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bchenu
Versailles
France
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Joined: 2022
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Battle of the Somme: Usual Suspects, Ideal Culprits
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Can we still find new elements concerning the battle of the Somme? It is doubtful. According to the counting carried out by Professor William Philpott in Bloody Victory published in 2009 and if we had the latest publications on the occasion of the centenary, almost a thousand books have been written on the subject. But in 2020, Dr Jonathan Boff’s book, Haig’s Enemy, took a fresh look at the conflict in general and the Somme in particular, debunking a number of established clichés. How did he succeed? He simply did not hesitate to spend a long time in Munich searching the Bavarian archives, which almost none of his peers had done before as mentioned by William Philpott who underlined the scarcity of German sources in the historiography of this battle. He made the same remark about French sources, which are nevertheless extremely rich. It must be said that the overwhelming majority of works concerning the Battle of the Somme are by Anglo-Saxon authors. With the notable exception of historians such as William Philpott, Elisabeth Greenhalgh or David Murphy who made the effort to visit the French military archives at Vincennes, these French sources have not been used. As for the very few works written by French authors, they are mainly based on the existing British bibliography. This lack of reference to French sources is reflected in the way the events of the first week of July 1916 are reported. While the battle on the British part of the front has been dissected, debated, and analysed in minute detail by scholars and historians, this is far from the case for the French sector. Yet it was in this area that the Franco-British allies achieved their best results during the first week of fighting. The French achieved a complete breakthrough of the German lines by penetrating open ground. But this breakthrough was not exploited. Why was it not exploited? It is at this level that the weakness of the use of French sources appears. Indeed, the elements provided by the few authors who have dealt with the operations on the French side seem singularly limited and the explanations put forward to explain the lack of exploitation of this first success are confusing, to say the least, when they are not downright contradictory. Moreover, they diverge from one author to another. For some, the failure of the British assault on 1 July condemned any possibility of exploitation, even though the French had obtained significant results. For others, on the contrary, the French success was too limited. The idea that the exploitation of this success would have led to a divergence in the axis of operations between the French and the British is also recurrent in certain works. In the absence of sources other than the few lines devoted by Joffre and Haig to this subject, these authors proceed by deductive reasoning. All these reasonings are in fact biased by a tenacious preconception: the undervaluation of British generals compared to their French counterparts. This is understandable given the inexperience of the British military leaders, sanctioned by the terrible losses of their assault on 1 July, in contrast to the very limited losses of the French, despite much more convincing results. Elisabeth Greenhalgh, for example, disputed the idea that there was an opportunity for victory south of the Somme – she called it a ‘legend’. She cited no sources to support this claim, as if, for her, the mere fact that Foch waited a week before attempting to exploit the French breakthrough south of the Somme and failed, was enough to show that there was no opportunity for victory. With regard to 3 July war council between Haig, Rawlinson, Joffre and Foch, the authors who talk about it included two major contradictory elements in their reasoning. First, they state that Joffre wanted to exploit success south of the river while actually Joffre didn’t say a single word about it during this meeting. Secondly, they report that Joffre was vehemently opposed to the idea of Haig limiting the resumption of his attack to the second position between Bazentin-le-petit and Longeval. Joffre wanted the British to retake the whole front, similar to their assault on 1 July. But this command was anything but adapted to the context of exploiting the French breakthrough in the south. The resumption of the British assault on the whole front required a large-scale prior bombardment and the commitment of the British divisions that had been badly shaken by the assault of 1 July. This meant a delay of fifteen days before its implementation. This delay would be incompatible with the French operation south Somme. On the contrary, Haig’s proposal was by far the most logical answer from a tactical point of view – It would neutralise the German artillery firing into the back of the French from the right bank. It could be implemented immediately with the artillery ammunition and reserve divisions still available to Haig. Joffre could not ignore this. Nevertheless, Joffre imposed to Haig his totally inconsistent decision. This inconsistency was noted by Liddell Hart. It is interesting to recall that he had the privilege of personally meeting all the military leaders involved in this battle, British, French and German, during the interwar period. The same judgement, but much more severe, was made by General de Castelnau, the Chief of the General Staff, the second in command of the French Armies. In his personal papers, we find a very detailed note of 30 July 1916 where, speaking of the three French military leaders involved, Joffre, Foch and Fayolle, he wrote about the failure to exploit the French breakthrough: ‘defective doctrine, inaccurate assessment of the comparative state of the forces involved, excessive timidity of the local command, deficiencies of the higher command’. The same severity appears in the minutes of the secret committee of 19 December 1916 where the President of the French Senate, Paul Doumer, denounced this error of the French military leaders. These two sources have never been cited in any book. Last, the memoirs of General von Lossberg, chief of staff of German Second Army on 2 July, corroborated in all points Liddell Hart and Castelnau judgments.
In preparing 1916, The Battle of the Five Empires, I was able to gather several other unpublished sources concerning the decisions taken during the first week of July 1916. They all confirm that a serious mistake was made by the French. These sources also confirm that this French mistake as well as the opportunity for a major victory were proven historical facts. They were known from the day they occurred. They were never disputed, but simply covered up. Those who committed this mistake had every interest in remaining silent. General de Castelnau and the main French politicians, for obvious reasons, had to conceal it from the enemy, from the French, but also from their British ally. Subsequently, the trace of this event was lost because of Castelnau’s silence – he did not write his memoirs and placed a total embargo on his personal papers. The lack of critical study in France of military operations in general and of the Battle of the Somme in particular adds to the fact that no one has tried to explore this episode further.
I believe that the French sources referenced in this book, 1916, the Battle of the Five Empires, could be used for academic work in Britain. Indeed, in this country, unlike France, War Studies and more generally Military History are very active fields of academic studies. Work based on these sources would allow a better understanding of the results obtained by the Franco-British forces after the assault of 1 July 1916 and the decisions that were taken on 3 July. They would challenge, in a new light, the usual clichés about the futility of the Battle of the Somme and the ineptitude of the British generals.
Benoît Chenu
Author of 1916 – The Battle of the Five Empires
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Phil Andrade
London
UK
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Posts: 6386
Joined: 2004
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Battle of the Somme: Usual Suspects, Ideal Culprits
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Welcome Benoit : forgive my failure to put the accent above the “I” in your name !
What a wonderful debut to our forum .
This is a real tour de force and I for one would wish to read it again , carefully, and try and do it justice.
It needs to be moved to the WW1 section of the forum.
We’re approaching the 106th anniversary of the end of the battle on 18 November.
A good time to reflect and reconsider our interpretations of this stupefyingly bloody affair.
Editing: it surprises me that you haven’t mentioned Jack Sheldon’s books. He certainly uses the Bavarian archives, and his historiographical contribution has been very significant. His book FIGHTING THE SOMME advocates a different view from yours . He suggests that Haig would have done better to follow Joffre’s insistence and continue his attack along the Thiepval Spur. My own opinion is that Haig was right to try and exploit success in the South, rather than reinforce failure in the North.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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scoucer
Berlin
Germany
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Posts: 3223
Joined: 2010
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Battle of the Somme: Usual Suspects, Ideal Culprits
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Welcome Benoit.
I have heard of you so let me post a video of yours so that others on the Forum know who you are. I am certainly overjoyed that you are here.
[Read More]
There is certainly so much to discuss here.
For me particularly, the mountain of new information as result of the centenary.
Once again welcome
Trevor Davies
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`Hey don´t the wars come easy and don´t the peace come hard`- Buffy Sainte-Marie
Some swim with the stream. Some swim against the stream. Me - I´m stuck somewhere in the woods and can´t even find the stupid stream.
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Phil Andrade
London
UK
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Posts: 6386
Joined: 2004
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Battle of the Somme: Usual Suspects, Ideal Culprits
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Thanks for the link , Trevor.
A superb rendition of the geo-strategic predicament of the belligerents, putting the Battle of the Somme into context.
I’m going to buy that book !
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Phil Andrade
London
UK
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Posts: 6386
Joined: 2004
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Battle of the Somme: Usual Suspects, Ideal Culprits
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Benoit ,
You ask Why was it not exploited ?
Yes, that’s the question.
Could it be that the success was so striking, so much greater than had been expected, that the French command was taken by surprise ?
Paralysis by excessive success : that’s a thought !
On that first day, the French captured perhaps twice as many prisoners as their total loss in killed and wounded. I don’t know what the figures actually were, but I’ve seen estimates of fewer than two thousand French casualties on 1 July 1916 on the Somme. The British suffered thirty times as many casualties as that, but captured fewer prisoners than the French.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Michigan Dave
Muskegon
MI USA
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Posts: 8091
Joined: 2006
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Battle of the Somme: Usual Suspects, Ideal Culprits
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Thank you Benoit, it is great to have such a WWI authority on our humble site! Please feel free to post here anytime!
Again, Thanks!
Regards,
MD
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"The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract."
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Phil Andrade
London
UK
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Posts: 6386
Joined: 2004
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Battle of the Somme: Usual Suspects, Ideal Culprits
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Today, 18th November, marks the 106th anniversary of the end of the battle.
Anyone unfortunate enough to to be in the front line there in the following days and weeks would hardly have felt that the fighting had ended. As for the conditions, they were indescribably awful.
Time for a quick recapitulation of the statistical outcome :
Casualties : British Empire, 416,000. Of these, roughly thirty percent were fatal. French: 204,000, approaching seventy thousand of whom were posted as killed or missing.
German figures indicate 437,000, of whom 165,000 were killed, missing or prisoners.
The British claimed 38,000 prisoners, the French, well over 40,000.
Enough there to reflect on.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Phil Andrade
London
UK
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Posts: 6386
Joined: 2004
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Battle of the Somme: Usual Suspects, Ideal Culprits
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True to my word, I bought this book.
It’s rather expensive.
Let me say that I’m thoroughly delighted with it.
It’s an eye opener.
It possesses a special quality : I haven’t read it properly. I open it and dip in randomly, and have found every page is absolutely captivating.
This is a real “ big picture “ account of a crucial period of that gigantic war. There’s a very revealing account of how the Italian Front impinged on fighting elsewhere.
Wholeheartedly recommended.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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