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Larry Purtell
Little Meadows
PA USA
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Posts: 1739
Joined: 2004
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July 29, 1861
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"My goal is to live forever. So far, so good.
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DT509er
Santa Rosa
CA USA
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Posts: 1442
Joined: 2005
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July 29, 1861
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Good morning to all. I am trying to gain a better understanding of General Robert Pattersons (?) failure leading up to Bull Run, does anyone have an available analysis or reading of his role and actions he failed to accomplish?
Dan
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"American parachutists-devils in baggy pants..." German officer, Italy 1944.
“If your experiment needs statistics, you ought to have done a better experiment.” Lord Ernest Rutherford
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morris crumley
Dunwoody
GA USA
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Posts: 3292
Joined: 2007
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July 29, 1861
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Dan, General Irwin McDowell was given command of the army in Washington, about 39,000 men. Despite the fact that many of his soldiers were raw recruits, lacked enough training and discipline, his superiors were demanding an "on to Richmond" movement to capture Beauregard`s force near Bull Run. Beauregard had about 21,000 men there to defend the Manassas railroad junction. Johnston commanded a smaller force of about 11,000 guarding Harper's Ferry and McDowell wanted Patterson, with 18,000 men, to seize Harper`s Ferry and push Johnston`s army back to Winchester and maintain enough pressure on Johnston to prevent him from re-enforcing Beauregard. It was imperative to Beauregard to bring all his scattered forces together if they had a chance to stop McDowell.
On July 18, the Confederate government allowed Johnston to withdraw from Winchester to join forces with Beauregard. Utilizing a cavalry screen to deceive Patterson and hold him in place, Johnston marched his men to Piedmont where they began boarding trains of the Manassas Gap RR. and while the effort over-taxed the RR, he got only two fifths of his command to Bull Run, but it was enough.
General Patterson failed in his assignment to prevent Johnston from joining Beauregard and became THE scapegoat. But, McDowell`s slow advance from the beginning, stopping for several days at Fairfax Court House on July 17 was problematic. He sent Tyler`s command to probe the Confederate flank where he blundered into a loosing effort at Blackburn`s Ford against Longstreet. McDowell finally ordered his attack along Bull Run to begin at dawn on 21 July, but the errors were many. Tyler, even blocking the movements of the units trying to make a march on the enemy`s flank at Sudley Springs , and he was to demonstrate to mask the flanking movement. His "demonstration" was so weak, it was believed by Col Nathan Evans to be a ruse, and a young Confederate officer, E P Alexander saw telltale evidence to the west that the enemy was flanking and signaled Johnston of the danger.
When all was said and done, the battle was won by Johnston and Beauregard, and McDowell`s "on to Richmond boys" became known for "the great skeedaddle.'
The blame belonged to many. The men who forced action on McDowell when his men were not ready. McDowell for being too slow when speed was needed. Patterson for not keeping Johnston out of the main fight. Tyler for constant screw-ups.
But, Patterson was the main scapegoat.
Respects, Morris
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"You are a $70, red-wool, pure quill military genius, or the biggest damn fool in northern Mexico."
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DT509er
Santa Rosa
CA USA
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Posts: 1442
Joined: 2005
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July 29, 1861
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Quote: Dan, General Irwin McDowell was given command of the army in Washington, about 39,000 men. Despite the fact that many of his soldiers were raw recruits, lacked enough training and discipline, his superiors were demanding an "on to Richmond" movement to capture Beauregard`s force near Bull Run. Beauregard had about 21,000 men there to defend the Manassas railroad junction. Johnston commanded a smaller force of about 11,000 guarding Harper's Ferry and McDowell wanted Patterson, with 18,000 men, to seize Harper`s Ferry and push Johnston`s army back to Winchester and maintain enough pressure on Johnston to prevent him from re-enforcing Beauregard. It was imperative to Beauregard to bring all his scattered forces together if they had a chance to stop McDowell.
On July 18, the Confederate government allowed Johnston to withdraw from Winchester to join forces with Beauregard. Utilizing a cavalry screen to deceive Patterson and hold him in place, Johnston marched his men to Piedmont where they began boarding trains of the Manassas Gap RR. and while the effort over-taxed the RR, he got only two fifths of his command to Bull Run, but it was enough.
General Patterson failed in his assignment to prevent Johnston from joining Beauregard and became THE scapegoat. But, McDowell`s slow advance from the beginning, stopping for several days at Fairfax Court House on July 17 was problematic. He sent Tyler`s command to probe the Confederate flank where he blundered into a loosing effort at Blackburn`s Ford against Longstreet. McDowell finally ordered his attack along Bull Run to begin at dawn on 21 July, but the errors were many. Tyler, even blocking the movements of the units trying to make a march on the enemy`s flank at Sudley Springs , and he was to demonstrate to mask the flanking movement. His "demonstration" was so weak, it was believed by Col Nathan Evans to be a ruse, and a young Confederate officer, E P Alexander saw telltale evidence to the west that the enemy was flanking and signaled Johnston of the danger.
When all was said and done, the battle was won by Johnston and Beauregard, and McDowell`s "on to Richmond boys" became known for "the great skeedaddle.'
The blame belonged to many. The men who forced action on McDowell when his men were not ready. McDowell for being too slow when speed was needed. Patterson for not keeping Johnston out of the main fight. Tyler for constant screw-ups.
But, Patterson was the main scapegoat.
Respects, Morris
Thank you for the reply Morris, it helps with what little I was able to dig up about Patterson over the weekend, the detail you provided was very helpful. As I continue to learn about this war, a question continues to pop up in my mind; how the hell did the Union ever keep the capital, D.C., from being overrun during 1861 to mid-1863!?
I'll get there soon enough with my readings and learning curve.
Dan
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"American parachutists-devils in baggy pants..." German officer, Italy 1944.
“If your experiment needs statistics, you ought to have done a better experiment.” Lord Ernest Rutherford
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scoucer
Berlin
Germany
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Posts: 3219
Joined: 2010
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July 29, 1861
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Dan,
The fortifications around Washington were formidable. This is why Lee was so disappointed that after Second Mannassas the Union Army escaped back to it. Both the Maryland and Gettysburg campaigns were intended to draw the Union Army away from Washington so they couldn´t retreat back into it´s safety.
Trevor
Ask away Dan. That´s what MHO is for.
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`Hey don´t the wars come easy and don´t the peace come hard`- Buffy Sainte-Marie
Some swim with the stream. Some swim against the stream. Me - I´m stuck somewhere in the woods and can´t even find the stupid stream.
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DT509er
Santa Rosa
CA USA
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Posts: 1442
Joined: 2005
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July 29, 1861
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Quote: Dan,
The fortifications around Washington were formidable. This is why Lee was so disappointed that after Second Mannassas the Union Army escaped back to it. Both the Maryland and Gettysburg campaigns were intended to draw the Union Army away from Washington so they couldn´t retreat back into it´s safety.
Trevor
Trevor, that the Union troops stood their ground maintaining the defensive screen demonstrates excellent control of the troops, the itch to press forward or maybe even depart must have been strong. Is it safe to assume (hindsight being the advantage here) that the Confederates could not draw the Union troops away from the D.C. area which seems to imply by 1862-ish, the Confederates were in a bad spot regardless of the victories they were achieving, and their cause was all but lost based on that defensive screen the Union maintained?
Of course, Union troop capabilities were blunted from going into Confederate territory and shutting them down as well for quite some time. I understand the war waxed and waned, western front, eastern front, north, south, etc., with troops deploying here and there either being pursued or countermarching to an area to reinforce (and I must say, these marches which seem to entail a wide swath of the war are quite remarkable).
I may be wrong in my line of thought here, and elsewhere but it is obvious the Germans learned little from this inability to kill the dragon so-to-speak during WWI & WWII and that space, time and availability, or potential of resources and the means to deliver such allowed, back to the discussion point, the Union forces to whittle the Confederates down until the deployment of its mass production and manpower, of which I suppose, the Confederates had no choice at some point other than to continue to fight on.
Dam
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"American parachutists-devils in baggy pants..." German officer, Italy 1944.
“If your experiment needs statistics, you ought to have done a better experiment.” Lord Ernest Rutherford
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scoucer
Berlin
Germany
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Posts: 3219
Joined: 2010
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July 29, 1861
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Dan,
Good questions but no easy answers. I´ll get back to you.
Trevor
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`Hey don´t the wars come easy and don´t the peace come hard`- Buffy Sainte-Marie
Some swim with the stream. Some swim against the stream. Me - I´m stuck somewhere in the woods and can´t even find the stupid stream.
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