By Alexandros Boufesis

The Yugoslav civil war was the eruption of decades of inherent hatred between the ethnic groups that formed up ex-Yugoslavia, the most prominent of which being the people of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia. In March 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) declared its independence via a referendum, which was held in February, and it would be internationally recognized in April. The siege of Sarajevo, on April 5, 1992, by the armed forces of the newly formed Republika Srpska (VRS), under General Ratko Mladic, along with the overrun of Srebrenica and Zepa (July 1995), would mark an all-time low for the International Community. It is of pivotal significance that the UN had marked Sarajevo, Žepa, Goražde, Tuzla and Bihać, as “safe areas” via the UN Security Council resolutions 819 and 824.[1] Those pockets, along with the UN troops that were defending them, had either been overrun or under siege, while NATO aircraft and naval vessels were imposing “Operation Deny Flight”, allegedly holding the Bosnian Serbs in check. The massacre at Srebrenica served as a wake-up call for the political leaderships on both sides of the Atlantic, prompting NATO to expand “Deny Flight” into “Operation Deliberate Force”. The combination of top class diplomatic and military activity, would eventually lift the siege of Sarajevo and forge the “Dayton Accords”, marking an end to the Bosnian Civil War. Although there is little doubt that “Operation Deliberate Force” fulfilled its objectives, it would serve as a prequel to “Operation Allied Force”, thus irrevocably ending the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's dreams of a “Greater Serbia”.

The death of the Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito, on May 4, 1980, put in motion those centrifugal forces, which would tear apart ex-Yugoslavia and give rise to Balkan nationalism. Even before the formation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1946, by Tito, the hatred between the Yugoslav ethnic minorities run so deep that they ended up fighting against each other, instead of fighting against the Nazis. When the war was over, Serbs and Montenegrins viewed the Croats as the fascist Ustashas,[2] who collaborated with the Germans, and the Bosnian Muslims, as the hated Turks in German uniforms. Likewise, for Croatians, Slovenians, Bosnians etc, the Serbs would always be the blood thirsty Chetniks, who were killing for sport.[3]

In the 1990s elections were held and in Croatia Franco Tudjman was elected.[4] Franco Tudjman was once a general in Tito’s army before being branded as an outcast, because of his historical books, which had glorified Croat nationalism.[5] In Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic was elected President after stealing $2 billion from the Federal Bank of Yugoslavia, to fund his campaign.[6] In Bosnia and Herzegovina, President Izedbecovic was elected, a lawyer by training and an Islamic scholar.[7] Bosnia and Herzegovina was the republic with the most mixed nationalities, namely 44 per cent Muslim, 31 per cent Serb, 17 per cent Croat and 5 per cent Yugoslav.[8] In Slovenia, the reformer and pro EU Milan Kucan was elected President.[9] On 25 June 1991, Slovenia declared its independence and the civil war commenced, initially between the JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) and Slovenia. On 7 July 1991, the Brioni Agreement was signed, putting an end to hostilities in Slovenia during the Balkan crisis in the 1990s. The agreement called for a ceasefire, a three-month moratorium on implementing the Slovenian declaration of independence and a commitment to begin political negotiations on Yugoslavia's future.[10] The diplomatic efforts, though, were not enough to stop Yugoslavia’s disintegration.

It was Croatia’s turn to declare independence, with the country being Yugoslavia’s second largest and richest republic. In September 1991 a status of open war existed between Serbia and Croatia along a 1,000-mile front, with the JRV (The Yugoslav Air Force) having the upper hand and Serbs striking targets deep inside Croatia.[11] During those initial phases of the war, the Serbs showed the first signs of the atrocities to follow in the coming years, during the siege of Vukovar, or as it became known as “The Stalingrad of the Balkans”. The city held out for 100 days and when it fell, Serb soldiers shot hundreds of prisoners.[12] The Serb-Croat war came to a halt during the Spring of 1992, following a tenuous treaty under UN supervision. According to the terms of the treaty, the JNA (Yugoslav National Army) forces were supposed to retreat from Croatia, but instead they just handed over their weapons to the militia of the newly formed Republic of Serb Krajina.[13] The Croats used the respite to build up their army and air force comprised by 20 MiG-21s fixed winged aircraft and 40 Mi-8 and 15 Mi-24 helicopters. The Country’s industry took Research and Development to another level by fielding its own UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles).[14]

The case of Bosnia was by far the most complicated in the Yugoslav Civil War. In 1992 the Country gained its independence, but simultaneously the Bosnian Serbs declared the formation of their own state within Bosnia, the Republika Srpska, the territorial area of which made up of 70 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[15] Its capital was Pale. The leader of Republika Srpska was Radovan Karadzic, a psychiatrist in Sarajevo, prior to the outbreak of the war. According to analysts, though, such as Ripley (2015), the strongman behind Republika Srpska’s leadership was none other than General Ratko Mladic. Ripley mentions the possibility that Karadzic and Milosevic had had a falling-out (citing senior US diplomat Christopher Hill, part of Dick Holbrooke’s negotiating team) and Milosevic was in a position to manipulate the International Community via the actions of Mladic.[16] Greek Television journalist, though, Nicholas Vafiadis, who had become a close confidant of Karadzic during the war, described the Milosevic-Karadzic split as “pure theater”.[17] According to Ripley (2015), “Mladic had his uses and his army created “facts on the ground” that served Belgrade’s purposes. The longer the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) held out, the better terms Milosevic could expect from the Americans. But at the same time, Milosevic kept to the absolute minimum the supplies he sent across the River Drina, in case it compromised his attempts to get sanctions lifted…”[18]

Soon, and with the aid of Milosevic, Republika Srpska had their own army, the VRS and their own air force, comprised by elements of the JRV and set up at Banja Luka. They would soon open the so called Posavina Corridor linking Yugoslavia with Serb held areas of Bosnia around Banja Luka.[19] Initially, it was assumed that Bosnia might be a less belligerent area, especially after the Milosevic and Tudzman meeting at Karadjordjevo, in 1991. Both leaders were planning a partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia leaving the Bosniaks (The Bosnian Muslims), with minimum territory.[20] The events, though, of the Country’s independence and the subsequent formation of the Republika Srpska, left whatever it was decided during the meeting, on the sidelines. On April 5, the Bosnian Serbs would lay siege on Sarajevo and over the years would be emboldened by the International Community’s inability to keep Mladic at bay. The culmination of those events would be the overrun of Srebrenica and Zepa and the commencement of NATO’s “Operation Deliberate Force”.

The involvement of the international community was plagued by either false decisions, indecisiveness or both. Between April 1992 and October 1993 alone, 47 UNSC Resolutions were passed, and none had managed to achieve a constructive result.[21] The most prominent was UNSCR 713, according to which: “…all States shall immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise following consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of Yugoslavia”.[22] Although, this would vex Milosevic to the point of activating or deactivating Mladic accordingly, in general terms it would prove ineffective-at best-as all the Countries of ex-Yugoslavia had their own indigenous arms production or they could smuggle weapons across their borders.[23] According to Sir Malcolm Rifkind, the British Defence Secretary until July 1995 and thereafter Foreign Secretary, “Arms embargo on Bosnia was ‘the most serious mistake made by the UN’”.[24] On 21 February 1992 the first UN Peacekeepers started arriving, specifically 14,000 were dispatched to Croatia and their Headquarters was established in Sarajevo. Their mandate was vague, as neither politicians nor the UN wanted to involve the strictly peacekeeping force into belligerent actions, which could provoke an involvement of Western governments into a Yugoslavian all-out war.[25]

The UNPROFOR (United Nations Protective Force), as it came to be known, was commanded at first by the French General Philip Morillon (September 1992), his command though was tainted by the assassination of the Deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina Hakija Turajlic, who was killed by a Bosnian Serb, while surrounded by French soldiers in a French Armored Personnel Carrier. He was succeeded by the Belgian General Francis Briquemont (July 1993), who spent his time mostly around his Headquarters in Sarajevo. Then it was Britain’s turn to send more active commanders. First it was General Sir Michael Rose (January 1994), a hardcore SAS, who was known to stroll the streets of Sarajevo, which were brimming with snipers, without body armor. This provided at least a level of psychological augmentation to the disheartened UN forces. Rose was himself a proponent of the so called “Safe areas” and whenever he could, he would confiscate heavy weapons. The fighting, though, continued in the region as UN forces were plagued by a lack of mandate, which did not allow them to use force, whenever and wherever it was dictated by the circumstances. His successor, General Sir Rupert Smith (January 1995), was the best UN commander, as he understood that the Bosnian Serb Army and Mladic understood only the language of aggression.[26] When General Smith arrived in Sarajevo he was already a reputed British Army’s best field commander. He was one of its few senior officers to have commanded a large formation of troops in battle, when he led the 1st (UK) armored division into Southern Iraq and Kuwait, in February 1991.[27] When the UNPROFOR was divided into three separate but interlinked Peace Keeping Operations (In Bosnia UNPROFOR kept the name and mandate, while in Croatia the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation was established. In Macedonia, United Nations Preventive Deployment Force, UNPREDEP, was formed, while the Joint Theatre of all three was known as United Nations Peace Forces headquarters, UNPF-HQ), Lt. General Bernard Janvier became the Theatre Force Commander and Rupert Smith’s superior.[28] Janvier was a former French Foreign Legion officer and a veteran of numerous colonial campaigns in Africa.[29]

The most ardent supporter of the safe haven policy was Madeleine Albright, the US ambassador to the UN at the time and the “chief hawk” on the Balkans, in Bill Clinton’s administration. From the start, Madeleine Albright would suggest the toughest military measures against Serbia. According to Ripley (2015), “A large group, led by UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, was convinced that Bosnia was a moral issue that required America to stand-up to Serb “aggression”, “genocide” and “fascism”. The Sarajevo government was “heroic” and the Serbs were “evil incarnate”.[30] It became clear in the aftermath of “Operation Deliberate Force” that any “hawkish rhetoric” needed to be backed up by both the military means and military intentions. The reason why it is imperative for the line to be drawn, is because of the fact that the military means existed, both in terms of UN forces on the ground and NATO’s activity in the context of “Operation Deny Flight”, as it will be discussed furtherly in this essay. The intentions, though, obscured UN and NATO’s presence of military assets in the area, as the political agenda continued to deny the necessary mandate for those assets to switch mode to aggressive peacekeeping.

In this context, Albright’s intentions coincided with the need for Western governments to adopt a militarily aggressive stance, as they would, in the aftermath of Srebrenica. At the time, though, what Albright was doing was using NATO’s “weight” and assets to establish safe areas, which would-“rhetorically speaking”-enjoy a status of safe havens, as Mladic and the Bosnian Serbs would never dare attack them. It was a reckless diplomatic poker game and a poor effort to read Mladic’s poker face, a blunder, which would on the one hand incur NATO’s wrath, on the other, though, it would cost thousands of civilian lives and UN’s credibility. Indeed, as Ripley (2015) points out, “Once in place, the safe areas policy became the fatal fault line in the UN mandate in Bosnia”.[31] In the words of Sir Malcolm Rifkind, “Safe haven’s policy was fundamentally flawed, because the UN Security Council resolutions were not backed up with the military capability required to make them credible…The UK more than most, constantly drew attention to that fact, right from the very moment the safe havens policy was raised..We went along with it because clearly there was an overwhelming desire to implement it amongst most other western countries…”.[32]

According to Connaughton (2008), “There were no maps or geographical boundaries delineating the {Safe} areas, no disarmament, no authorization to search houses and barns for weapons (the USA resisted this in the Security Council). Efforts were now made to find UN forces to occupy the ‘safe areas’ as deterrent forces. The ‘safe areas’ all had one thing in common: they were Bosniac havens…”.[33] Just to get a glimpse of the confusion that prevailed in the allied leadership, regarding the conflicting orders that the UN forces on the ground were receiving, one needs to take into consideration the phone call between the commander of the Welch Fusiliers, defending the Gorazde enclave, Lt-Colonel Jonathon Riley and the British Prime Minister, John Major. On a phone call, Riley informed the British Prime Minister that it was high time his men were extracted from Gorazde, as in then Lt-Colonel’s words: “It was impossible to carry out peacekeeping, where there was no peace to keep”. The higher echelons of the military hierarchy were apparently vexed by Riley’s “bluntness”, so much so that a stream of senior officers, one of whom were Sir Michael Rose, were lined up to telephone Riley and tell him “To stop rocking the boat”. A senior officer went thus far as to state preposterously that “Riley should get back in his trench and die and stop thinking too much”.[34]

The situation on the French side was pretty much the same. When the Canadian troops at Visoko were hit by Serb mortar rounds and some 20 UN armored vehicles had been hijacked, while the Serbs rolled up one position after another, French President Jacques Chirac, outraged while watching on the television French soldiers surrendering, called his Chief of Defense staff, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, demanding to know why French troops were not fighting back. The Admiral’s response was indeed a candid one, reflecting the lack of a political mandate, which would allow UN forces to fight back. “Peacekeepers don’t do that sort of thing”, a statement which incurred the French President’s wrath and called him a coward.[35] On the one hand there was exasperation regarding the unwillingness of UN troops to stand and fight, on the other there wasn’t any political initiative which would impose an active engagement, thus taking the fight to Mladic and BSA.

The creation of the Anglo-French Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) with a Dutch contribution by June 1995 remains up to date a political enigma. Both British John Major and French President Jacques Chirac had already decided to bring reinforcements to the Bosnian theater of operations, but reinforcements to do what exactly? UN had already had 38,599 military personnel by March 1995 deployed as peacekeepers with no peace to keep, plagued by political reluctance to take up any offensive initiatives. “The politicians did not know what to do but send more troops”, a senior British officer in Bosnia commented . According to British Chief of the Defense Staff, Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge, “It was more important as a signal than an actuality”. Ripley (2015) states that “The origins of the RRF like in the contingency planning, which begun in December 1994 for an Anglo-French withdrawal option if the United States lifted the arms embargo, thereby forcing a fighting withdrawal of UNPROFOR”.[38] On the other hand, General Smith was content that the politicians had taken into consideration his proposal to form reserve battle-groups [39] in the three UN sectors and General Smith was well known by then for his aggressive stance against the BSA. So, what was the new RRF’s mandate?

The most probable scenario was that the RRF was initially deployed in the context of OPPLAN 40-104 or “Operation Determined Effort”, as it came known, which had the objective of evacuating UN forces from Bosnia. Indeed, on 10th February 1995 the UN Secretary General had formally written to his NATO counter-part Willy Caes, asking NATO to prepare for UN personnel evacuation. A war game was carried out at Ramstein, Germany, for this plan to be tested and evaluated, but the results were disheartening at best. The plan envisaged some 60,000 troops including 25,000 Americans moving into Hungary, Croatia and Bosnia to evacuate UN forces and it was going to involve thousands of tanks, armored vehicles and numerous attack helicopters.[40] The plan was a political and logistical nightmare, and it soon became clear to the political leaderships that it was unattainable. However, some assumed that the RRF would serve to evacuate personnel from the besieged enclaves, as it was comprised of the British 24 Airmobile Brigade made up of nine Westland Gazelle AH.Mk.1 light observation, nine Westland Lynx AH.Mk.9 transport helicopters and nine Lynx AH.Mk.7 attack helicopters of the Army Air Corps, six Boeing Chinook HC.Mk2 and six Westland Puma HC.Mk1 Royal Air Force transport helicopters.[41] General Smith was aware of its potential use of extraction and his opinion was explicit, it couldn’t be used for extraction purposes, but it was meant to be used when finally, NATO was in the offensive, in the context of “Operation Deliberate Force”.

During the initial phase of Sarajevo’s siege, provision of humanitarian aid was feasible, but it did not occur seamlessly. Even though Serbian forces were in control of the airport (JNA and VRS), until June 1992, when it was handed over to UNPROFOR, Lockheed C-130 Hercules and C-141 Starlifter transports of the USAF, followed by French C-130, were allowed to deliver humanitarian aid, starting from mid-1992.[42] On 3 July 1992, an air bridge was established, operated within the framework of “Operation Provide Promise” or, as it may be viewed, the initial phases of NATO intervention, in its humanitarian form. The operation was a joint effort between UN and NATO, under US European Command (USEUCOM) and it was managed by the Headquarters of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in Zagreb (Croatia) and the NATO Joint Air Operations Centre in Ancona.[43] An indication of the fluidity of the situation on the ground and the fact that friends and foes were rarely conspicuous in the Yugoslav civil war, was the shot down of an Aieritalia G222 transport from the 46 Aerobrigata of the Italian Air Force, by a Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPAD). The incident occurred in an area 25 km from Sarajevo, over the territories controlled by Croat and Bosnian forces and it was not the only one. Croat forces subsequently opened fire upon the rescue party comprised by two Sikorsky Ch-53 Sea Stallions and two Bell AH-1W Super Cobras. As a result of the aggression, Sarajevo airport was closed for a month.[44]

By the end of 1992, US alone had managed to deliver over 5,400 tons of food and medical supplies. After President Clinton’s inauguration the operation expanded further. In February 1993, Clinton authorized the drop of food and medicines to all the enclaves, like Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa and Gorazde. Provide Promise made history on October 8, 1993, when surpassed the Berlin airlift in duration. By the end of the year, Air Force aircraft had delivered more than 30,000 tons of food and medicine to the former Yugoslavia.[45] From the start, the Serbian Air Force and Air Defense (V i PVO) monitored the airlifts via the radar installations in Plješivica, Kozara and Jahorina. The Serbs were evidently worried that the nature of the provisions dropped may soon change to ammunition and military equipment or that the Operation itself may have been the prequel of a broader plan involving airstrikes.[46] The last air drops were carried out in August 1994, when the BSA activated their radar guided SAM missile defense system over Bosnia. By the time, 2,828 sorties were estimated to have been flown.[47]

The military prequel of “Operation Deliberate Force” commenced with “Operation Sky Monitor”[48] via the UNSC Resolution 781, according to which a ban of military flights was imposed over Bosnia and Herzegovina (excluding UNPROFOR or other UN flights). Specifically, Resolution 781 requested “… UNPROFOR to monitor compliance with the ban on military flights, including the placement of observers where necessary at airfields in the territory of the former Yugoslavia..”.[49] It was essentially the first No Fly Zone (NFZ). The first allied flight took place on 16 October 1992 by a Boeing E-3A Sentry Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS), which was forward deployed in Italy. Starting from October 1992 the Operation involved an AWACS flying over southern Hungary and was later on enhanced by other allied Air Forces and aerial assets such as E-3s from NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF), RAF and Armée de l'Air aircraft.[50]

Sky Monitor was unattainable, because Resolution 781 denied all flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina including allied flights and certain C-130s from Saudi Arabia Air force, which landed more than a dozen times at Tuzla and Bihać and delivered cargoes, which was not humanitarian.[51] Soon, the number of flight violations would surpass 500, thus the UNSC issued Resolution 816. According to the new UN Resolution, all flights in Bosnia and Herzegovina were prohibited except those expressly authorized by the UN Flight Coordination Centre in Zagreb. In addition, it authorized all UN member states to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance, which opened widely the door for the launch of “Operation Deny Flight”, which began at noon on 12 April 1993 and was primarily enforced by F-15C-MSIP-II “Eagle” Interceptors of the 36th Fighter Wing, USAF, forward deployed at Aviano, Italy.[52] Even from the start and judging from it mandate, “Operation Deny Flight” imposed the strictest of measures to pilots about to get involved in hostile activities. The execution of the missions were controlled by the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) at the HQ of the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF), at Vincenza, Italy. Any use of force should have had the approval by a three or four star general present in CAOC. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) handed over the responsibility to Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in South Europe (AFSOUTH), who, in turn, passed responsibility to the Allied Air Force Commander in South Europe (AIRSOUTH).[53] During “Operation Deliberate Force” the “Triumvirate” of the “Two Smiths” (Admiral Leighton Smith and General Rupert Smith) and AIRSOUTH commander Lt-General Mike Ryan, would play a pivotal role in its planning and execution.

On 2 August 1993, NATO expanded responsibilities of “Deny Flight” through potential authorization of airstrikes. This resulted in the concentration of several Allied nations’ Air Forces at Italian airbases. Moreover, to improve communication between the HQ 5th ATAF, Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) and UNPROFOR units on the ground, NATO started deploying EC-130H Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Centre aircraft (ABCCC). Still, though, despite all the preparations and the accumulated assets, the political “OCD” regarding the aversion of an all-out war in Bosnia, which would “suck in” the Western world, still dictated the operational theatre. That said, to further control potential arbitrary initiatives by the commanders in charge, NATO and the UN established a “dual key” control, whereby prior to any operations, approval had to be granted by both NATO and the UN.[54][55]

“Operation Deny Flight” brought together air assets from a wide range of allies, including US, Britain, France, Netherlands and Turkey, while later the Spanish Air Force along with the German Luftwaffe were to join. The aerial assets operated from Aviano Air Base in Italy, reactivated to receive F-15 Cs of the 36th Fighter Wing (FW), which were homebased in Bitburg, Germany. In addition, F-14 “Tomcats” and F/A-18C Hornets were operating from the USS Theodore Roosevelt, especially during the summer of 1993.[56] Later, Aviano also accommodated F-16C “Fighting Falcons”, which replaced the F-15 Cs along with A-10 “Thunderbolt” IIs and F-15E “Strike Eagles”, previously based at Lakenheath UK. By early 1994 the base was expanded to host fighter-bomber wings, specifically 48 F-16 C/Ds.[57] Additionally, KC-135 “Stratotankers” were stationed at Sigonella in Sicily, Milano-Malpensa and Pisa, while all those assets were reinforced by ABCCCs, Combat Search and Rescue Helos, AC-130H “Spectre” Gunships (deployed at Brindisi), EF-111A and EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft.[58] At Sigonella P-3C Update III+ “Orions” were also stationed, equipped with video surveillance systems, able to broadcast live imagery to ground stations.[59]

Moreover, the British contributed Tornado F.Mk 3s, SEPECAT Jaguar GR.Mks, Vickers VC.10 tankers and Lockheed Tristars, Nimrod Mr.Mk 2Ps and Sea Harrier FRS.Mk2s operating over Bosnia, flying CAP (Combat Air Patrol) missions. The French contributed Mirage 2000Cs, Mirage F-1CRs, C-135FR tankers, E-3F Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS), SEPECAT Jaguars, C-130s and C-160s, along with C-160G Gabriels and Douglas DC-8 Sabrigues for ELINT/SIGINT missions. The French navy was operating from the Adriatic with the Foch and Clemenceau aircraft carriers, transporting Super Etendards, Etendard IVPs, Breguet 1050 Alizee aircraft, SA-360 “Dauphin”, SA-321 “Super Frelon” and SA-330 “Puma” helicopters. It is notable that on the first day of “Deny Flight”, a French Mirage 2000C crashed into the sea. The Turks contributed F-16 Cs.[60]

The Serbs hosted a well-organized and equipped air defense network. The main radar-guided SAMs were the Soviet S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) and upgraded versions of the 2K12 Kub-M (SA-6 Gainful).[61] All the heavy SAMs were concentrated in the West of Republika Srpska, while the East was defended by numerous MANPAD (Man Portable Air Defense) systems [62] (Strela-2 and 3 or in NATO’s terminology, SA-7 Grail and SA-14 Gremlin). The BSA also had vehicle mounted Strela 1s (SA-9 Gaskin) and Strela 10s (SA-13 Gopher) vehicle-mounted SAMs.[63] A combination of Soviet and Swedish Ericsson Giraffe radar systems made up a network of eight early warning radar sites. The Serb air defense forces (RV i PVO) were also in possession of advanced electronic warfare systems. The early warning radars systems, mobile SAMs and electronic warfare were all linked together by a network of more than 20 microwave relay towers. In plain terms, BSA had plenty of warning of anything that penetrated the Bosnian airspace, along with eavesdrop capabilities on NATO, UN, Bosnian and Croat radio communications.[64]

Circumstances were about to flare up for the pilots operating in the framework of “Deny Flight”. A “dogfight” began on 24 February 1994 when a NATO AWACS aircraft called a pair of F-16s, already on a CAP mission, to intercept a flight of six jets heading towards central Bosnia. Ripley (2001) claims that the jets were SOKO G-2 Galeb,[65] while according to Dimitrijević (2021) the jets were Jastrebs.[66] Beale (1997) also claims that the aircraft were Jastrebs.[67] Captain Bob “Wilbur” Wright and his wingman, Captain Scott O’Grady, chased the Jastrebs and Wright managed to shoot down three “bandits” with an AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and two AIM-9 Sidewinders. Wright was “Winchester” (out of ammo) and almost “Bingo Fuel” (out of fuel) and handed over the chase to O’Grady, who fired a Sidewinder, but due to a lack of “Good tone” (solid radar lock), he missed. The pair, both “Bingo Fuel” by then, broke off and another pair of F-16s, “Knight 25” and 26, were tasked to see the chase through.[68] “Knight 25” (Captain Stephen Allen) got a “Good tone” and downed two more Jastrebs with two Sidewinder, but he was credited with just one kill.[69] By then, the “Bandits” were outside Bosnian airspace, a “No-Go” area for NATO flights. Following the incident, Wright earned the status of USAF’s highest scoring F-16 pilot.[70]

In April 1994, NATO missions were about to be switched from CAS to airstrikes via UN Resolution 836, the same Resolution that defined the “Safe areas” and the necessity to protect them. Mladic and the BRS were on the move, already having launched an all out offensive against the enclave of Gorazde, in eastern Bosnia, one of the UN designated “Safe areas”.[71] Lt-Colonel Jonathon Riley’s Welch Fusiliers were under heavy weapon fire and UNPROFOR’s commander General Sir Michael Rose warned Mladic to withdraw his forces or else face the consequences. Mladic ignored him. Subsequently, a pair of F-16s of the 555th Fighter Squadron were called in with the objective to relieve Gorazde’s garrison. Once again, information is conflicting. Dimitrijević (2021) suggests that Rose had given strict commands not to hit moving targets but stationary positions instead.[72] Ripley (2010) claims that the F-16s were initially targeting the tanks firing at the garrison [73] and because of the bad weather they were directed to a secondary target, which was an artillery command post. Either way, following the airstrike Mladic went on a rampage threatening “no UN would come out of Bosnia alive”.[74] The following day and following BSA’s continued aggressiveness, two F/A-18s repeated the pattern of airstrikes which had been initiated the previous day.[75] The BSA’s attacks continued on 15 April and two UNPROFORs were killed. Airstrikes were once again called in and NATO planes targeted BSA’s artillery positions once again. One French Etendard IVP surveillance aircraft operating from the French carrier Clemencau, was hit on the tail, but the pilot managed to land it on the carrier, nevertheless. The following day was the Sea Harrier’s turn. The weather was overcast so the aircraft were flying low and subsequently four fly-bys later one Sea Harrier was hit by a MANPAD. The pilot ejected safely and landed on an area surrounded by Bosnian Muslim allies. Eventually, political intervention deescalated the crisis, the BSA withdrew their heavy weapons, while UNPROFOR troops were now permitted to operate from Gorazde.[76]

Those fragile truces, that were achieved at times, were tenuous and found NATO forces on the one hand more involved in the Bosnian war turmoil and the political leadership, on the other, more hysterical that they were going to be sucked in a political maelstrom. Another crisis broke out in November 1994, when heavy fighting was intensified around another “Safe area” in North West Bosnia, the Bihać enclave. Dimitrijević’s (2021) approach suggests that those enclaves branded as “Safe areas” were staging points used to attack the BSA and as such Bihać was treated, when the Joint aerial assets of Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs, were called in to provide Close Air Support against the Bosnian army’s operation “"Grmeč '94".[77]

From 8 and 9 November, Oraos and Jastreb aircraft reinforced by Milosevic’s Yugoslavian Air Force (RV i PVO) Jastrebs and Galebs, hit several armament factories and around Bihać. According to Dimitrijević (2021), on 14 November 1994 an accident occurred when an Orao hit a chimney and crashed. The UN personnel converged and thus it was deducted that Serbian aircraft were in violation of the No-Fly Zone, providing Close Air Support around the “Safe area” of Bihać.[78] Whether it is true or not, NATO’s reflexes were activated once again and aircraft were scrambled, following Resolution 958 of the UN, which granted NATO the authorization it required to operate against targets in Croatia. NATO was targeting Udbina air base this time and a large strike force took off comprised by 39 different combat aircraft belonging to US, Britain, France and Holland. The strike package included two French and four British Jaguars, two Mirage 2000N-K2s, four Dutch F-16As, six F/A-18Ds of US Marines, six F-15Es , ten F-16s and one EF-111A of the 429th Electronic Combat Squadron (ECS).[79]

The aircraft were tasked to be refueled by KC-135s, French LC-135 FRs and British Tristars. Electronic Countermeasure activity severed the connection between the Bosnian Serb radar installation at Mount Plješivica and Udbina Air Base. The first target was an SA-6 battery, while clusters of Mk.82 and Mk.83 bombs were shredding Command Posts, Power generators and Transporter Erector Launchers to pieces. Further strikes were carried out at Light Anti-Aircraft Defense Battalion and the Air Base’s runway, which was perforated following the drop of 80 Mk.84s and CBU-87 Cluster bombs. None of the aircraft parked in the base were hit.[80] Mladic was rabid once again and this time he took more than 300 UN hostages around Sarajevo. Eventually, NATO backed down and the hostages were released.[81]

The political reality was abysmal. Western governments were watching helplessly as NATO’s campaign was deteriorating the situation, by further emboldening Mladic and the BSA, instead of deterring them. The chain of command further mirrored the political impasse. Admiral Leighton Smith was arguing in favor of additional airstrikes against Bosnian Seb air defense network, however General Rose insisted that such operations were irrelevant to UNPROFOR’s peacekeeping mandate. As he would earlier state to the New York Times: “Hitting one tank is peacekeeping. Hitting infrastructure, command and control, logistic, that is war”.[82] General Rose was going to get substituted by Rupert Smith, whose doctrine of “escalate to deescalate”, would make him totally compatible with Leighton Smith, thus cementing the success of “Operation Deliberate Force”.

During the Spring of 1995, the situation was deteriorated once again. In Sarajevo, the Bosnian army launched a series of offensives against the BSA, prompting Mladic to make use of his artillery and armor, after taking it out of UN-inspected locations. Subsequently he started shelling the Bosnian Muslims and the “Safe areas”. It was time for the newly appointed Rupert Smith to show that he was not Rose. On 25 and 26 May, NATO resumed the airstrikes, when F-16s in collaboration with Spanish F/A-18s used LGBs (Laser Guided Bombs) to take out ammunition dumps South of Pale. The aftermath was the same as before, Mladic took more than 380 UN hostages and chained them around potential NATO targets, to deter NATO from bombing them. Once more, the political leadership “blinked” and the bombings were stopped.[83] On 2 June, the “duo” Wright/O’Grady operated again, but this time a Serb Kub-M battery hit O’Grady’s F-16, forcing him to eject and land behind enemy lines. On 8 June, O’Grady was rescued after a SAR mission was undertaken, in which AC-130 gunships, AV-8B Harriers, F-15Es, F-16Cs, EF-111/EA-6B (ECM platforms) and AH-1W “Cobras” and CH-53 “Super Stallions” helos participated.[84]

The massacre at Srebrenica was meant to happen, being the result of a timid collective Western political leadership that failed to utilize the military assets in the operational theatre, in order to demonstrate a brazen stance. It was the same leadership, that emboldened Mladic, who defied Western Institutions, by capturing hostages and shelling “Safe areas” defended by UN forces. The same protagonists, who under the influence of “PTSD” in the post-“Black Hawk Down era” in Somalia, refused vehemently to being dragged in what was perceived as a full scale war in Bosnia and were instead planning to exfiltrate UN forces and leave the area in a genocidal “spin”. It was high time the West was awoken and this “wake up call” occurred in Srebrenica, when, according to Ripley (2015), Karadzic issued Directive No 7, to the BSA “to complete the physical separation of the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves as soon as possible, preventing even communication between individuals of the two enclaves…”.[85] Between July 11 and 22 of 1995, VRS forces, under the Command of Ratko Mladic and Bosnian Serb forces, following the capture of the Serbian enclave of Srbrenica, killed more than 8,000 Bosniak (Bosnian Muslims) men 16 years and above, in one of the biggest genocides in human history, while 20,000 were also displaced, a process known as ethnic cleansing,[86] while the UN Dutch contingent stood idly by, doing nothing to prevent the slaughter.

While NATO had carried out six airstrikes involving 18 aircraft, at the behest of the Dutch contingent,[87] many NATO officers doubted that additional aerial activities would make any difference. According to RAF Group Captain, John White, on duty at the CAOC in Vincenza, during the attack “It [referring to further aerial activity], could only have been used against tanks. Srebrenica was not a conventional war zone-it was a guerilla war zone…It would have been like using Close Air Support in Northern Ireland. How would you have identified the targets?”.[88] At the conference on 21 July 1995, in London’s Lancaster House (also known as the London Conference), it was decided that further BSA activities, threatening “Safe areas”, would be met with widespread offensive air action.[89] The countdown to “Operation Deliberate Force” had commenced and the allies now were pursuing the opposite. Instead of finding excuses not to intervene, they were now looking for a “trigger” to intervene and that opportunity was given on 28 August 1995, when a mortar attack on Sarajevo caused the death of 38 civilians and wounding many more.[90]

In the absence of General Janvier, the “two Smiths” (Rupert and Leighton) “turned the key”, thus initiating “Operation Deliberate Force”. The plan included extended airstrikes against Serbian radar and missile sites, which were going to be carried out in the framework of “Dead Eye” operations. Option 1 targets were the ones in or near “Safe areas”, while Option 2 targets were military targets supporting forces besieging the safe areas. Option 3 were infrastructure targets such as power stations, airfields and dams, along with other targets meant to make an impact on the civilian population.[91] Authorization was given for Option 1 and 2 targets, as Option 3 targets were considered an exaggeration. The British thought, for example, that in order to bomb Option 3 targets, a new Security Council Resolution was needed, which would probably be vetoed by Russia. General Janvier thought that Bosnia, being an agricultural Country, didn’t provide many alternatives for Option 3 targets.[92]

On the first hours of August 30, the bombing commenced, with SEAD strike packages from Aviano and USS Theodore Roosevelt, which was already at the Adriatic, already airborne and ready for “Dead eye” strikes. There was a massive release of ADM-141 Tactical Air Launch Decoys, equipped with radar reflectors, to provoke the Bosnian Serb air defenses to “paint” them, thus revealing their positions for the HARM (High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles) missiles to obliterate them. The Bosnian Serbs, though didn’t take the bait and they refrained from “painting” NATO aircraft. The Dead Eye Strike package flew over Sarajevo and was headed to eastern Bosnia, at Sokolac, where the only SA-6 “Gainful” radar was operating.[93] F-16s from the 510th Fighter Squadron had the privilege of dropping the first Laser-Guided bombs, hitting the “Straight Flush” radar vehicle of the missile battery. What was left, was targeted by the second wave of F/A-18D “Hornets”. Another wave followed, this time targeting the Pale ammunition dump complex, hitting as well the radar site at Jahorina Mountain and a microwave communications relay tower at Han Pijesak.[94] A radar site at Košuta was also targeted and destroyed along with a communication facility at Ravna, killing 7 of the personnel that were manning it.[95] Overall, the strike package was comprised by 43 strike and 14 SEAD aircraft, accompanied by EF-111A “Raven” jammers and EC-130H “Compass Calls”. Other targeted positions included the Pretis factory and its depot in Vogošća, storage depots at Toplo, Lukavica, Toplik and Žunovnica along with BSA positions at Gavrića Brdo. At 07:00 and 10:00 AM, the communications sites at Mount Majevica and Straznica were bombed along with other targets in Gorazde and facilities near Nevesinje and Bileća. Overall, there were five strike packaged dubbed “Alpha” to “Echo”.[96] Harriers and Jaguars were frequently used to “buddy lase”, which means indicating the targets with lasers so that the laser guided munitions could strike.[97]

At 04:45 AM the Multinational Brigade (MNB) of the Rapid Reaction Force on Mount Igman, initiated a heavy pummeling on the BSA forces, around Sarajevo, launching an artillery barrage from 14 UN artillery pieces and 15 mortars, for 75 minutes.[98] The volleys obliterated gun positions, mortar pits, tanks and command posts, causing considerable casualties to the Serbs, who did not respond with Counter-artillery fire.[99] The first day of the operations were marked by the downing of a French Mirage 2000. Although several SAR operations were organized, the position of the pilots remained elusive and they were released in December after the signing of the Dayton Accords.[100]

On 31 August, airstrikes continued and during the night three strike packages sowed havoc among the BSA. Pale, Sokolac, once again and Han Pijesak were hit along with communication sites at Mount Jahorina and BSA positions at Kalauzović and Mount Ozren. A radar site at Nevesinje and facilities at Čajniče were also targeted.[101] The air attacks were halted at 05:00 AM on September 1, as Janvier was about to meet Mladic, believing that the Bosnian Serb General would yield to UN/NATO terms. Understandably, Admiral Smith faced criticism from both the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and SACEUR, General George Joulwan.[102] At 04:00 on September 2, NATO came out of the meeting with Mladic, having received hollow promises that the last would withdraw his heavy weapons and respect the “Safe areas”. He was given until 23:00 on September 4 to comply. On September 4 a publication by Reuters emerged with a recording of Karadzic giving instruction on how to feint a retreat. “You have to start moving towards Trnovo [southeast of Sarajevo] so the cameras can record it and send it to the world even if it means returning [the weapons] during the night…You have to form a small column of five or six pieces [of heavy weapons]…don’t move before the journalists arrive”[103]

The Serbs were just pretending to be retreating and General Ruper Smith swore to “inflict pain” on Mladic, following the expiration of the ultimatum. Over the next 6 days 12 bridges were targeted and communication networks were severed, cutting off Mladic from his subordinates, thus making him feel that he was “losing control”. Those tactics went along with the assumption that the BSA General was a “control freak” and he would panic once he felt that the situation was out of his control. Hence, on 5 September, the TV and radio transmitter at Stolice was hit, disrupting communications between the Eastern and Western part of Republika Srpska.[104] Further airstrikes comprised by F/A 18s, F-16s and F15s bombed several more communication sites, such as the command and communications Centre in Han Pijesak. The US Navy also used F-14s for the first time with ground attack roles (the “Bombcats”), while F/A-18s were “buddy lasing” the targets.[105] Ammunition storage bunkers and vehicle parks around the HQs of the BSA “Romanija Corps” were targeted by American, Spanish, French and British jets, thanks to the “creative thinking” of the “Two Smiths’, who marked them as “storage areas”, instead of “barracks”, thus avoiding the restrictions imposed. In addition, the MNB silenced an artillery battery to the north of Sarajevo, as the BSA had started shelling once again the Bosnian capital.[106] Also Rupert Smith’s targeting of bridges was carried out in the context of minimizing the routes, which the BSA forces would take to withdraw their heavy weapons and thus being able to monitor them appropriately. It also added more targets to a list, which was becoming shorter every day.[107] Indeed, on 7 September Smith registered this shortcoming along with the adverse weather conditions that allied aircraft were facing.[108]

On the same day several ammunition dumps were targeted successfully, while RAF was bombing the Pale microwave radio towers and USAF was hitting bridges along the Drina river valley. Ryan and Admiral Smith also agreed to expand the operations to include air defense sites in Western Bosnia, as the ones in Eastern Bosnia were almost exhausted and Mladic was in no “compliance mood” yet.[109] On 7 September the planning of Dead Eye Northwest commenced against targets around Banja Luka. NATO’s new weapons were about to get used, which were none other than the USAF GBU-15 and US Navy’s AGM-84 Stand-off Land Attack Missile (SLAM). Ryan also requested the deployment of F-117 “Nighthawks”, which were stealth bombers first used in action during “Operation Just Cause” in Panama in 1989.[110] The bombers were flown into Aviano only to be denied action by the Italian government, five days later.[111]

On September 8 the Croats launched “Operation Mistral 2” on the ground, in an attempt to seize as much Bosnian Serb territory as possible, before the Bosnian Muslims grabbed it first. Operation Mistral 2 was carried out despite the NAC had issued three warnings between the 30th August and 5th September for all the parties to show restraint and not take advantage of NATO’s airstrikes.[112] The Croatian president Tudjman was not willing to play by the rules, though, being a man with fervent nationalistic beliefs and as ruthless as Slobodan Milosevic.

On September 9 the strike packages chased their Dead eye targets and once again a barrage of AGM-141 decoys were fired against targets in Banja Luka, followed by 33 HARMs. Once again, the Bosnian Serbs did not “take the bait” and refrained from “painting” their targets or they painted them for a short while, causing the pilots to “jump the gun” and release their aircraft’ armaments, hence the 33 HARMs and the minimum damage inflicted by them.[113] An example was the Kozara radar site, which was first targeted with HARMs and then with Precision Guided Munition (PGM).[114]

On September 10 Tactical Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) or Cruise missiles, were used against Bosnian Serb targets. Specifically, 13 “Tomahawks” (TLAMs) were launched from the USS Normandy, in the Adriatic, against air defense position in the wider Banja Luka area and western parts of Republika Srpska. Seven of them scored hits at the radar site at Kozara and three more, which were launched later, rendered it totally out of function. Additional “Tomahawks” were also fired and targeted the radio relay communications site near Lisinac.[115] The targeting of BSA installations by “Tomahawks” proved to have more concrete results than strike packages using HARMs and SLAMs. It also proved to be safer for pilots, who did not have to fly in SAM infested areas. This was exactly the argument used to convince individuals in the NATO and UN, when they expressed fears that “Tomahawks” were actually an escalation.[116]

On the same day Serb artillery fired on UN Norwegian troops at Tuzla. A pair of “Hornets” from USS America targeted it and released a GBU-12 Laser-Guided munition, obliterating it. In addition, the Stolice Communications tower complex was hit again, by British and French aircraft (Harriers and Jaguars) and this time it was destroyed. A spectacular video footage was recorded, as one of the towers collapsed after being hit by a French Matra 1,000 kg LGB.[117] F-15E “Strike Eagles” bombed the Prnjavor microwave relay tower with three GBU-15s and managed to put it out of function. Serb communication sites were further targeted that day, when additional F/A-18 Cs from the USS America bombed Mkronjic Grad with LGBs.[118]

On 11 September 70 aircraft took off in six strike packages targeting ammunition dumps, storage facilities, bridges and communication nodes. Hadzici, Visegrad, Pale, Ustikolina, Vogosca and Koleovik were once again bombed, while British Harriers attacked the Lukavica barracks in Sarajevo and USAF F-15 Es struck air defence targets around Banka Luka, along with the Mrkonic Grad microwave tower, making use of GBU-15s. September 11 saw the last activity of the MNB, when two smoke rounds were fired at a Serb SAM at Hadzici.[119]

On 12th and 13th September, the last days of “Operation Deliberate Force”, airstrikes targeted the bulky ammunition dump in the South of Doboj. One LGB munition “hit jackpot”, detonating a large quantity of artillery shells, creating a huge mushroom cloud and shattering windows in downtown Doboj. The Bosnian Serbs panicked to such an extent, that they accused NATO of using tactical nuclear weapons.[120] Late in the evening of the 12th, “Hornets” from the USS America made the last stand-off strike into northwestern Bosnia, firing four SLAMs at the Lisina television mast. Three of the four missiles found their targets, toppling the tower. The last bombs were dropped on the 13th on an ammunition dump and tank training ground near Sarajevo.[121] The operations were over, it was time for Richard Holbrooke to take action.

Richard Holbrooke, a seasoned diplomat and a hawk, was described as “a political appointee” not a career foreign service officer.[122] He was known to “beat two drums”, the first one being the hawkish-Madeleine Albright’s style-of Serbs being “thugs and murderers” and the other, associated with the need to keep the negotiations open with Slobodan Milosevic. He went that far as to propose the covert arming of Muslims, while he was an early proponent of the airstrikes carried out in the framework of “Operation Deliberate Force”. He also advocated in favor of Serb leaders being trialed for war crimes. This kind of talk was his modus operandi of “shaking up” Clinton’s administration policy on Bosnia.

In 1994 he was appointed as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs.[123] Holbrooke’s job was “cut out for him”. By the spring of 1995 the various peace initiatives had all but failed, namely the European Economic Community Cutileiro plan, the Vance-Owen peace plan, the HMS Invincible Peace Talks, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, the Contact Group plan and the Carter Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. The age of appeasement was over for Milosevic and his political and military associates in Bosnia, the need for exhibition of brute force was pivotal and Holbrooke along with Albright and Vice President Al Gore, were the strongest proponents.[124]

On 9 August 1995 President Clinton formally launched the US peace initiative, which would culminate to the Dayton Peace Accords. The plan included seven main elements: It was going to be a comprehensive peace settlement, it would involve a three way recognition of Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia, it would fully lift all sanctions and the supply of arms to the former Yugoslavia, following a successful agreement, it would include a peaceful return of Eastern Slavonia to Croatia, it would reflect an all-out effort to pursue a cease fire and an end to all offensive operations and it would impose a 51-49% territorial division between the Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska, along with regional economic construction.[125] Richard Holbrooke was appointed as chief US negotiator between the belligerent sides [126] and to achieve where everyone else had failed, he was willing to “strike a deal with the devil”, meaning that he was willing not to hinder the Croat “Mistral 2” offensive, despite the political warnings and the discomfort it was causing to the Western political leadership.[127]

By 14 September, only seven Option 1 and 2 targets were left and Mladic still refused to budge. An expansion to Option 3 targets would have major political and humanitarian consequences. It would lead to the total annihilation of the BSA army, thus allowing the Bosnian Muslims and Croats to seize the whole Bosnia for themselves and it would cause a massive refugees flow, not to mention Russia’s distress and the power it still held in the UN as a permanent member of the UNSC, with the power to veto decisions. During the afternoon of 13 September Holbrooke was to meet Milosevic and was about to hide the truth, that “Operation Deliberate Force” was about to reach an impasse. Instead, he would use the momentum created by the UN/NATO operation and the imminent fall of BSA’s stronghold in Banja Luka by the Croatian forces, in order to offer Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb associate a “clean way out”. The bluff worked and Milosevic went thus far as to threaten Mladic that he would abandon the BSA to its fate, unless he complied with the Western demands.[128]

The ultimatum dictated that the Bosnian Serbs would withdraw all their heavy equipment from Sarajevo to a 20 km exclusion zone and would last until 10:00 PM, 16 September, however it was to be extended for another 72 hours, as technical failures plagued the Bosnian Serb vehicles. The reopening of Sarajevo airport was a pressing need, since it was closed since April, because of heavy fighting. The airport was reopened by 15 September and the next day the airbridge was established once again, bringing in much needed humanitarian aid. On 20 September Admiral Smith and General Janvier flew to Sarajevo to ascertain, whether the BSA was in compliance. The Bosnian Serbs had pulled back 250 tanks and heavy weapons, a fact that officially sealed the success of “Operation Deliberate Force”, although NATO aircraft were still patrolling Bosnian skies. On 3 October, a Bosnian Serb radar “painted” a pair of “Prowlers”, which in turn destroyed it by firing HARM missiles.[129] The last airstrike would take place on 9 October, when a Danish F-16 would strike a Serb artillery battery, which was shelling the UN base at Tuzla.[130] Overall, until the end of 1995, NATO had conducted around 100,420 sorties over Bosnia and its wider region. 23,021 were CAP mission in the framework of “Operation Deny Flight”, 27,077 strike missions, 29,158 different support missions (refuel, reconnaissance. AWACS, ELINT and jamming missions) and 21,164 training missions would make up the bulk of NATO’s overall interference in the Bosnian civil war.[131]
Welch Fusiliers
From 18 to 20 September 1995, the Serb Gazelles, Oraos and Jastrebs were executing airstrikes to halt the Croatian advance. Understandably, NATO did nothing to intercept those flights, despite Muslim complaints that the Serbian air was “very active…”.[132] “Operation Deliberate Force” had already crippled BSA forces and politicians had turned a blind eye to the joint Bosnian Muslim-Croatian operations. Furthermore, Holbrooke needed his 49-51% partition of Bosnia and did not want the Bosnian-Croatian forces marching into Banja-Luka, thus canceling the agreement. On 21 November 1995, the diplomatic marathon was culminated in the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside of Dayton, by the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. The Bosnian war was officially over after it had claimed 200,000 lives and had displaced two million.[133]

From a perspective of military novelty, “Operation Deliberate Force” featured the first Precision Guided Munitions, like the GBU-10 and GBU-12 Laser guided Bombs, the first deployment of Predators UAVs, the first deployment of GBU-15s Glide Bombs, the first deployment of Matra and GBU-12 Laser-Guided Bombs by French Mirage 2000N-K2 and Jaguar As, the first deployment of AN/ASQ-213 HARM Targeting Systems on F-16Cs and the first combat deployment of the “Tomahawk” TLAMs in the European Operation Theatre. It also featured the first deployment of German, Spanish and Italian air forces in combat since the Second World War.[134]

In conclusion, the timidity and appeasement showed by the collective Western political leadership, even though military assets were deployed in Bosnia, in the framework of “Operation Deny Flight” led undoubtedly to the humanitarian disaster at Srebrenica. The fact itself that the West needed Srebrenica as a “Wake-up call” is disturbing beyond the wildest imagination. The lack of a concrete and explicit mandate led the UN Dutch troops in Srebrenica, to sit back, doing nothing while Mladic was committing his genocide. The definition of the “Safe zones” by the International Community with Madeleine Albright as the fiercest supporter resembled a “paper-shield” of false hopes and wishful thinking, behind which the UN and Western political leadership were hiding, hoping that Mladic would not dare cross that line. In the post-Cold war era Clinton’s embrace of Fukuyama’s view of “The end of history” made him a leader of the “Geoeconomic era”, which dictated that no major wars were to be fought and the need to resolve complex situations with the use of armed forces was essentially absent. Especially in the aftermath of Somalia and the “Black Hawk Down” experience, Clinton’s administration and the West as a collective whole, were suffering from an “OCD-PTSD comorbidity”, being obsessed that any involvement in Bosnia would bring about a political maelstrom, sucking them in, while at the same time reliving Somalia, all over again.

If we want to draw a line between Bosnia and the contemporary battlefields, the UN safe zones resembled the case of Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia, when the Russian Federation integrated them, while they were still under Ukrainian control, on the one hand and on the other embarrassingly withdrawing from Kherson during November 2022, officially losing territory, which was a first since the German invasion in 1941.

“Operation Deliberate Force” remains up to date a perfectly executed plan and there is little doubt that it fulfilled its objectives. Nevertheless, a cloud of “What ifs” still hover above it. What if Holbrooke was not able to convince Milosevic to force Mladic to withdraw? NATO forces had already run out of Option 1 and 2 targets and were about to expand to Option 3. What if NATO had been forced to strike Option 3 objectives? What if the Bosnian Muslims and Croatians had never mounted an assault against the Serbs? What if the pursuit of Option 3 had resulted in the fall of Banja Luka and the complete annihilation of the BSA, would the Dayton Accords end the conflict, by implementing Clinton’s 49-51% plan?

It is human after all to perceive things as “Black and White”, a view which is being reflected in modern military operations around the world. After “Deliberate Force” NATO was-to an extent-falsely overconfident that air campaigns could win wars, not considering the fact that the operation was being supplemented by Bosnian Muslim-Croat operation on the ground. The view that NATO’s air force was omnipotent would be later manifested to the adoption of the so called “Rumsfeld doctrine”, transforming the US armed forces to fight the War against Terror, by utilizing minimum ground elements. The reemergence of Russia and China, though, makes a combined arms approach, Desert Storm style, imperative, utilizing fire power to its full extent by aerial, naval and terrestrial assets alike. On the other hand, there is Russia, whose involvement in Ukraine underscored the grim reality that whatever military novelties it had managed to achieve in the post-Georgian war era, were available solely for parades and “posh” aerial acrobatics, featuring weapons systems, that were not essentially integrated into the Country’s war doctrine.

In terms of the political reality created in the aftermath of “Deliberate Force”, Milosevic’s appetite for a “Greater Serbia”, would not be sated yet and in the next four years his genocidal campaign against the Albanian population in Kosovo, would trigger the next NATO intervention in the Balkans, “Operation Allied Force”, which would put an end to a “Serbian genocidal rampage” in the region for good. From that perspective, “Operation Deliberate Force” would pose as a prequel to “Operation Allied Force”, just as the Dayton Accords would build the appropriate “Holbrooke dynamics”, when in 1996 he would intervene during the Imia/Kardak crisis, to prevent an all out war between Greece and Turkey (both NATO members) and thus saving once again NATO’s reputation from a fatal spin, which would further question its raison d'être in the post-Cold war era.

* * *

Show Notes

* * *

© 2025 Alexandros Boufesis.

Alexandros Boufesis is a holder of an Msc in International Security Studies (London Metropolitan University) and a PgC in Counter-Terrorism (St Andrews University). He has worked for many years as an investigative journalist in the areas of defense, geopolitics and military history. He is the author of the book: "The Russian Georgian War of 2008: Russia's Geostrategic Ascension", along with the upcoming books by Helion: "Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector, NATO and the Air War over Libya" and "China's Military Modernization, Assessing China's Weapons and Strategic Reach in the early 21st Century".

Alexandros Boufesis Books:
Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector
China's Military Modernization
The Russia-Georgia War of 2008: Russia's Geostrategic Ascension (Decisive Battles of the 21st Century Book 2)

* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent those of MilitaryHistoryOnline.com.