate treaty) Poland, were undermined by language which would let them pretend they had not committed to what the various treaties stated.
As an extension of how Germany was seen, both during the inter-war years and during the years following the 1933 Nazi accomplishment, may I suggest a book by Julia Boyd, Travelers in the Third Reich. The Rise of Fascism: 1919-1945, 2018? It raises questions about how Germany was conceived during those years, and tosses out some scary material for thought. Boyd talks about the large numbers of British and American tourists who visit Germany for the cheap prices and the increasingly good roads. About the efforts of the German government to promote German visits. She talks about turning the most negative ideas into “experiences”; she describes, e.g., the ability of travellers to have tours of Dachau, including a dinner with the Commandant and (undoubtedly standin) inmates. She discusses the strange links between British and German values, and why so many of the upper class (she is focusing on the Mitford family) consider Nazi German “Kulture” to be an appropriate “finishing school”. She mentions Lindberg and Ford. These are people who willingly chose to visit Germany, and who often returned buying into Hitler’s rather confused beliefs for the German people.
VP, you state: “[…] just a note, Hitler demanded the Sudetenland and all the ethnic Germans there be returned to Germany, fact was the German speaking inhabitants of the Sudetenland were never part of Germany they were part of Austria.” That’s true. But in Hitler’s eyes, the question wasn’t whether you were German (nationality) but rather whether you were germanic, and therefore part of Das Volk. To this end, he promoted what he perceived to be germanic organizations in hosts of countries. Holland, Sweden and France had affiliated groups; Italy and Spain were governed by similarly-driven values. Norway would learn (think Quisling) it was not safe. The British had the the British Union of Fascists (think Moseley, and – once again – a Mitford girl); the US had the Bundt. All were sideblows of the twisted, illogical Hitler-based values which are part of Mein Kampf.
Nationality was not the issue. It was cultural affinity that was the key to Hitler’s argument. Volk. Kulture.
Okay, too much chat.Hope I’ve offered some points worth discussing.
Cheers
Brian G
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"We have met the enemy, and he is us." Walt Kelly.
"The Best Things in Life Aren't Things" Bumper sticker.
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Phil Andrade
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Quote:
edit: just a note, Hitler demanded the Sudetenland and all the ethnic Germans there be returned to Germany, fact was the German speaking inhabitants of the Sudetenland were never part of Germany they were part of Austria.
vpatrick
Vin,
Hitler himself was Austrian, and he had already absorbed Austria into the Reich by his Anschluss earlier in 1938. As Brian emphasises, Hitler saw ties of race, blood and culture as the defining characteristic of his territorial ambitions.
Forgive me for repeating points you’ve already made, Brian. They’re so important that they merit repetition.
Another edit: isn’t it remarkable that three of the great dictators of modern times were , in a sense, “ outsiders “ ? Napoleon Buonaparte was Corsican, Hitler was Austrian, and Stalin was a Georgian .
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Brian Grafton
Victoria
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Posts: 4718
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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George, for the most part I agree. The buzz of hyper-patriotism which swamped so many nations in WW1 was distinctly lacking. But I wonder about much of the motivation which led men to sign up.
Barry Broadfoot, in either his Ten Lost Years or Six War Years talks at some length about the temptations of good boots and a warm bunk playing a major role in many men’s decisions.
My father was a labourer in 1939, still working for daily hire where he could. He was married, and had a son just 1 year old, yet he volunteered. He was rejected (minor heart issues); his older bother, a bachelor, signed up; his younger brother, also a bachelor, did not volunteer and never served. Not one of them ever talked – to me at least – about what motivated them, whether they regretted their actions, or anything else.
There may, of course, have been a distinction between Central and Western economics in 1939, and Broadfoot’s focus was IIRC the western provinces. But I don’t think we can ignore economic necessity as a driver for enlistment.
Cheers
Brian G
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"We have met the enemy, and he is us." Walt Kelly.
"The Best Things in Life Aren't Things" Bumper sticker.
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kaii
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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This is a very good and interesting thread Vince thanks for starting it. And thanks to Brian, George and Phil for weighing in with very good points.
It is always difficult to evaluate what would and could have happened, and how the Czechoslovak army would have fought, had the Germans invaded.
In general the Czechoslovak army was highly regarded at the time, for instance possessing a considerable armoured force that other countries, like Poland did not quite have. Most of this would fall into German hands and pressed into service as the Czech 38 tank in the early days of the war.
Having done some work on the Czechoslovak exile units of ww2 (article here on MHO) it is my impression that those soldiers and officers that served in the Czech army before the war were convinced that they could and would have stopped any German attempt to invade in 1938/39 had they been allowed to keep Sudetenland. Losing Sudetenland meant losing all their fortifications and mountain passes and despite a sizeable armoured force the Czech army was not designed to defend in the lowlands. I firmly believe the Czechs would have fought at least as hard as the Poles. Remember the traditions of the Czech legion that fought its way through Russia/Soviet union in ww1 and the military traditions were definitely there.
I am not sure how relevant the past of being part of Austria-Hungary is in this case. There were as far as I know no major ethnic disagreements between Czechs and Slovaks, although Czechs in general were probably richer and from a more industrialised part of the country. Noteworthy is of course also that Slovakia became a vassal state actively supporting Germany after the occupation, whereas Czechia had an active resistance movement (think Reynhard Heydrich...) throughout the war, and large exile forces that fought very well in France, the Middle East and on the western front from 1944.
Not sure that made much sense, but my point was that I believe the Germans would not have dared to invade Czechoslovakia in 1938, had the Sudetenland plan failed.
Interestingly, a few strategic war games have been made about Fall Grün (Case Green, the planned German invasion). Having played a few, they show that an invasion would have been very tough indeed for the Germans. However, games like that generally assume the Czechs would have fought to their full ability, of course.
On the topic of why the western powers gave in, we really don't have to go farther than to the current Russian invasion of Ukraine. there is no lack of voices in the west arguing that territory should be transferred to Russia to avoid a third world war. Same basic flawed thought process. Western politicians had no stomach for war, and wanted to believe that Hitler was a rational man that would standby his word that if he got Sudetenland, he would have no further territorial claims in Europe. Once you desperately want something to be true, you can easily start to believe it is, and you will grab at any straw. Dictators do not have that same problem since they largely create the events....until they suddenly don't anymore.
K
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George
Centre Hastings
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Quote: George, for the most part I agree. The buzz of hyper-patriotism which swamped so many nations in WW1 was distinctly lacking. But I wonder about much of the motivation which led men to sign up.
Barry Broadfoot, in either his Ten Lost Years or Six War Years talks at some length about the temptations of good boots and a warm bunk playing a major role in many men’s decisions.
My father was a labourer in 1939, still working for daily hire where he could. He was married, and had a son just 1 year old, yet he volunteered. He was rejected (minor heart issues); his older bother, a bachelor, signed up; his younger brother, also a bachelor, did not volunteer and never served. Not one of them ever talked – to me at least – about what motivated them, whether they regretted their actions, or anything else.
There may, of course, have been a distinction between Central and Western economics in 1939, and Broadfoot’s focus was IIRC the western provinces. But I don’t think we can ignore economic necessity as a driver for enlistment.
Cheers
Brian G
Hi Brian,
I enjoyed both of Broadfoot's books. I believe that the stories that recounted the reasons that people enlisted were in the Six War Years. And many of those who recounted their stories seemed to have practical reasons for their enlistment. I recall one fellow saying that he and his brothers lived on a hard scrabble farm out west and none of them had boots to wear. One brother walked to the nearest enlistment centre barefoot and signed up. He came home wearing a pair of boots and a uniform. Brother number two donned the boots and headed to town to get his boots and so on. Four brothers enlisted and all for the chance to get a pair of boots. Sounds far fetched but apparently a true story.
There were also four brothers in my Dad's family. The two eldest were already in the militia and were activated quickly when the war started. My Dad, number three, was anxious to get into it, just like his brothers. Born in 1922, he turned 18 in 1940 and into the army he went. Brother number four turned 18 a year or so later and he joined the air force when he turned 18, sometime in 1941 I believe. So they were all in but I am not sure what motivated them. It could be that the older brothers set the tone for the family. I never heard any talk of duty to the King and Empire from my father and his younger brother when I was young.
Cheers,
George
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vpatrick
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Quote: This is a very good and interesting thread Vince thanks for starting it. And thanks to Brian, George and Phil for weighing in with very good points.
It is always difficult to evaluate what would and could have happened, and how the Czechoslovak army would have fought, had the Germans invaded.
In general the Czechoslovak army was highly regarded at the time, for instance possessing a considerable armoured force that other countries, like Poland did not quite have. Most of this would fall into German hands and pressed into service as the Czech 38 tank in the early days of the war.
Having done some work on the Czechoslovak exile units of ww2 (article here on MHO) it is my impression that those soldiers and officers that served in the Czech army before the war were convinced that they could and would have stopped any German attempt to invade in 1938/39 had they been allowed to keep Sudetenland. Losing Sudetenland meant losing all their fortifications and mountain passes and despite a sizeable armoured force the Czech army was not designed to defend in the lowlands. I firmly believe the Czechs would have fought at least as hard as the Poles. Remember the traditions of the Czech legion that fought its way through Russia/Soviet union in ww1 and the military traditions were definitely there.
I am not sure how relevant the past of being part of Austria-Hungary is in this case. There were as far as I know no major ethnic disagreements between Czechs and Slovaks, although Czechs in general were probably richer and from a more industrialised part of the country. Noteworthy is of course also that Slovakia became a vassal state actively supporting Germany after the occupation, whereas Czechia had an active resistance movement (think Reynhard Heydrich...) throughout the war, and large exile forces that fought very well in France, the Middle East and on the western front from 1944.
Not sure that made much sense, but my point was that I believe the Germans would not have dared to invade Czechoslovakia in 1938, had the Sudetenland plan failed.
Interestingly, a few strategic war games have been made about Fall Grün (Case Green, the planned German invasion). Having played a few, they show that an invasion would have been very tough indeed for the Germans. However, games like that generally assume the Czechs would have fought to their full ability, of course.
On the topic of why the western powers gave in, we really don't have to go farther than to the current Russian invasion of Ukraine. there is no lack of voices in the west arguing that territory should be transferred to Russia to avoid a third world war. Same basic flawed thought process. Western politicians had no stomach for war, and wanted to believe that Hitler was a rational man that would standby his word that if he got Sudetenland, he would have no further territorial claims in Europe. Once you desperately want something to be true, you can easily start to believe it is, and you will grab at any straw. Dictators do not have that same problem since they largely create the events....until they suddenly don't anymore.
K
Thanks Kaii,
A great analysis concerning the morale of Czechslovak troops never read anything that gave me the insight you did. So many moving parts concerning The Munich agreement, my simple comments was it seemed like a poker game, Hitler was clearly bluffing, Chamberlain seemed to have never played the game but wanted a silly fair outcome to keep the peace, Daladier wanted to challenge the bluff but his people were telling him to fold and let Chamberlain lead, Mussolini was shouting that Hitler isnt bluffing, Stalin was not offered a seat at the table as was Czechoslovakia and Poland and Hungary were cheering on Hitler, because they were offered a small part of Hitler's pot with heavy ramifications.
One note; pressure was also pilled on by both Hungary and Poland because both countries wanted a piece of Czechoslovakia this may also been a reason why Czechoslovakia felt the futility of fight as they were surrounded three front war may have been impossible even for Czechoslovakia's 35 divisions especially after being abandoned by the French and the Brits. Poland's pre-war actions are head scratcher since after Czech crisis was resolved it seemed evident to most the Danzig corridor was Hitlers next play and Poland was surly going to be next on the list which it was.
Lastly your comments on the current situation in Ukraine is something I think about too and I think the west still today have leaders in place making decisions that have no business making them, but now we are inserting the nuclear element into the discussion which scares the shit out of the populace and its hard for me to be a critic of the folks in the US supporting the war and those that want to end funding the war in my country, I am just confused, scared if we go too far one way we will lose the planet, and if we dont go far enough Ukraine will cease to exist. I realize I am not smart enough or have the information I need to form a resolute decision. I wonder though after almost two years of War in Ukraine and witnessing the complete folly of the war and how it has backfired on Russia, (more Nato members on Russia's border and the viewing of the real shit capability of Russia's conventional forces that Putin is indeed a madman like Hitler, meaning Putin like Hitler does not seem know when to quit, is waiting out the Allies to infight a successful strategy?, ask Hitler how that went, and maybe the West will with its support but at what cost to Russia? seems like the strategy of a madman? ) a nuclear armed madman.. very scary? Chamberlain would have offered France if Hitler had Nukes (if it was possible and maybe half the British Empire as well). The cost benefit analysis of continuing this war for Putin does not make sense, even if he gets Ukraine or parts of it the cost seems excessive as has has shown his cards and his conventional military machine has been punched in the face and will take a decade at least for them to recover.
Probably just derailed the thread but History does tend to repeat itself and its beyond frustrating to see the same patterns and the lessons learned in history completely lost on current leaders and the people they lead.
vpatrick
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Brian Grafton
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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I think Kai’s comments on similarities between Hitler’s threats over Sudeten Czechoslovakia and Putin’s military actions against Ukraine are worth some exploration. It scares me how many parallels there are, though I see major differences as well. But I think we either have to discuss the Czech crisis or the Ukraine crisis. We can’t do both, IMHO, without distorting to some extent both historical events in a search for parallels, and maybe breaching many of the MHO’s new (if largely unwritten) protocols on subjects which become verboten.
There are some issues I see as worth discussing, at least two of which are raised in Kai’s comments:
• Was Czechoslovakia a nation united in more than name?
That sounds arrogant, perhaps, and echoes at least to some extent the current questions of Ukrainian unity. At issue, IMHO, is the fact that Czechoslovakia was, IIUC, a nation created by committee. Parts of the A-H Empire were linked as a new nation under authority of the Versailles Treaty. Germany and the A-H empire, as losers, lost most; and the erstwhile Kingdom of Bohemia – largely German-speaking and surrounded on three sides by Bavaria, Saxony and Prussia. – was still a majority German-speaking area in 1938. This is the location of the Sudetenland. It had been part of Czechoslovakia for the 20 years only since the end of WW1. Would German-speakers feel drawn to a antiunion in which they would be a minority, particularly under the German propaganda programs of the late 30s which suggested German culture was being destroyed by the Czechs?
• What, exactly, was at issue that was “solved” by the Munich Pact?
My understanding is that the agreement applied only to the Sudeten, not to all of Czechoslovakia. Hitler was fully prepared to state this was his “last claim in Europe”, brushing off the lie as diplomacy. Britain and France, having signed a complex series of treaties and agreements to support each other’s commitments in times of aggression, found sufficient means to convince themselves that handing a part of a nation to an aggressive Germany was not a violation of Czech sovereignty as their treaty commitments might be understood. Another convenient lie, decided without representation from the Czech; it was after all only a part of their sovereign land that was being abandoned by Britain and France. Kai notes, “… it is my impression that those soldiers and officers that served in the Czech army before the war were convinced that they could and would have stopped any German attempt to invade in 1938/39 had they been allowed to keep Sudetenland. Losing Sudetenland meant losing all their fortifications and mountain passes and despite a sizeable armoured force the Czech army was not designed to defend in the lowlands.” But that is precisely what Chamberlain and Deladier ceded to Hitler.
• What was the threat Britain and France posed to Germany?
In truth, nobody seems to talk about that. Czechoslovakia was as far from Britain and France as Poland, and we all know how much assistance Poland received when war came in 1939, for very much the same kind of reason (this time it was access to Danzig, a German-speaking city determined to be an international city by the League). This time Hitler could be bolder; this time his eastern borders were not a threat.
We know how the Phoney War developed (Sept 1939-April 1940). There is no reason to assume that is what would have happened had Munich not been signed.
• What role did Mussolini play at Munich?
None that I can see. But both France and Britain were overly concerned about Italy’s influence and potential power in the Med, particularly since Italy’s defiance of he League when they attacked Ethiopia and their growing influence in Spain during the Spanish Civil War. I sense Mussolini was the club Hitler didn’t have to use; he carried it as a big stick while he conned Britain and France with feigned diplomacy.
There are other issues as well, but maybe they can wait to another post. I think Kai gives a wonderful theoretical distinction between Democracies and oligarchies/ditctatorships. But I’m not convinced that folks like Chamberlain and/or Deladier truly represented their electorte. In truth, I don’t know whether the majority of Chamberlain’s electorate was informed about his actions, or about what issues were involved. But, as I say, that’s probably not totally germane here.
Cheers
Brian G
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"We have met the enemy, and he is us." Walt Kelly.
"The Best Things in Life Aren't Things" Bumper sticker.
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kaii
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Quote: I think Kai’s comments on similarities between Hitler’s threats over Sudeten Czechoslovakia and Putin’s military actions against Ukraine are worth some exploration. It scares me how many parallels there are, though I see major differences as well. But I think we either have to discuss the Czech crisis or the Ukraine crisis. We can’t do both, IMHO, without distorting to some extent both historical events in a search for parallels, and maybe breaching many of the MHO’s new (if largely unwritten) protocols on subjects which become verboten.
There are some issues I see as worth discussing, at least two of which are raised in Kai’s comments:
• Was Czechoslovakia a nation united in more than name?
That sounds arrogant, perhaps, and echoes at least to some extent the current questions of Ukrainian unity. At issue, IMHO, is the fact that Czechoslovakia was, IIUC, a nation created by committee. Parts of the A-H Empire were linked as a new nation under authority of the Versailles Treaty. Germany and the A-H empire, as losers, lost most; and the erstwhile Kingdom of Bohemia – largely German-speaking and surrounded on three sides by Bavaria, Saxony and Prussia. – was still a majority German-speaking area in 1938. This is the location of the Sudetenland. It had been part of Czechoslovakia for the 20 years only since the end of WW1. Would German-speakers feel drawn to a antiunion in which they would be a minority, particularly under the German propaganda programs of the late 30s which suggested German culture was being destroyed by the Czechs?
• What, exactly, was at issue that was “solved” by the Munich Pact?
My understanding is that the agreement applied only to the Sudeten, not to all of Czechoslovakia. Hitler was fully prepared to state this was his “last claim in Europe”, brushing off the lie as diplomacy. Britain and France, having signed a complex series of treaties and agreements to support each other’s commitments in times of aggression, found sufficient means to convince themselves that handing a part of a nation to an aggressive Germany was not a violation of Czech sovereignty as their treaty commitments might be understood. Another convenient lie, decided without representation from the Czech; it was after all only a part of their sovereign land that was being abandoned by Britain and France. Kai notes, “… it is my impression that those soldiers and officers that served in the Czech army before the war were convinced that they could and would have stopped any German attempt to invade in 1938/39 had they been allowed to keep Sudetenland. Losing Sudetenland meant losing all their fortifications and mountain passes and despite a sizeable armoured force the Czech army was not designed to defend in the lowlands.” But that is precisely what Chamberlain and Deladier ceded to Hitler.
• What was the threat Britain and France posed to Germany?
In truth, nobody seems to talk about that. Czechoslovakia was as far from Britain and France as Poland, and we all know how much assistance Poland received when war came in 1939, for very much the same kind of reason (this time it was access to Danzig, a German-speaking city determined to be an international city by the League). This time Hitler could be bolder; this time his eastern borders were not a threat.
We know how the Phoney War developed (Sept 1939-April 1940). There is no reason to assume that is what would have happened had Munich not been signed.
• What role did Mussolini play at Munich?
None that I can see. But both France and Britain were overly concerned about Italy’s influence and potential power in the Med, particularly since Italy’s defiance of he League when they attacked Ethiopia and their growing influence in Spain during the Spanish Civil War. I sense Mussolini was the club Hitler didn’t have to use; he carried it as a big stick while he conned Britain and France with feigned diplomacy.
There are other issues as well, but maybe they can wait to another post. I think Kai gives a wonderful theoretical distinction between Democracies and oligarchies/ditctatorships. But I’m not convinced that folks like Chamberlain and/or Deladier truly represented their electorte. In truth, I don’t know whether the majority of Chamberlain’s electorate was informed about his actions, or about what issues were involved. But, as I say, that’s probably not totally germane here.
Cheers
Brian G
Good post Brian, and I agree let's stick to Czech 38/39 in this post.
I agree with everything you have written here (especially the parts where you quote me :-)).
One might add, as you also touch onto in the end - that the democracies of 1938 were perhaps not quite what we see asdemocracies today- the Munich agreement did follow in a long tradition of Real politik, where the major powers in the European balanceof power would cut and dice the smaller nations as they saw fit tomaintain the balance of power, and did not really see the need to consult the targets of their dicing and cutting. Chamberlain and Daladier only did what their predecessors had been doing for centuries by moving around bits of land between the major powers to keep the balance of power intact. In fact, I would even argue that this kind if "decisiveness" would be part of what the description of a "true statesman"would loook like in the 30's. Does not make it "better" or "smarter" seen from today, but perhaps more understandable seen from the time of the events. As you say, Czechoslovakia was created by the same powers only twenty years before, so essentially one could say they were just correcting a mistake in the first place....
K
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Markus Becker
Westphalia
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Quote:
Having done some work on the Czechoslovak exile units of ww2 (article here on MHO) it is my impression that those soldiers and officers that served in the Czech army before the war were convinced that they could and would have stopped any German attempt to invade in 1938/39 had they been allowed to keep Sudetenland. Losing Sudetenland meant losing all their fortifications and mountain passes and despite a sizeable armoured force the Czech army was not designed to defend in the lowlands. I firmly believe the Czechs would have fought at least as hard as the Poles. Remember the traditions of the Czech legion that fought its way through Russia/Soviet union in ww1 and the military traditions were definitely there.
So did the Wehrmacht after they got to see what and how much they had.
The Czechoslovakian military had been in continuous existence since 1919. It was fully trained an equipped.
The German army and military industrial complex were almost totally dismantled after the Great War and the process of rebuilding didn’t get into high gear until 1935/36. Even with the massive booty from Czechoslovakia and another years time, the Wehrmacht wasn’t impressed with it’s own performance in Poland.
Perhaps the only superiority Germany had was in the air because of sheer numbers.
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vpatrick
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Quote:Quote:
Having done some work on the Czechoslovak exile units of ww2 (article here on MHO) it is my impression that those soldiers and officers that served in the Czech army before the war were convinced that they could and would have stopped any German attempt to invade in 1938/39 had they been allowed to keep Sudetenland. Losing Sudetenland meant losing all their fortifications and mountain passes and despite a sizeable armoured force the Czech army was not designed to defend in the lowlands. I firmly believe the Czechs would have fought at least as hard as the Poles. Remember the traditions of the Czech legion that fought its way through Russia/Soviet union in ww1 and the military traditions were definitely there.
Thanks Markus So did the Wehrmacht after they got to see what and how much they had. The Czechoslovakian military had been in continuous existence since 1919. It was fully trained an equipped. The German army and military industrial complex were almost totally dismantled after the Great War and the process of rebuilding didn’t get into high gear until 1935/36. Even with the massive booty from Czechoslovakia and another years time, the Wehrmacht wasn’t impressed with it’s own performance in Poland. Perhaps the only superiority Germany had was in the air because of sheer numbers.
This is what I dont get the Germans knew they would have a tough time in Czechoslovakia and were clearly bluffing the entire time, it seems hard to believe that French/English intelligence did not know that the Germans would face slaughter if they tried the Czech defenses in the Sudetenland. I briefly read that some British leaders looked down on Czechoslovakia and its 20 year existence and was the cause of German angst so why go to war over it. Brian G. may have hit on this if Im repeating sorry.
This is a weird aside but I wonder if the British took Hitler seriously, Did Chamberlain a British aristocrat respect Hitler? A peasant Austrian corporal, maybe he deemed Hitler's bluster as the rantings of a populist leader, turned dictator as the rantings of a charlatan who was using nationalism to unite his country and secure his powerbase and nothing more and in 1938 did not have the capability to wage war. War seemed far fetched and so out of the question after WW1 that produced such slaughter that it was laughable that any leader would want to revisit such carnage and the 20 year old Czechoslovakia was just a lamb of no consequence and Chamberlain maybe was indeed sure when he waved that piece of paper that there would be peace in his time not a big price to pay for a made up 20 year old country. Little did Chamberlain know he just let WW2 happen.
Hard to be a Monday morning quarterback on Chamberlain he meant well who could have envisioned a Hitler?
vpatrick
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DT509er
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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The handing over of Czechoslovakia was a result of peace at any cost. My questions is, was there any combat resistance by any Czechoslovakian soldiers?
Dan
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"American parachutists-devils in baggy pants..." German officer, Italy 1944.
“If your experiment needs statistics, you ought to have done a better experiment.” Lord Ernest Rutherford
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Brian Grafton
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Markus, I seem to remember your name from many years ago. Welcome back.
You say: “… The German army and military industrial complex were almost totally dismantled after the Great War and the process of rebuilding didn’t get into high gear until 1935/36. Even with the massive booty from Czechoslovakia and another years time, the Wehrmacht wasn’t impressed with it’s own performance in Poland.
Perhaps the only superiority Germany had was in the air because of sheer numbers. …”.
You’re right about this. Let me add, if I may, some vaguely remembered numbers (hope I’m not too far off with these). IIRC, when the Nazis came to power in 1933 the Germany Army was still capped in numbers and equipment. I believe there were 40,000 members of the Army and equipment capable of “maintaining civil peace”. At the same time, however, I believe the Nazi SA alone had about ten times the number of members (i.e., 400,000) committed to the Nazi cause. They were radical and increasingly undisciplined, which eventually led Hitler to active “The Night of the Long Knives”. But many of the rank-and-file SA found a home in the Workers’ Brigades, Hitler’s army in potens. I think of Leni Rieffenstahl’s Triumf Des Willen, with all those men from all over the Reich, shouldering their shovels like rifles and chanting their allegiance. Hitler had a large body of “workers” who were ready to spring “full grown” onto the landscape when Hitler decreed. They were trained, fit and avid believers. It only took mating them with weapons to make them effective, and that did take time.
While Germany was denied an army that was more than a civil peace-keeping organization, it was prohibited an air force while being allowed to develop civilian aviation. Germany built a complex civilian air system (think early Lufthansa), which included developing means of navigating, landing and taking off at night. Incidentally (of course), many of these techniques would aid the Luftwaffe bomber arm in their assault on Britain, just as at least some of a/c such as the Ju 52/3 (a passenger liner) and the Do-17 (a mail carrier) were adaptable as troop carrier and bomber respectively. The Luftwaffe was officially announced in 1937, but – again – it had a large pool of skilled airmen prepared to join the new force. Lufthansa had trained pilots in multi-engined a/c and in disciplined flying by day or night; the popularity of gliding across Germany prior to 1937, together with some powered facilities located in Russia, provided fighter pilots with huge numbers of hours behind them as the new fighter craft began to roll off the line. And, of course, the Kondor Legion of the Spanish Civil War allowed the Luftwaffe to hone their skills and techniques in combat conditions.
What I don’t know is how fully the Germans had advanced in developing their combined-arms attacks. Seems to me that even in Poland the technique (the west, at least, called it Blitzkrieg) was not fully integrated.
The numbers, of course, can be played with over and over. And, IIRC, the military can be ignored. I don’t think a Czech invasion was ever supported by the German High Command of the time. Nevertheless, I believe Hitler was fully prepared to attack if required. I’ve never seen a depiction of troops (Kai, have you got one up your sleeve?), but assume there were German forces lurking on three sides of the Czech western region.
As it happened, Hitler didn’t need to activate his troops. A Brit and a Frenchman made his life easier, while at the same time making Nazi Germany seem more formidable. The Czechs didn’t get a chance to demonstrate their military capability, because their government accepted the decisions made at a conference to which they were forbidden.
Cheers
Brian G
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"We have met the enemy, and he is us." Walt Kelly.
"The Best Things in Life Aren't Things" Bumper sticker.
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MikeMeech
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Quote: Markus, I seem to remember your name from many years ago. Welcome back.
You say: “… The German army and military industrial complex were almost totally dismantled after the Great War and the process of rebuilding didn’t get into high gear until 1935/36. Even with the massive booty from Czechoslovakia and another years time, the Wehrmacht wasn’t impressed with it’s own performance in Poland.
Perhaps the only superiority Germany had was in the air because of sheer numbers. …”.
You’re right about this. Let me add, if I may, some vaguely remembered numbers (hope I’m not too far off with these). IIRC, when the Nazis came to power in 1933 the Germany Army was still capped in numbers and equipment. I believe there were 40,000 members of the Army and equipment capable of “maintaining civil peace”. At the same time, however, I believe the Nazi SA alone had about ten times the number of members (i.e., 400,000) committed to the Nazi cause. They were radical and increasingly undisciplined, which eventually led Hitler to active “The Night of the Long Knives”. But many of the rank-and-file SA found a home in the Workers’ Brigades, Hitler’s army in potens. I think of Leni Rieffenstahl’s Triumf Des Willen, with all those men from all over the Reich, shouldering their shovels like rifles and chanting their allegiance. Hitler had a large body of “workers” who were ready to spring “full grown” onto the landscape when Hitler decreed. They were trained, fit and avid believers. It only took mating them with weapons to make them effective, and that did take time.
While Germany was denied an army that was more than a civil peace-keeping organization, it was prohibited an air force while being allowed to develop civilian aviation. Germany built a complex civilian air system (think early Lufthansa), which included developing means of navigating, landing and taking off at night. Incidentally (of course), many of these techniques would aid the Luftwaffe bomber arm in their assault on Britain, just as at least some of a/c such as the Ju 52/3 (a passenger liner) and the Do-17 (a mail carrier) were adaptable as troop carrier and bomber respectively. The Luftwaffe was officially announced in 1937, but – again – it had a large pool of skilled airmen prepared to join the new force. Lufthansa had trained pilots in multi-engined a/c and in disciplined flying by day or night; the popularity of gliding across Germany prior to 1937, together with some powered facilities located in Russia, provided fighter pilots with huge numbers of hours behind them as the new fighter craft began to roll off the line. And, of course, the Kondor Legion of the Spanish Civil War allowed the Luftwaffe to hone their skills and techniques in combat conditions.
What I don’t know is how fully the Germans had advanced in developing their combined-arms attacks. Seems to me that even in Poland the technique (the west, at least, called it Blitzkrieg) was not fully integrated.
The numbers, of course, can be played with over and over. And, IIRC, the military can be ignored. I don’t think a Czech invasion was ever supported by the German High Command of the time. Nevertheless, I believe Hitler was fully prepared to attack if required. I’ve never seen a depiction of troops (Kai, have you got one up your sleeve?), but assume there were German forces lurking on three sides of the Czech western region.
As it happened, Hitler didn’t need to activate his troops. A Brit and a Frenchman made his life easier, while at the same time making Nazi Germany seem more formidable. The Czechs didn’t get a chance to demonstrate their military capability, because their government accepted the decisions made at a conference to which they were forbidden.
Cheers
Brian G
Hi
The Luftwaffe was announced to the world in March 1935, with a strength of 1,888 aircraft of all types and 20,000 officers and men. The British had already in 1934 started to consider re-orientation of the air defence system to face Germany, the areas considered at threat from German bombers were the north-east coast, West-Riding of Yorkshire, whole of Lancashire, the industrial Midlands as well as Greater London, all these were within 375 miles of the North Sea coast of Germany. It was also suspected that the Germans would use Belgian and Dutch air space to make attacks. The air defence system was planed to stretch from Portsmouth to the Tees. Of course 1935 into 1936 was a problematic year as the UK had to send forces to the Med due to the tensions with Italy. It was also during this period that the the RAF cancelled the Sound detection system update (which had started) and were going to rely on RDF instead. It should be remembered that the first air attacks on the UK in 1939 were made by German bombers on the Firth of Forth and Scapa Flow showing they could reach targets in Britain from Germany, although without fighter escort. As at 1st August, 1938 the Luftwaffe had an establishment of 3,714 aircraft although the strength was 2,928 with 1,669 serviceable, for the main bombers the figures were 1,409/1,157/582. In 1938 it was expected that any air attack would use HE, incendiary and poison gas bombs against the civilian population, which is why during 1938 civilian gas masks were issued and other precautions taken. There were also arguments over deep shelters and surface shelters as to which would be best, deep shelters could suffer from an accumulation of gas due to it being heavier than air which would cause problems to those civilians in the shelter. These fears were real (around much of Europe) probably there were less concerns about this form of attack in North America due to being out of range of any air assailant, but it was a great fear in Britain which should be taken into account during Munich along with the fact they remembered the German air attacks of WW1.
Mike
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Brian Grafton
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Thanks, Mike, for the corrections and additional information.
Cheers
Brian G
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"We have met the enemy, and he is us." Walt Kelly.
"The Best Things in Life Aren't Things" Bumper sticker.
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Markus Becker
Westphalia
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Quote:
This is what I dont get the Germans knew they would have a tough time in Czechoslovakia and were clearly bluffing the entire time, it seems hard to believe that French/English intelligence did not know that the Germans would face slaughter if they tried the Czech defenses in the Sudetenland. I briefly read that some British leaders looked down on Czechoslovakia and its 20 year existence and was the cause of German angst so why go to war over it. Brian G. may have hit on this if Im repeating sorry.
I am very surprised the Allies overestimated the German military this much. The post WW1 disarmament was closely supervised by a control commission that was snooping around all over Germany until sometime in the late 1920s. Germany did manage to hide several division’s worth of weapons but no factories and more important men. All the WW1 veterans who were still of military age in 1933 had not gotten any reserve training for at least 10 years, the men who came of age after 1918 were never drafted in the first place until 1935. So by 1938 Germany had rusty veterans the youngest were close to 40. That’s secondary reserve age. And OFC plenty of untrained ones.
It must have been the Luftwaffe that deterred them. Bombardment from the air was feared a lot, Germany had a decent number of aircraft and exaggerated their performance.
WRT armoured vehicle production in Czech factories. That were the LT-35 and especially the LT-38 that was also the basis for the Czech made Marder III and “Hetzer” tank destroyers.
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kaii
Oslo
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Quote: . I don’t think a Czech invasion was ever supported by the German High Command of the time. Nevertheless, I believe Hitler was fully prepared to attack if required. I’ve never seen a depiction of troops (Kai, have you got one up your sleeve?), but assume there were German forces lurking on three sides of the Czech western region.
Cheers
Brian G
I should have an overview with some graphics somewhere. I will try to find it.
K
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Markus Becker
Westphalia
Germany
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Posts: 58
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Here's something with a map:
http://www.fortif.net/files/overview.php
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Michigan Dave
Muskegon
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Quote:
Not getting the map?
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"The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract."
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Markus Becker
Westphalia
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Czechoslovakia 1938
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Here's a different link.
https://i.postimg.cc/5ygfRFPh/republika.jpg
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