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prr
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Posts: 21
Joined: 2007
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Mobilization as a factor in World War I
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I’m thinking about mobilization as one cause of World War I. This isn’t news at all, I realize.
But it got me thinking…. What was it about WWI that made mobilization, and perhaps schedules for mobilization, so important? I mean, countries always had to mobilize for war. So why don’t people speak of the Crimean War, or the Napoleonic Wars, in the same light? Given Napoleon’s penchant for speed, and meeting up with one opponent before they could unite with others, why isn’t mobilization seen as a big issue in all these wars?
Was it industrialization, that gave a new impetus to mobilization as a factor in war? Or was it simply Russia’s mobilization that was so important (given the Schlieffen Plan, Germany had to mobilize before Russia did)? Was that why mobilization is considered such a big factor in WWI?
Some interesting thoughts on this are in Henry Kissinger's book, Diplomacy, at least in the edition I have, pp. 201-17 (Chapter 8, Into the Vortex: the Military Doomsday Machine): [Read More]
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prr
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Posts: 21
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Mobilization as a factor in World War I
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Perhaps another way of saying the same thing: If Germany had not attempted the Schlieffen Plan, but used instead Moltke's earlier plan of fighting two defensive campaigns along both the western and eastern fronts--then mobilization schedules wouldn't have mattered so much, would they have? It was only when Germany decided they had to defeat France BEFORE Russia was fully mobilized, that made mobilization such an important factor?
I'm thinking out loud here. Feel free to comment & correct any incorrect assumptions.
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Phil Andrade
London
UK
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Posts: 6387
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Mobilization as a factor in World War I
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The system of alliances made the mobilisation factor the deadly one .
Mobilisation in itself is one thing : mobilisation entailing a chain reaction of belligerents coming to each others’ aid is another.
The military plans entailed “ war by time-table “, with armies being deployed by railway systems and depending on speed to get the advantage.
A terribly toxic relationship between mass, speed of manoeuvre and treaty obligations between the powers. The Plan, as usual, being the first casualty.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Brian Grafton
Victoria
BC Canada
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Posts: 4720
Joined: 2004
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Mobilization as a factor in World War I
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Quote: I’m thinking about mobilization as one cause of World War I. This isn’t news at all, I realize.
But it got me thinking…. What was it about WWI that made mobilization, and perhaps schedules for mobilization, so important? I mean, countries always had to mobilize for war. So why don’t people speak of the Crimean War, or the Napoleonic Wars, in the same light? Given Napoleon’s penchant for speed, and meeting up with one opponent before they could unite with others, why isn’t mobilization seen as a big issue in all these wars?
Was it industrialization, that gave a new impetus to mobilization as a factor in war? Or was it simply Russia’s mobilization that was so important (given the Schlieffen Plan, Germany had to mobilize before Russia did)? Was that why mobilization is considered such a big factor in WWI?
I think I agree with Phil’s comments here, but I’m not quite sure what you mean by arguing for “mobilization as one cause of World War I”. Are you suggesting that a nation’s mobilization (as France did in the last days of peace in 1914) is in effect irreversible? Just for comparison, was the mobilization of 120,000 Russian troops along Ukraine’s border an indication of a Russian attack, or was it a fire-exercise which was used by the West as a reason to escalate tensions between Russia and the West.
What I note about Phil’s response is the inferred link between mobilization and mobility. Mobilization is, IIUC, the ability to field a huge military force, equipped and prepared for action, in as rapid a time as possible. Mobility makes that more possible and perhaps more rapid, but also immensely more complex. Add to that the increasingly sophisticated weaponry is not part of a normal citizen’s inventory, and the issue of mobilization becomes even more challenging.
Cheers,
Brian G
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"We have met the enemy, and he is us." Walt Kelly.
"The Best Things in Life Aren't Things" Bumper sticker.
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prr
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Posts: 21
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Mobilization as a factor in World War I
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No, I wouldn't say that mobilization was irreversible. Germany certainly didn't think so when they asked the Tsar to stop. It's my understanding that Russia refused to stop.
As far as how much of a factor it was, Kissinger in the chapter linked to above, says this about mobilization (p. 203):
However trivial the cause, war would be total; if its prelude involved only one neighbor, Russia should see to it that the other was drawn in. Almost grotesquely, the Russian general staff preferred to fight Germany and Austria-Hungary jointly than just one of them. A military convention carrying out Obruchev's ideas was signed on January 4, 1894. France and Russia agreed to mobilize together should any member of the Triple Alliance mobilize for any reason whatsoever. The doomsday machine was complete. Should Germany's ally, Italy mobilize against France over Savoy, for instance, Russia would have to mobilize against Germany; if Austria mobilized against Serbia, France was now obliged to mobilize against Germany. Since it was virtually certain that at some point, some nation would mobilize for some cause, it was only a matter of time before a general war broke out, for it required only one mobilization by a major power to start the doomsday machinery for all of them.
Kissinger's quote certainly supports Phil's statement above:
Quote:Mobilisation in itself is one thing : mobilisation entailing a chain reaction of belligerents coming to each others’ aid is another.
In point of fact, it appears that this agreement between Russia & France actually predates the convention of Jan 1894 referred to by Kissinger. Here is a link that gives the text of a treaty between Russia & France dating to 1892, that includes the same provision about both countries mobilizing as soon as one of the Triple Alliance did so: [Read More]. I just found a site called the International Encyclopedia of the First World War, that states that this 1892 agreement was a convention signed between the two general staffs; the 1894 document was a formal treaty ([Read More]).
Quote:
I think I agree with Phil’s comments here, but I’m not quite sure what you mean by arguing for “mobilization as one cause of World War I”. Are you suggesting that a nation’s mobilization (as France did in the last days of peace in 1914) is in effect irreversible? Just for comparison, was the mobilization of 120,000 Russian troops along Ukraine’s border an indication of a Russian attack, or was it a fire-exercise which was used by the West as a reason to escalate tensions between Russia and the West.
What I note about Phil’s response is the inferred link between mobilization and mobility. Mobilization is, IIUC, the ability to field a huge military force, equipped and prepared for action, in as rapid a time as possible. Mobility makes that more possible and perhaps more rapid, but also immensely more complex. Add to that the increasingly sophisticated weaponry is not part of a normal citizen’s inventory, and the issue of mobilization becomes even more challenging.
Cheers,
Brian G
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George
Centre Hastings
ON Canada
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Posts: 13378
Joined: 2009
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Mobilization as a factor in World War I
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Isn't mobilization or the ability to mobilize a consequence of preparation for war in that age? There are a number of factors that motivated the different European nations to prepare for war. The system of alliances made them quite suspicious of one another.
I would grant that German observations of additions to Russia's rail system and other preparations were worrisome to Germany as it saw itself as encircled with only one friend, the Austro-Hungarian empire which was in a state of decay.
In her book, "The War that Ended the Peace", Margaret MacMillan observes that Germany considered going to war against France before Russia had the opportunity to strike. There were men in the military that feared looking weak to its competitors.
She also notes that Bismarck would never have considered a preventative war of that nature. Was there a likelihood that Germany could call off its mobilization once it decided to support A-H's decision to teach the Serbs and Bosnians a lesson?
I don't think so. Kaiser Wilhelm who had been referred to derisively as the Prince of Peace by some in his military was adamant that the Serbs would be dealt with severely. He and others in the military were adamant that they should show that they could and would back up rhetoric with action.
And once their slavic brothers were under siege, the Russian bear was committed to mobilize in support. Russia had also received reports that Germany was contemplating to strike first before Russia could mobilize.
Of note, when A-H decided to send an ultimatum to Serbia after the assassination, it also sent copies of it to the heads of government in the other European countries. That was on July 20 so there was an opportunity for diplomacy to put an end to the conflict as had happened when other crises arose at the beginning of the 20th century.
Russia informed A-H that it would not look favourably upon any attempt by A-H to interfere with the sovereignty of Serbia.
So is the suggestion that the speed with which European countries could mobilize in 1914 the primary reason that a world war ensued? It may have been a factor but there were many other factors that left all of these countries primed for war as their alliances demanded.
Margaret MacMillan also noted that even the news of the A-H ultimatum did not seem like an emergency in Britain or France. Britain was pre-occupied with the Irish problem. France felt that it was just another Balkan kerfuffle that would resolve itself. So even at that late date, there was no mobilization in many of the eventual combatants. However, France did send a delegation to Russia to indicate its support should Russia determine to defend Serbia.
It is interesting to me that when A-H declared war on Serbia, Russia opted for a partial mobilization.
On July 29, Germany told France that it would take a hard line if France continued with its mobilization.
Russia refused Germany's demand that it cease with its mobilization plans. Russia had two plans, one along the A-H border and the other if Germany was the opponent. The Czar send a cable to Wilhelm to ask him to intervene so that all out war did not break out. When asked by his military to declare a general mobilization on July 29, the Czar said that the mobilization plan against A-H would be stopped but the partial one against Germany would continue.
Britain was asked to mediate but did not. Meanwhile Germany was encouraging A-H to announce a general mobilization and to move troops up to its border with Russia.
On July 31, Germany took first steps toward general mobilization with the Schlieffen plan in its back pocket. This was the fatal step as Germany's mobilization plans were a masterpiece of organization. To quote Margaret MacMillan, "For Germany, mobilization was not a diplomatic tool, it was war itself.". And on Aug. 1, Wilhelm declared the general mobilization.
Not all the eventual participants could mobilize as well as Germany could but they were all prepared to do so.
Could mobilization have been called off once the Schlieffen plan was in motion? Some German politicians feared this moment as they felt that once mobilization was declared that responsibility had shifted from the politicians and the ruler to the military and it would be difficult to retrieve that control in Germany. At that point, it would have taken some back tracking by several parties to stop Germany's plan.
France refused to backtrack and declared a general mobilization on Aug. 2.
So while I ramble on here, it seems that there was a multi-participant game of chicken going on and no-one dared to back down. The ability to mobilize was but one factor in the decision to go to war. All of the combatants had different goals and objectives. All had mobilization plans but once the dominoes fell, there was no political will to call off the mobilization.
Cheers,
George
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Phil Andrade
London
UK
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Posts: 6387
Joined: 2004
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Mobilization as a factor in World War I
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This is such a massive topic, and it’s been so thoroughly thrashed out by historians over the generations, that I find my head spins.
I do remember that Margaret Macmillan made an emphatic point that, despite the temptation to see the crisis of 1914 as something that in hindsight became virtually unavoidable, we must never forget that personalities and the choices made by them had a crucial impact on outcomes. The Kaiser was wobbling : he even tried to get his Warlords to change course and turn away from violating Belgian neutrality.....but he was given short shrift by his over mighty General Staff who ran the show, and Moltke, encouraged by Falkenhayn, told him to grow a pair and leave matters to the professionals. The German Emperor was a frightened man posturing as a colossus : a weak man who tries to be strong is a dangerous thing.
That’s a grotesque caricature of the narrative, but I find it convincing .....Germany committed the original sin of the twentieth century, because it was a state run by its army, instead of the other way round. To ascribe inevitability to the outbreak of that war is, to my mind, a mistake. I think that Margaret Macmillan is right.
That mobilisation hinged largely on the conduct of individuals. The British Foreign Secretary took his eye off the ball because of Ireland , and his failure to address the gravity of events immediately after Sarajevo was to have awful consequences.
There were contingencies and choices that need to be countenanced as crucial in the way things happened, and even the mightiest mobilisation programmes could be turned awry if a man of Bismarck's calibre had been to the fore.
A bit breathless and incoherent, sorry, but I hope there’s something convincing in my post.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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prr
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Posts: 21
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Mobilization as a factor in World War I
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I agree. He is the one who said that Germany had no interest in the Balkans worth the bones of a Pomeranian musketeer.
Quote:There were contingencies and choices that need to be countenanced as crucial in the way things happened, and even the mightiest mobilisation programmes could be turned awry if a man of Bismarck's calibre had been to the fore.
Regards, Phil
Anyways, thanks for your remarks connecting the dots between mobilization and various alliances.
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Phil Andrade
London
UK
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Posts: 6387
Joined: 2004
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Mobilization as a factor in World War I
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Quote:I agree. He is the one who said that Germany had no interest in the Balkans worth the bones of a Pomeranian musketeer. Quote: There were contingencies and choices that need to be countenanced as crucial in the way things happened, and even the mightiest mobilisation programmes could be turned awry if a man of Bismarck's calibre had been to the fore.
Regards, Phil Anyways, thanks for your remarks connecting the dots between mobilization and various alliances.
Forgive the agitated tone of my post. I suspect that the appalling current events are impinging on me and making me a bit hysterical. Trying to place the immensity of the 1914 events into context is so challenging that it’s a form of refuge to seek explanation in the conduct of individuals, rather than grapple with a narrative that entails explaining how multi million armies came into collision.
One of the most bizarre features I’ve encountered in the anecdotal history of 1914 is a suggestion that the Austrian Generalissimo, Conrad von Hotzendorff, was determined to try conclusions with the Serbs because he wanted to bed the wife of a fellow officer, and felt that by winning a mighty victory he would have his way with her. A horny old man commits Europe to war. Who knows ?
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Lightning
Glasgow
UK
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Posts: 1042
Joined: 2005
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Mobilization as a factor in World War I
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Hi prr,
The emphasis on mobilisation was about being able to take the fight to the enemy before he could bring the fight to you. Each of the continental powers had war plans that involved being on the front foot and invading their foes, by various routes. The BEF was slightly different in that was planned to land and support French forces, but again the assumption was that it would support a French offensive, not a desperate fighting retreat all the way to the Marne.
The theory of offensive action by default could be widely debated, but I believe it comes mainly from the Prussian-led forces routing of France in 1870-71. Prussia was ready to go first, got around the French armies and forced the armistice. Each of the major combatant nations noted that and sought to do similar decisive damage with their own forces. Remember, the so-called 'Race to the Sea' was really about finding the exposed flank and exploiting it.
Industrialisation brought the time required for mobilisation down to weeks, rather than months (and sometimes years) as had it had been before. The railway boom across Europe rapidly accelerated the movement of troops, even in relatively backwards Russia, who managed to mobilise a good chunk of their forces quicker than expected. Technology ensured wars could be started more quickly, but also that the size of forces and new weapons involved would (in most cases) drag out the conclusion.
Cheers,
Colin
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"There is no course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end."
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john hayward
Keene
NH USA
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Posts: 921
Joined: 2004
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Mobilization as a factor in World War I
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Phil
"One of the most bizarre features I’ve encountered in the anecdotal history of 1914 is a suggestion that the Austrian Generalissimo, Conrad von Hotzendorff, was determined to try conclusions with the Serbs because he wanted to bed the wife of a fellow officer, and felt that by winning a mighty victory he would have his way with her. A horny old man commits Europe to war. Who knows ?"
Sex is a powerful weapon.
The shooting of the French newspaper editor Gaston Calmette by Henriette Caillaux had a big influence on French politics. Henriette was the wife of Joseph Caillaux, the French Minister of Finance. the publishing of certain letters by Calmette damaged Caillaux political standing and his wife that more damaging letters would be printed. It seems she and Caillaux had an affair while was married. She asked for the letters to be returned and when Calmette refused, she shot him. The trial was the "Trial of the Century" in France. Henriette was found not guilty but the fallout kept Caillaux from gaining the top political leadership of France in 1914. He was a leader of the French Radical Party and Minister of Finance, but his progressive views in opposition to the military and friendship with Jaures alienated him from conservative elements. He favored a policy of conciliation with Germany during his premiership from 1911 to 1912, which led to the maintenance of the peace during the Second Moroccan Crisis of 1911.
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"When fascism comes to America it will be wrapped in the flag and carrying a cross."
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