By nightfall on June 6th 1944-D-Day,
Hitler's Atlantic Wall on the coast of Normandy had been breached.
The Allies, at a cost of 9,500 casualties compared with 4-10,000
Germans, were ashore in Fortress Europe. But their position
remained precarious; the beachheads had less depth than had been
hoped for, and British and US forces had not yet linked up.
Supplies and reinforcements were not coming ashore as rapidly as
had been planned, and the initially slow and piecemeal enemy
reaction could not be expected to remain so favorable.
The Allies had to link up and expand their currently insecure
toeholds into something more substantial as rapidly as possible.
For Germany, the result of the first day of fighting had been
disappointing, but was not viewed as disastrous. Partly as a
result of Hitler's hesitancy, and also as a consequence of
virtually complete Allied air supremacy over the approaches to the
battle area, 21st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, forming the
immediate mobile reserve, had not intervened effectively on June
6th. Indeed losses from enemy air attack were so substantial that
it is unlikely that their earlier release would have made any
significant difference.
Rommel, absent in Bavaria during the opening hours of the battle,
arrived back at Army Group B Headquarters late in the evening, and
began re-organising the currently fragmented command structure.
Panzer Group West of General Geyr von Schweppenberg, took over
from 7th Army command of the front between the Rivers Vire and
Orne, and was tasked with organising a powerful armoured
counterstroke. Meanwhile Rommel, in an order endorsed by Hitler on
June 11th, ordered his troops to maintain a static defence and
hold their ground. This would, it was hoped, reduce the effects of
Allied air power and keep open the possibility of a panzer
counteroffensive. Rommel was faced with a situation in which the
uncompleted Atlantic Wall had failed to repulse the invasion, and
he now had to devise a new defensive strategy which would also
allow for major armoured counterstrokes. But Allied air power and
naval gun support, and the virtual non-existence of the Luftwaffe
in the theater, meant that Rommel could hardly hope to win a full
scale mobile battle . Instead he would have to use all the
advantages of terrain to fight a defensive action.
Most of the terrain over which the battle of the coming weeks
would be fought was well-suited to such a strategy. In particular,
Normandy was noted for the bocage, a dense chequerboard of small
fields, surrounded by thick hedges and earth banks, with narrow
sunken lanes running between them. German defensive skills soon
proved to have the ability to turn every field into a potential
death trap for Allied armor and infantry. The bocage extended for
up to 50 miles inland, excellent country for anti-tank warfare
which would also use up attacking infantry at a very high rate.
Clever use of concealment in the woods and hedgerows also reduced
the effects of Allied air attack by up to 75%. In these conditions
determined infantrymen armed with rockets or the deadly
panzerfaust , supported by the redoubtable dual-purpose 88mm AA/AT
gun , could wait in concealment until an enemy tank was at very
close range before opening fire.
About 20 miles south of Bayeux, the bocage turned into an area of
thickly wooded ridges with the key feature of Mont Pincon, a 1200
foot hill 20 miles south-west of Caen. Another important
observation post was Hill 112, 5 miles to the south-west of Caen.
Also significant in this area were another series of ridges,
extending to the south and south-east as far as Falaise, of which
the most important, providing an excellent defensive position
against attack by armor, and blocking the road to Paris, was
Bourgebus Ridge, 3 miles to the south of Caen and dominating the
town.
On the American front, the main objectives were the port of
Cherbourg on the tip of the Cotentin Peninsula, and the important
road junction town of St Lo, whose capture would open up the
possibility of a drive deep into the French interior.
Despite the defensive advantages of the bocage, and his success on
June 6th in preventing Montgomery from taking Caen, Rommel had no
illusions concerning the probable long term outcome of the
struggle. At best he could buy time, either for Hitler to produce
powerful reserves from elsewhere, such as the powerful units of
15th Army still deployed in the Pas de Calais awaiting another
invasion, or until another defensive position was prepared further
into the interior, along the Seine, or even on the line of the
much-vaunted West Wall along the German frontier. Just how much
time Rommel had would depend as much upon Allied actions as his
own.
Fighting Resumes
On June 7th 21st Panzer Division, which had performed the only
significant counterattack on D-Day, was caught up in defensive
fighting outside Caen. It was left to the dynamic, newly-promoted
General Kurt Meyer, with his fanatical Hitler Youth –recruited
12th SS, to attempt to strike back. From the beginning his efforts
were impeded by enemy air attack. It took his leading units 10
hours to cover the 40 miles to their jump-off point, suffering
casualties in the process. The attack by 12th SS directed against
Canadian troops between Caen and Bayeaux, met with some initial
limited success, gaining some ground and taking some prisoners (23
of whom were executed in cold blood, making 12th SS the most hated
of the Allies' opponents in Normandy). However a combination of
massed artillery fire and naval gun support quickly stalled the
German advance, forcing them back to their start line with the
loss of 31 tanks. The next nearest panzer reserve formation ,
Panzer Lehr Division, was also struggling to reach the scene of
action in the face of almost continuous attacks from the air , and
in the course of the day had a total of 40 petrol tankers, 90
trucks, 5 tanks and 84 half-tracks and self-propelled guns knocked
out.
For about the next 48 hours, the main immediate concern for the
Allies remained the situation at "Omaha" beach. Fortunately, the
German forces in the immediate vicinity, consisting of the
battered 352nd Infantry Division and the 30th Mobile Brigade, were
in no condition to present a serious threat, and as Allied
reinforcements continued to pour into the beachhead the situation
steadily improved. Early on June 8th British troops from "Gold"
beach linked up with the American forces from "Omaha", whilst the
US forces continued to expand the "Utah" bridgehead. By early on
June 9th, with 11 Allied Divisions ashore, the immediate crisis
was over.
Still heavily outnumbering their immediate opponents, troops of US
V Corps were making steady, if unspectacular, progress inland from
"Omaha" against light opposition towards St Lo and Carentan. By
the evening of June 11th 1st and 2nd US Divisions had advanced 14
miles, although supply shortages were beginning to be felt. Next
day General Omar C. Bradley (1st US Army) ordered V Corps to
launch a renewed drive on St Lo, but the American forces were not
strong enough to break through the solidifying German defence
lines. On June 15th 29th US Division began a new thrust, but this
was brought to a halt three days later only 5 miles short of St
Lo.
The other immediate American objective was to link up the "Utah"
and "Omaha" bridgeheads. The main obstacle in the way of this was
the town of Carentan, fiercely defended by men of the German 6th
Parachute Regiment. Rommel regarded holding Carentan as critical,
and ordered its defenders to be reinforced by II Parachute Corps
from Brittany and 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division moving up from
the south.
The next few days saw bitter fighting. Link-up thrusts by the
lightly armed 101st Airborne from "Utah" and 29th Division from
"Omaha" were halted by the German paratroopers after a tough
battle. Fortunately for the Allies, Rommel's promised
reinforcements were severely delayed by a combination of air
attacks and sabotage by the Resistance. On June 11th, just as the
first elements of 17th SS were arriving in the area, 101st
Airborne renewed the attack on Carentan, with massive air and
naval support , and finally drove out the defenders early next
day. The link-up of the Allied bridgeheads was complete.
Villers-Bocage : The British Repulsed
Despite the disappointing results of the initial German
counter-attacks, Hitler still planned a major German
counteroffensive directed at the British and Canadian beach heads.
Von Schweppenberg's Panzer Group West was tasked with organising
this, and set up a field headquarters in orchards near the village
of Thury Harcourt, 12 miles south of Caen. Among its equipment
were several powerful radio transmitter trucks. The signals sent
out by these were picked up by British Traffic Analysis monitors,
and on June 10th Allied Typhoons and Mitchells hit the German HQ.
Von Schweppenberg was injured and many of his staff killed. With
Panzer Group West HQ for the moment out of action, responsibility
for directing the German offensive was handed over to "Sepp"
Dietrich of 1 SS Panzer Corps, who quickly decided that for the
moment potential Allied opposition was too strong to make such an
operation feasible.
Both Montgomery and the British Official History would claim in
years to come that the Allied plan from the beginning had been for
British 2nd Army to adopt an overall defensive strategy, aimed at
drawing against it around Caen the bulk of the German panzer
divisions and so easing the task of US 1st Army in expanding the
bridgehead to the west and eventually breaking out. In fact, there
is convincing evidence that for several weeks at least after
D-Day, Montgomery still hoped to take Caen and thrust armored
columns deep beyond it towards Falaise. By June 10th he was
planning a major offensive intended to trap Caen and its defenders
in the jaws of a double envelopment. Whilst 51st Highland Division
and 4th Armored Brigade performed a short hook east of the city in
the Orne valley, in the west the right pincer consisting of
British XXX Corps spearheaded by 7th Armored Division, would take
the key road junction of Villers Bocage. It would then turn east
to link up with the 1st British Airborne Division which would be
dropped in the Odon Valley, trapping the defenders of Caen.
However Montgomery's plan ran into immediate difficulties. Air
Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commanded the AEAF (Allied
Expeditionary Air Force) refused to carry out the drop of 1st
Airborne on the grounds that the operation would be too dangerous
for his aircrews. German counterattacks east of Caen reinforced
the view that opposition to the paratroops was likely to be too
strong.
Nevertheless Montgomery put the rest of his plan into operation on
June 10th, when 51st Highland Division opened its attack east of
Caen, only to be firmly repulsed by 21st Panzer. With his planned
left hook stalled, Montgomery's hopes of success rested on the
drive to Villers Bocage, headed by 7th Armored. Initial progress
here also proved slow. But on the evening of June 11th it became
apparent that there was an opportunity to outflank Panzer Lehr
which had been fiercely opposing 7th Armored around Tilly sur
Seulles, and drive through a gap which existed between Lehr's left
and the 352nd Infantry Division opposing the US V Corps' drive on
Caumont.
Speed was essential. Unfortunately Lieutenant-General G.C.
Bucknall, commanding XXX Corps, lacked the necessary drive. It was
not until midday on 12th June, urged on by General Richard
Dempsey, Commanding 2nd Army, that Bucknell ordered Maj-General
Robert Erskine of 7th Armored, too disengage around Tilly and move
round Lehr's flank, heading for Villers Bocage.
Valuable time had been lost, and although the operation began
well, it soon became clear that the 7th Armored, famed as the
"Desert Rats" in the North African campaign, were ill at ease in
the confined surroundings of the bocage. Erskine would claim later
that he had been given his orders to exploit the gap 24 hours too
late. Even so, an opportunity still remained. Immediate opposition
consisted of two armored and four infantry battalions of Panzer
Lehr, reinforced by 501st SS Heavy Tank Battalion. With a 10-mile
front to defend, the Germans could have been seriously stretched
by an assault on a broad front, but fortunately XXX Corps elected
to drive a narrow spearhead, headed by 7th Armored directly along
the route to Villers Bocage.
The attack was headed by Brigadier Robert Hinde's 22nd Armored
Brigade. Hinde was a fearless commander who believed in leading
from the front. Pushing forward with reasonable speed, 22nd
Armored was within 5 miles of Villers Bocage by the evening of
June 12th, when Hinde, uncertain of enemy strength, halted for the
night. Early next morning the advance was resumed, and Villers
Bocage occupied to a rapturous reception from its inhabitants.
Hinde ordered "A" Squadron of the 4th County of London Yeomanry
(Sharpshooters), supported by the motorized infantry of "A"
Company of the Rifle Brigade, to secure high ground, known as Hill
213, which lay about a mile north-east of the town. The commander
of the Sharpshooters, Lieutenant-Colonel Cranley was concerned
about the lack of adequate reconnaissance before he made his
advance, but was urged to haste by Hinde. Whilst Cranley moved
forward, four of his tanks and the motorized Riflemen remained
parked in the road leading out of Villers Bocage.
Cranley's fears were about to be savagely confirmed. Moving
forward to defend the same high ground around Hill 213 was German
armor, including No 2 Company, 501st SS Heavy Tank Battalion,
commanded by the panzer ace Obersturmfuhrer Michael Wittmann, who
had already earned himself a formidable reputation on the Eastern
Front. During a period lasting no more than about five minutes,
Wittmann's company of four Tigers and one Panzer IV, using every
advantage of concealment provided by the hedgerows, carried out a
devastating surprise attack on the British column on the road from
Villers Bocage. By the end of the day, in this and renewed
fighting, Wittmann had knocked out at least 20 Cromwell tanks, 4
Fireflys, 3 light tanks, 3 scout cars and a half track, and
inflicted about 150 casualties.
Although in a renewed attack on Villers Bocage, Wittmann was
repulsed with the loss of four of his tanks, he had brought 7th
Armored to a complete halt. As reinforcements from 2nd Panzer
moved up to strengthen the German defences, the position of 7th
Armored, lacking infantry support, became increasingly dangerous.
An attack by 50th Infantry Division around Tilly had failed to
gain ground, and there was an increasing possibility that 7th
Armored might be cut off in Villers Bocage. Early in the evening
of June 13th Erskine pulled back about a mile west of the town in
an attempt to hold high ground around Hill 174. If he received
infantry support from XXX Corps, Erskine still hoped to make a
stand here.
Unfortunately General Bucknall seems to have failed to grasp the
urgent need to reinforce 7th Armored with infantry, and ordered
that 50th Division continue its unsuccessful attacks to dislodge
Panzer Lehr from around Tilly. By the afternnon of June 14th it
was obvious that Panzer Lehr was not going to be dislodged, and
Bucknall ordered 7th Armored to pull back to new positions east of
Caumont.
Though not fully admitted at the time or later, the failure at
Villers Bocage was crucial to events over the next few weeks.
Bucknall, soon to be replaced as commander of XXX Corps by the
more dynamic and thrusting Brian Horrocks, had cost the British
their last real chance of staging a major breakthrough in the Caen
sector before German defences solidified.
Though the Allies were safely ashore, and their bridgehead, unless
they made a major error, unlikely to be threatened, a grim battle
of attrition lay ahead. The first major task was to complete the
capture of Cherbourg, for nature was about to demonstrate the
frightening vulnerability of the Allied forces until they held a
major port.
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