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The current time is: 9/19/2018 7:32:10 AM
 (1863) Battle of Gettysburg
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Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom,
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Posts: 78

Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/26/2018 3:22:33 AM
length of engagement 30 mins. 12000 V 6000 with 70 supporting Art.

Lethality index using lanchester square law.
shot 1
Case 7
Cannister 12.
Rifle 1.


12000 CSA manoeuvres towards US, under shot and case ( equal use by US of each munition type) for 10 mins to get to cannister 500 range.This subjets them to 30 rounds of fire.
This long range Art Fire, reduces CSA to 1129.

US Art switches to cannister.CS advances to 200 yards. This takes 3 mins and subjets them to 9 rounds of fire.
This cannister fire reduces CS to 10165.

CS and US are now at rifle range and exchange fire for 5 mins, cannister is still fired, while some CS attempt to close to contact. This subject CS to 15 round of cannister and rifle fire, US to 15 rifle fire.

Cannister and rifle fire reduce CS to 7626 and US to 4587.

CS withdraws after failure of closeing to contact, and or driving of by exchange of fire. After 5 mins the officers can see they are losing men at a rate of twice that of their openent. ( 519 CS 267 US). 10 mins retreat under long range fire shot and case.

This reduces CS strength to 6474.

CS losses under Lanchester 5526. US Losses under lanchester 1413.

What of the second wave?.
Had L/Street send in the second wave of 5500, and it arrived at the end of 5 min exchange of fire fight at 200 yards with the first repulse of attempts to close, things changes.

CS ( CS outnumbers US 8 to 5, is inflicting 1 for every 2 lost, with supports that jumps to 13 to 5) CS 7859 inflicts 89 as supports arrive, CS now has 13186 and increases to inflicting each round 115 before falling back to 104 after 5 mins of exchange, US 4761 was inflicting 173 as supports arrive and now drops to 160 after five min and has reduced to 3134. 5 mins after the suports arrive the CS outnumbers the US 11 to 3 is losing 3 to 2 inflicted.

Its not clear from this that a second wave will succede, its committed 17500 and has lost 7500, despite reducing the US from 6000 to 3134, but has not achieved superiority of fire, but i would hazard the second wave may have triggerd a collapse of morale as casualties in the US doubled in a 5 min span, but equally the CS first wave would have hit that wall earlier only incremintaly.

The only way to achieve superiority of fire is for art to acompany the attack, or to have reduced the US Art present before the attack went in. CS achieved neither and paid the price.

Phil andrade
London, UK
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Moderator
Posts: 3192

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/26/2018 8:32:03 AM
Nick,

Is this a computerised game ?

Has it been predicated on statistics produced by historians ; in this case Stewart’s book on Pickett’s Charge ?

Or did the numbers get produced by Lanchester’s own formula ?

Presumably, the numbers are based on “hits”, ie killed/wounded. No provision made for twelve to fifteen hundred unwounded rebel prisoners . There also would have been significant numbers who refused to advance, and kept their heads down in whatever cover the ground offered. I wonder how many just ran away.

Regards, Phil
---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom,
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E-4 Specialist
Posts: 78

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/26/2018 8:43:54 AM
Hi Phil

Editted the first post to make things more clear.

Just an example of how lanchesters laws predicts the outcome, ( its a prediction model, not an outcome model based on an authors set of casulaties inflicted and recieved) using 12000 v 6000 with 70 supporting Art, and scn where a second wave of 5500 sent in. Could easly add in the 9 Howizters for CS as part of the first wave for instance. Set up a spreadsheet and you can perform it for any encounter with couple of mins effort.

Phil andrade
London, UK
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Posts: 3192

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/26/2018 10:27:40 AM
Alexander wanted to follow up with howitzers ; or does memory play me false ?

There was a rather token kind of follow up from the Florida and Alabama brigades of Perry and Wilcox that fell apart after suffering several hundred additional casualties.

People seem to overlook the severity of the loss suffered by the federal regiments that bore the brunt of the confederate attack.

Obviously, we have to allow for the very heavy damage that Hancock’s command had sustained on Day Two, but, when these have been taken into account, the troops who got hit by the close quarters fighting at the climax of battle on day three appeared to have taken percentage casualties ( excluding prisoners) that rivalled those of the attacking enemy.

Vanderslice calculated that the Union casualties for the entire action along and around Cemetery Ridge throughout the third day amounted to 2,220 killed and wounded and 112 taken prisoner. The figure for killed and wounded is about fifty per cent greater than the 1,500 cited in Stewart’s book. I think that this might be attributable to the losses suffered in the sustained skirmishing along the Union centre ( e.g. Bliss Farm), and the damage suffered by rear echelon troops in the artillery barrage, which overshot and hit the wagon parks etc in rear.

Am I to understand that Lanchester predicted these statistical outcomes independently from the historical records ?

Regards , Phil
---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom,
top 50
E-4 Specialist
Posts: 78

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/26/2018 11:16:11 AM
Dammit eddited out earlier reply to you Phil. Ill asume you will have read it already tho, if not drop me a pm.


The effective strength of a force is proportinal to the square of the number of combatants entering an engagement. For instance, a force which outnumbered an opposing force at a ratio of three to two would have the advantage of being able to destroy enemy fighting elments, more effectively, and this superiority could be measurd as a ratio of nine to four. This relationship, is called Lanchester's Square Law. In Pickets charge the CS amases a numerical force ratio of 2 to 1, this is 4 to 1 combat power.

70 Cannon each with cannister shot ( let alone its LR ordinance) changes the percieved 2:1 numerical odds by adding in 10780 equivalents to the US 6000, the odds are now 12:17 and the combat power ratio has moved from 4:1 in favour to 1:2 against.



Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom,
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E-4 Specialist
Posts: 78

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/27/2018 3:43:42 AM
https://s3.amazonaws.com/OM-SHARE/LanchesterLaws.pdf

For anyone intrested.

Wayne Wachsmuth
Shippensburg, PA, USA
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Posts: 239

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/27/2018 8:49:12 AM
In all of the calculations have the heavy pre charge casualties in the Confederate units been taken in to account. Units on the Confederate right suffered from "overs" aimed at ANV artillery to their front and accounts mention that many men who had been on the ground to take at least a bit of shelter did not get up when the order to advance came.

Wayne

Michigan Dave
Muskegon, Michigan, MI, USA
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Posts: 3895

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/27/2018 10:06:38 AM
Hi Wayne,

I have heard that the Confederate Artillery was more accurate and damaging than 1st thought?
GNMP Ranger's battlefield walk on it.

[Read More]

What do you think?
MD
---------------
"The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract."

Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom,
top 50
E-4 Specialist
Posts: 78

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/27/2018 10:16:17 AM

Quote:
Hi Wayne,

I have heard that the Confederate Artillery was more accurate and damaging than 1st thought?
GNMP Ranger's battlefield walk on it.

[Read More]

What do you think?
MD
--Michigan Dave


It was a box barrage, people just did not know it was.

Jim Cameron
North Bellmore, NY, USA
top 15
E-8 Master Sergeant


Posts: 764

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/27/2018 2:17:05 PM
No, it wasn't. It's purpose was to surpress the Union defenses. A box barrage was typically fired on three sides of a position to isolate it to either prevent enemy reinforcements, during a trench raid, for example, or, to allow attacking troops time to consolidate on a newly taken objective.
---------------
Jim Cameron

Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.

Phil andrade
London, UK
top 5
E-9 Cmd Sgt Major
Moderator
Posts: 3192

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/27/2018 3:45:19 PM
Nick,

This has taken me aback, somewhat .

I don’t even know what Lanchester is. So abysmal are my IT skills that I can barely cope with a spreadsheet. The acronyms worry me : what is CEV ?

But I am deeply impressed.

Here’s a model, with predicted analysis telling us that the numbers of attacking troops struck down in their advance correspond almost exactly with what the most meticulous studies of the PPT action tell us actually occurred.

It reminds me of the movie, with Longstreet telling us that it was all a question of arithmetic....the numbers hit during the attack, first by long range artillery, and then by canister and rifle fire, were going to make the whole thing disastrous .

It’s a refreshing slant to see the predicted model imply that the extra five or six thousand troops, along with the properly deployed forward howitzers, would be enough to swing the thing a different way.

Not such a forlorn hope, after all ?

Regards, Phil

---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

Jim Cameron
North Bellmore, NY, USA
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E-8 Master Sergeant


Posts: 764

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/27/2018 7:12:22 PM
Of course, those extra five or six thousand troops were hard to come by. And howitzers deployed within musketry range was a dicy proposition.

I think the Bliss farm skirmishing was one of the most consequential actions of the battle. Holding the farm was so important, by way of keeping Confederate skirmishers out of even long musketry range of the Union battle line, and the fighting so protracted, that it drew enough strength to the area to effectively prevent the Confederate assault from progressing north past the Copse on the afternoonnof July 2. It wasn't so much that Posey didn't come up in support of Wright's brigade, as that his troops were so tied up in the Bliss farm action that most of them simply couldn't. The assault was running out of steam by this point anyway, but the Union strongpoint resulting from the fighting around the farm basically put a stopper on the Confederate efforts.

BTW, one often overlooked element in the fighting here was the fact the Emmitsburg Road in this sector was within the Union skirmish lines. The road provided covered positions for Union skirmish line reserves, and, allowed the Union troops to control the fences along the road.
---------------
Jim Cameron

Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.

Phil andrade
London, UK
top 5
E-9 Cmd Sgt Major
Moderator
Posts: 3192

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 5:10:39 AM

Quote:
In all of the calculations have the heavy pre charge casualties in the Confederate units been taken in to account. Units on the Confederate right suffered from "overs" aimed at ANV artillery to their front and accounts mention that many men who had been on the ground to take at least a bit of shelter did not get up when the order to advance came.

Wayne
--Wayne Wachsmuth



In heated agreement with you here, Wayne.

Does the Lanchester method give due weight to the psychological effect this had ?

One of the most anomalous things about the statistical record of Pickett’s Division at Gettysburg is that Kemper’s command, for some reason, took casualties that were markedly lower than those in the other two brigades. The anecdotal histories tell us that , of all the brigades that participated, Kemper’s suffered the preponderant damage from the long range artillery fire in the pre charge dual of the opposing gunners. I have long suspected that this had a very deleterious effect on the morale of the troops in that brigade. To endure the helplessness of being subjected to long range artillery fire, with no chance of retaliation , all the while awaiting the order to advance against an enemy waiting in position, is an excruciating ordeal for the infantrymen. The wounds are so often extremely horrific - heads carried away, dismemberment etc, that the impact is especially ghastly. Just a couple of hundred casualties suffered in that manner would be enough to smash morale as surely as it did the bodies of men. Perhaps some of the men who didn’t get up were broken in spirit rather than in body. In the event, Kemper’s brigade fell apart quite quickly. The other two brigades pressed home further, and took the bloodier losses. I make this assertion without my books to hand, because I’m in my coastal bivouac. I’ll be back home on Monday night, and will check my sources in the hope that I’m right.

Regards, Phil
---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom,
top 50
E-4 Specialist
Posts: 78

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 7:05:31 AM

Quote:
No, it wasn't. It's purpose was to surpress the Union defenses. A box barrage was typically fired on three sides of a position to isolate it to either prevent enemy reinforcements, during a trench raid, for example, or, to allow attacking troops time to consolidate on a newly taken objective.
--Jim Cameron


Thats a description of a ww1 box barrage, which requires map grid refernces of the target area, so no it was not that form of a box barrage as its technologiocly beyond the CSA to perform that. CS was not

At G/Burg there was no trenches on either side of the planned sector of the main line of resistance being assualted, so there was ability to safley reinforce the threatened sector by latteral movement under cover in the trench system on either flank. To perform latteral reinforcement ment moving in full view of the enemy, to present a column formation ( turning by Reg to the flank) target to the CSA artillary. So that was a no no. The way to reinforce the main line of resistence was to do so from the rear of the posistioned threatened, in column and then turn into line of battle.

So CSA art, posistioned in an arc firing at the point of attack, when overshooting by not correcting the guns properly, creats to the rear, and left and right rear an arc of arty effects that make any such movement subject to incomming rounds. Imagine a C where c is the CSD art fire directed at the , the arc created behind and to the left/right rear is an area brought under fire and creates the effect of box barrage on that area, thus isolating the attack point from reinforcements, hitting any posistioned there as support, like meades HQ and driving them away.

Porter noted he had driven off a Bttn of 18 guns and advised picket to launch his attack. L/street having delagted to Porter when best time to attack with infantry when the barrage had its best effect.

Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom,
top 50
E-4 Specialist
Posts: 78

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 7:09:47 AM

Quote:
Phil

I don’t even know what Lanchester is. So abysmal are my IT skills that I can barely cope with a spreadsheet. The acronyms worry me : what is CEV ?


Combat effectivness value. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a096203.pdf


Quote:

It reminds me of the movie, with Longstreet telling us that it was all a question of arithmetic....the numbers hit during the attack, first by long range artillery, and then by canister and rifle fire, were going to make the whole thing disastrous .


l/Street was against the attack, a good argument can be made he declined to send in the full amount he had authority from lee so as to minimise the losses of an attack he had decided would fail.

Consider 2nd day his achievemnt with 15000 with 80odd cannon against 21000 US with 50 odd cannon.

Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom,
top 50
E-4 Specialist
Posts: 78

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 7:12:15 AM

Quote:
Of course, those extra five or six thousand troops were hard to come by. And howitzers deployed within musketry range was a dicy proposition.


Except Lee had authorised l/Steet to use up to 10,000 and had them if he had chosen to employ them.

Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom,
top 50
E-4 Specialist
Posts: 78

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 7:15:57 AM

Quote:

Quote:
In all of the calculations have the heavy pre charge casualties in the Confederate units been taken in to account. Units on the Confederate right suffered from "overs" aimed at ANV artillery to their front and accounts mention that many men who had been on the ground to take at least a bit of shelter did not get up when the order to advance came.

Wayne
--Wayne Wachsmuth



In heated agreement with you here, Wayne.

Does the Lanchester method give due weight to the psychological effect this had ?


Dont see why there is any confusion, as i remarked it works on any numbers used as inputs, i used 12000, allowing 500 not going forward. lanchester does not calculate psychological effect, it calculates loss rates.

Jim Cameron
North Bellmore, NY, USA
top 15
E-8 Master Sergeant


Posts: 764

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 9:37:28 AM

Quote:


Thats a description of a ww1 box barrage, which requires map grid refernces of the target area, so no it was not that form of a box barrage as its technologiocly beyond the CSA to perform that. CS was not

At G/Burg there was no trenches on either side of the planned sector of the main line of resistance being assualted, so there was ability to safley reinforce the threatened sector by latteral movement under cover in the trench system on either flank. To perform latteral reinforcement ment moving in full view of the enemy, to present a column formation ( turning by Reg to the flank) target to the CSA artillary. So that was a no no. The way to reinforce the main line of resistence was to do so from the rear of the posistioned threatened, in column and then turn into line of battle.

So CSA art, posistioned in an arc firing at the point of attack, when overshooting by not correcting the guns properly, creats to the rear, and left and right rear an arc of arty effects that make any such movement subject to incomming rounds. Imagine a C where c is the CSD art fire directed at the , the arc created behind and to the left/right rear is an area brought under fire and creates the effect of box barrage on that area, thus isolating the attack point from reinforcements, hitting any posistioned there as support, like meades HQ and driving them away.

Porter noted he had driven off a Bttn of 18 guns and advised picket to launch his attack. L/street having delagted to Porter when best time to attack with infantry when the barrage had its best effect.

--Nick Spencer


Sounds like a very convoluted way of saying it wasn't a box barrage after all, except maybe by coincidence and poor gunlaying.
Dangerous to comingle CW artillery practices and capabilities with those of a war still 50 years in the future.
---------------
Jim Cameron

Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.

Jim Cameron
North Bellmore, NY, USA
top 15
E-8 Master Sergeant


Posts: 764

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 9:43:52 AM

Quote:


Except Lee had authorised l/Steet to use up to 10,000 and had them if he had chosen to employ them.

--Nick Spencer


Who, specifically? Once the charge went forward, Seminary Ridge was pretty bare.
---------------
Jim Cameron

Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.

Wayne Wachsmuth
Shippensburg, PA, USA
top 30
E-5 Sergeant


Posts: 239

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 10:23:13 AM
Reference the barrage, ANV accounts mention setting fuses on shell rounds at 1 and 1/2 mile times for some batteries when the actual range was much closer to 1 mile and accounts from observers along the Taneytown Road reported a lot of the barrage falling in that area. There were also complaints from ANV artillerymen about the fuses not being up to par the primary fuse factory having been damaged in a fire.

To add to Jim's question just where were those "extra" 10,000 troops available to Longstreet? Another question is if you are going to support a first wave of attackers you can't wait till that wave makes contact and then make the decision to send support when it takes 15-20 minutes to move across the ground. Things are pretty much going to be over one way or the other by the time the support arrives.

Wayne

Phil andrade
London, UK
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Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 11:01:57 AM
Not wishing to step away from the Lanchester method and our discussion.....but I would ask how far confederate failure might be attributable to defective artillery ammunition. More specifically , there had been an explosion in one of the principal munitions factories near Richmond ( Tredegar ? ), depriving Lee’s army of the correct fuses for the shells. Inferior fuses had to be used from other sources, and this improvisation seriously compromised the artillery effectiveness.

The other thing that keeps coming back to my mind is that Lee was, apparently, unaware of how badly damaged some of AP Hill’s units had been on Day One.

Their deployment in the attack on Day Three went ahead without a proper report of the extent of the casualties suffered by Heth and Pender’s commands two days earlier. Longstreet was reluctant to commit Hood’s and McLaws’ to the advance with Pickett. That, I daresay, was partly because he had full cognisance of their losses on Day Two. I should think that Heth’s division on Day One sustained casualties that were comparable with those suffered by Hood and McLaws, but this had not been properly countenanced. Why ?

I wonder if there was a systemic failure of staffwork in AP Hill’s corps. I can see from the research that John and Travis Busey have made into Confederate casualties at Gettysburg that the initial return of Longstreet’s corps was very close to complete when it came to the casualty figures ; the only caveat being that many of the men posted as missing had in fact been killed. But at least their status as missing in action had been offcially recognised. This was very definitely not the case in AP Hill’s command, especially in Heth’s division. In some brigades, there was no record of any missing at all. I’m tempted to surmise that there was a culpable insouciance about proper record keeping in this corps ; but it might be more fair to attribute this defect to the sudden and sharp encounter battle that enveloped Heth’s division, thereby depriving it of the chance to get any reports compiled. Ewell’s corps was also very heavily engaged that day, but the deficiency in his casualty returns was nowhere near as bad. Ewell deployed his men after the initial encounter, and might have had a better chance to get the ducks lined up.

Again, I’m writing this from my Jurassic Coast bivvy, and will seek to confirm my statement when I get back to London.

Regards, Phil
---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

Jim Cameron
North Bellmore, NY, USA
top 15
E-8 Master Sergeant


Posts: 764

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 12:35:55 PM

Quote:
Reference the barrage, ANV accounts mention setting fuses on shell rounds at 1 and 1/2 mile times for some batteries when the actual range was much closer to 1 mile and accounts from observers along the Taneytown Road reported a lot of the barrage falling in that area. There were also complaints from ANV artillerymen about the fuses not being up to par the primary fuse factory having been damaged in a fire.

To add to Jim's question just where were those "extra" 10,000 troops available to Longstreet? Another question is if you are going to support a first wave of attackers you can't wait till that wave makes contact and then make the decision to send support when it takes 15-20 minutes to move across the ground. Things are pretty much going to be over one way or the other by the time the support arrives.

Wayne
--Wayne Wachsmuth


Fuse settings were only part of the problem. Sights were crude, at best, and with no recoil mechanisms guns had to be manhandled back into battery after each shot. The gunners were basically firing into a wall of smoke with little ability to observe fall of shot or correct, much less duplicate their aim from shot to shot. Even a minor error in sighting could send rounds over the target, meaning it hardly mattered how accurate the fuse setting was.

As far as the extra troops, to be of any use they would have had to have been under orders and ready to go. But McLaws, often talked about as part of a "second wave", wrote that he knew nothing about the attack until it was already over. And Rodes, also a second wave candidate, wrote that his orders were the same as the day before, and general, and that he was therefore on the lookout for an opportunity to make himself useful. What this amounted to, as far as having any role in the charge, or in exploiting any success, was no orders at all.
---------------
Jim Cameron

Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.

Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom,
top 50
E-4 Specialist
Posts: 78

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 2:07:46 PM

Quote:

Sounds like a very convoluted way of saying it wasn't a box barrage after all, except maybe by coincidence and poor gunlaying.
Dangerous to comingle CW artillery practices and capabilities with those of a war still 50 years in the future.

--Jim Cameron


No its an explanation of the effect of the CS barrage, which was to achieve what a box barrage is intended to achieve by design. Since both sides did it here, no one raises the point of the US counter firing over the CS guns and hitting unitended targets due to the same problem with restting the guns, and other engments its a common event in the WBTS, but due to the posistion of the tubes firing it created a box barrage effect on those it was placed.
Your the one who did that, so yep.

Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom,
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E-4 Specialist
Posts: 78

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 2:43:31 PM

Quote:

Quote:


Except Lee had authorised l/Steet to use up to 10,000 and had them if he had chosen to employ them.

--Nick Spencer


Who, specifically? Once the charge went forward, Seminary Ridge was pretty bare.
--Jim Cameron


Lee gave 2 corps to L/street to conduct the assualt, he could draw on any of those Brigades, he used only a fraction, because before attemting it he had already decided it would fail. lee explained his attack plan was poorly co ordinated in his report, thats what he was refering to. Taylor and Long both in their memoirs took up the defence of Lee, claiming the 2 Div attack could and should have been a 4 Div attack, as directed by Lee, and that those 10,000 would have achieved success, Imboden thought it would as well as did Lee..https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=nu6LDAAAQBAJ&pg=PT378&lpg=PT378&dq=general+taylor+4+divisions+instead+of+2+at+pickett%27s+charge&source=bl&ots=bgePDRjI-G&sig=6gLOGJsyEp2tJmmVyjZvTACGmcI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjivpWUtMLcAhUkC8AKHcFSB60Q6AEwGHoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=general%20taylor%204%20divisions%20instead%20of%202%20at%20pickett's%20charge&f=false

[Long, Memoirs of RE Lee, pgs 288-95] [Annals of the War, Taylor, Campaign in Pennsylvania pg 305]

Volume XL of the Southern Historical Papers, which was issued in September, 1915, Dr. Randolph H. McKim has published an article entitled "The Gettysburg Campaign,"
"But this is not all. General Longstreet disobeyed General Lee in another respect; it is an unquestionable fact, supported by testimony from various sources, that Longstreet was directed to put his whole corps into the attack. Indeed he himself admits it. (See Henderson's Lecture, p. 15). () The divisions of McLaws and Hood and Pickett were all to be employed. He was to be reinforced moreover by Heth's division, and by two brigades of Pender's division, to the command of which Major-General Trimble was assigned--and General Hill was ordered to afford General Longstreet further assistance if necessary. Instead of this Longstreet sent forward about 12,000 men only to assail the whole Federal army. They made the assault, those Virginians and North Carolinians, with magnificent gallantry. They pierced the enemy's center, but where were their supports? Where were the divisions of McLaws and Hood? Where the brigades Hill was to put in? The answer is,--idle, looking on, doing nothing! This devoted column of 42 regiments, possibly 12,000 men assaulted nearly the whole Federal army, while seven-ninths of the Confederate army looked on without firing a shot. At the moment of their success they looked back vainly for support; "not a single Confederate bayonet, save in the hands of wounded or retreating men, was between them and the ridge from which they had advanced, 1,200 yards in the rear. Fiercely they struggled to maintain their position, but their courage had been thrown away." (Henderson, p. 16.)

General R. H. Anderson says in his report, which is published in Volume III of the "Southern Historical Society Papers," page 52:

"I received orders to hold my division in readiness to move up in support if it should become necessary.




Phil andrade
London, UK
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Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 3:46:56 PM
Nick,

Weren’t the SHSP the main conduit for Lost Cause polemics ?

By their reckoning , Longstreet was the villain of the piece.

Did Longstreet account for his refusal to pitch Hood and McLaws into the fray with Pickett ?

Regards, Phil
---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

Jim Cameron
North Bellmore, NY, USA
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Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 9:25:09 PM

Quote:

Quote:


No its an explanation of the effect of the CS barrage, which was to achieve what a box barrage is intended to achieve by design. Since both sides did it here, no one raises the point of the US counter firing over the CS guns and hitting unitended targets due to the same problem with restting the guns, and other engments its a common event in the WBTS, but due to the posistion of the tubes firing it created a box barrage effect on those it was placed.
Your the one who did that, so yep.

--Nick Spencer


No, it didn't, but if you want to have WW1 artillery tactics 50 years early, have fun.
---------------
Jim Cameron

Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.

Jim Cameron
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Posts: 764

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/28/2018 9:30:41 PM

Quote:
Nick,

Weren’t the SHSP the main conduit for Lost Cause polemics ?

By their reckoning , Longstreet was the villain of the piece.

Did Longstreet account for his refusal to pitch Hood and McLaws into the fray with Pickett ?

Regards, Phil
--Phil andrade


The SHSP needs to be taken with a large dose of caution, for that very reason.
Frankly, this thread isn't particularly realistic and would be better suited to a gaming forum.
---------------
Jim Cameron

Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.

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Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/29/2018 7:19:46 AM

Quote:

Quote:
Nick,

Weren’t the SHSP the main conduit for Lost Cause polemics ?

By their reckoning , Longstreet was the villain of the piece.

Did Longstreet account for his refusal to pitch Hood and McLaws into the fray with Pickett ?

Regards, Phil
--Phil andrade


The SHSP needs to be taken with a large dose of caution, for that very reason.
Frankly, this thread isn't particularly realistic and would be better suited to a gaming forum.
--Jim Cameron


Jim,

Nick is clearly a gaming enthusiast . That’s a sector I know nothing about. I do think, though, that we can use the thread to develop discussion about the battle; although I’m worried that I’ll be treading over old ground. I suppose virtually everything we discuss about Gettysburg falls into that trap !

I would be keen to investigate my suggestion that Longstreet was much better informed about the severity of his casualties than Hill was. Even in the movie, we see his staff officer , Maxley Sorrel, giving him a full rendition of the loss of officers almost immediately after the repulse : a rather implausible prospect , given the chaos and confusion that must have attended. IIRC, Longstreet dismissed this and says something like “ Not now, later ! “.

Lee was shocked at the condition of Scales’s brigade when he saw it before the advance, asking why the lightly wounded men had not been sent to the rear. He had not been informed as to the extent of the damage sustained on Day One.

Insufficient reporting dogged his battle.

Regards, Phil
---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

scoucer
Berlin, Germany
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Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/29/2018 9:38:40 AM

Quote:

Quote:
In all of the calculations have the heavy pre charge casualties in the Confederate units been taken in to account. Units on the Confederate right suffered from "overs" aimed at ANV artillery to their front and accounts mention that many men who had been on the ground to take at least a bit of shelter did not get up when the order to advance came.

Wayne
--Wayne Wachsmuth



In heated agreement with you here, Wayne.

Does the Lanchester method give due weight to the psychological effect this had ?

One of the most anomalous things about the statistical record of Pickett’s Division at Gettysburg is that Kemper’s command, for some reason, took casualties that were markedly lower than those in the other two brigades. The anecdotal histories tell us that , of all the brigades that participated, Kemper’s suffered the preponderant damage from the long range artillery fire in the pre charge dual of the opposing gunners. I have long suspected that this had a very deleterious effect on the morale of the troops in that brigade. To endure the helplessness of being subjected to long range artillery fire, with no chance of retaliation , all the while awaiting the order to advance against an enemy waiting in position, is an excruciating ordeal for the infantrymen. The wounds are so often extremely horrific - heads carried away, dismemberment etc, that the impact is especially ghastly. Just a couple of hundred casualties suffered in that manner would be enough to smash morale as surely as it did the bodies of men. Perhaps some of the men who didn’t get up were broken in spirit rather than in body. In the event, Kemper’s brigade fell apart quite quickly. The other two brigades pressed home further, and took the bloodier losses. I make this assertion without my books to hand, because I’m in my coastal bivouac. I’ll be back home on Monday night, and will check my sources in the hope that I’m right.

Regards, Phil
--Phil andrade


Now this interests me after doing a lot of reading about the 24th Virginia a few years back. I had started to write but unfortunately was taken ill. Will get back after I´ve re-read my stuff. I remember also something about it not only being "overshoot" but that Kemper´s Brigade had no cover and no water. A lot was to do with heatstroke.
wasn´t it Kemper´s Brigade that took flanking fire from the Vermont Brigade ?

Will get back anyway.

Trevor
---------------
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Some swim with the stream. Some swim against the stream. Me - I´m stuck somewhere in the woods and can´t even find the stupid stream.

Phil andrade
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Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/29/2018 10:27:09 AM

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:
In all of the calculations have the heavy pre charge casualties in the Confederate units been taken in to account. Units on the Confederate right suffered from "overs" aimed at ANV artillery to their front and accounts mention that many men who had been on the ground to take at least a bit of shelter did not get up when the order to advance came.

Wayne
--Wayne Wachsmuth



In heated agreement with you here, Wayne.

Does the Lanchester method give due weight to the psychological effect this had ?

One of the most anomalous things about the statistical record of Pickett’s Division at Gettysburg is that Kemper’s command, for some reason, took casualties that were markedly lower than those in the other two brigades. The anecdotal histories tell us that , of all the brigades that participated, Kemper’s suffered the preponderant damage from the long range artillery fire in the pre charge dual of the opposing gunners. I have long suspected that this had a very deleterious effect on the morale of the troops in that brigade. To endure the helplessness of being subjected to long range artillery fire, with no chance of retaliation , all the while awaiting the order to advance against an enemy waiting in position, is an excruciating ordeal for the infantrymen. The wounds are so often extremely horrific - heads carried away, dismemberment etc, that the impact is especially ghastly. Just a couple of hundred casualties suffered in that manner would be enough to smash morale as surely as it did the bodies of men. Perhaps some of the men who didn’t get up were broken in spirit rather than in body. In the event, Kemper’s brigade fell apart quite quickly. The other two brigades pressed home further, and took the bloodier losses. I make this assertion without my books to hand, because I’m in my coastal bivouac. I’ll be back home on Monday night, and will check my sources in the hope that I’m right.

Regards, Phil
--Phil andrade


Now this interests me after doing a lot of reading about the 24th Virginia a few years back. I had started to write but unfortunately was taken ill. Will get back after I´ve re-read my stuff. I remember also something about it not only being "overshoot" but that Kemper´s Brigade had no cover and no water. A lot was to do with heatstroke.
wasn´t it Kemper´s Brigade that took flanking fire from the Vermont Brigade ?

Will get back anyway.

Trevor

--scoucer



Yes, you’re right, I’m sure, Trevor....and thanks for that mention of heat stroke ; I had not thought of that. A very valid reason for ascribing failure in the advance.
Am I right in suggesting that Kemper was cut from different cloth from Garnett and Armistead : a politician of sorts, as opposed to the professional soldier ?
I wonder if that impinged on the performance of his command.

Significant that Kemper was the only brigade commander to survive the action in Pickett’s division , although he was desperately wounded. And I must counter my implication about Kemper’s non military background being an impediment.....Barksdale had been a newspaper owner in civvie street, and his combat record - and that of the men he led - was hardly lacklustre . I have read, though, that some of his soldiers considered him a puffed up figure who had been given too much credit. But soldiers always bitch about their leaders, don’t they ?

Stannard’s Vermonters definitely struck Kemper’s brigade in the flank. Ohioans worked the same magic on the other side of the attacking lines. I must refer to my books when I get home and check which yankees broke up Brokenbrough’s ( Mayo’s) brigade . That might have been Stannard’s work, too...or maybe it was the Ohio men who did that. Brokenbrough’s Virginians certainly gave up the fight after suffering relatively few casualties. I’ve read that Chancellorsville had knocked the stuffing out of them, and that they had also taken some punishment on Day One. I am worried that I’ll prove myself wrong about the difference in the casualty rates between Kemper’s and Armistead/Garnett’s brigades. That’ll have to wait until tomorrow night .

Thanks for chipping in here, Trevor.

Regards, Phil



---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

Jim Cameron
North Bellmore, NY, USA
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Posts: 764

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/29/2018 10:41:17 AM

Quote:


Lee was shocked at the condition of Scales’s brigade when he saw it before the advance, asking why the lightly wounded men had not been sent to the rear. He had not been informed as to the extent of the damage sustained on Day One.

Insufficient reporting dogged his battle.

Regards, Phil
--Phil andrade


I have wondered about this from time to time. One thought that has occurred to me was that perhaps even a badly depleted infantry unit was less evident on visual inspection, that, say, an artillery or cavalry unit. Even after heavy losses, which would render a modern unit combat-ineffective, a CW infantry regiment could simply shorten its line, and still function. Badly depleted artillery or cavalry, not so much.
---------------
Jim Cameron

Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.

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Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/29/2018 3:26:50 PM
Jim,

Lee was taken back at the number of soldiers in Scales’s brigade who were bandaged up, and yet deployed for the advance.

Why are these poor boys here ? They should be sent to the rear !

I’m making that up a bit, but I think he’s supposed to have said something like that.

It suggests that Lee had not been aware of how smashed up some of those brigades had been on Day One. I’ve laboured this point before, but I hope I’ll be forgiven for reiterating : Day One at Gettysburg was exactly one year after the gruesome repulse of Malvern Hill. Lee’s casualties at Malvern Hill on 1 July 1862 and those of 1 July 1863 at Gettysburg were very, very similar....in the order of six thousand on each occasion. The first was a tactical defeat heralding a strategic victory ; the second was a tactical success that was to produce a strategic defeat.

It makes me wonder how far even the best commanders can be acquainted with the tactical realities of the battles they fight. Lee surely had a first rate “ feel “ for the ebb and flow of combat : he certainly commanded the devotion of his soldiers...and that would not be bestowed on a general who lacked empathy with his men. Lee excelled in this regard, and yet he was somehow out of his depth at Gettysburg.

Regards , Phil

---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

Wayne Wachsmuth
Shippensburg, PA, USA
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Posts: 239

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/30/2018 9:04:04 AM
Much of what Lee or any commander knew of troop condition or casualties depended on the work of the commander's staff to gather that information and bring it to his attention. Much of the problem here is that Lee Han no staff worthy of the name. Lee's Field & Staff officers amounted to 17 men as listed in Regimental Strength and Losses at Gettysburg. Longstreet's F&S is listed at 16 men or only one less than that of the whole army. With that few F&S officers it would not have been possible to adequately keep the CG updated. Many historians have referred to Lee's staff as "A dozen gentleman couriers" and I suspect there is more truth that poetry there.

Wayne

Michigan Dave
Muskegon, Michigan, MI, USA
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Posts: 3895

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/30/2018 9:26:45 AM
It wasn't so much Lee making mistakes at Gettysburg, as Union officers, & troops excelling! They (the Union) were experienced, motivated, fighting on their own soil with veteran leadership! (possible exception here Dan Sickles).

[Read More]

IMHO No slight to the ANV, but the Union subordinates, even guys like Greene, O'Rouke, Chamberlain, & right down the list preformed admirably, the ANV didn't lose the battle so much as the Union won it!?

What say you?
MD
---------------
"The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract."

John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre, PA, USA
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Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/30/2018 9:28:54 AM
Wayne,

Offhand do you know the size of Scott's staff in Mexico? Could the size of Lee's staff be related in some way?
---------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country.
"to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"


Jim Cameron
North Bellmore, NY, USA
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Posts: 764

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/30/2018 9:36:06 AM

Quote:
Much of what Lee or any commander knew of troop condition or casualties depended on the work of the commander's staff to gather that information and bring it to his attention. Much of the problem here is that Lee Han no staff worthy of the name. Lee's Field & Staff officers amounted to 17 men as listed in Regimental Strength and Losses at Gettysburg. Longstreet's F&S is listed at 16 men or only one less than that of the whole army. With that few F&S officers it would not have been possible to adequately keep the CG updated. Many historians have referred to Lee's staff as "A dozen gentleman couriers" and I suspect there is more truth that poetry there.

Wayne
--Wayne Wachsmuth


As I've said before, Lee was running the ANV like a mom & pop store. By way of example, plenty of people in gray uniforms would have been aware of Sickles' advancebbto the Peach Orchard well before McLaws "discovered" it. But there was nobody whose job it was to make sure the news got up the chain of command to Longstreet and Lee.
The AOP staff operation, by comparison, was Macy's department store.
---------------
Jim Cameron

Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.

Phil andrade
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Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/30/2018 9:59:10 AM

Quote:
Much of what Lee or any commander knew of troop condition or casualties depended on the work of the commander's staff to gather that information and bring it to his attention. Much of the problem here is that Lee Han no staff worthy of the name. Lee's Field & Staff officers amounted to 17 men as listed in Regimental Strength and Losses at Gettysburg. Longstreet's F&S is listed at 16 men or only one less than that of the whole army. With that few F&S officers it would not have been possible to adequately keep the CG updated. Many historians have referred to Lee's staff as "A dozen gentleman couriers" and I suspect there is more truth that poetry there.

Wayne
--Wayne Wachsmuth



Thank you, Wayne : that goes a long way towards explaining why the return of casualties submitted by Longstreet’s corps was virtually complete, while the AONV as a whole was more than fifteen per cent short of the actual total. The great preponderance of the shortfall is attributable to Hill’s corps.

Editing : pleased to report that I was right about the Ohio men who struck the flank of the confederate attack on day 3. These were the soldiers Franklin Sawyer’s 8th Ohio, and they did indeed strike the left wing of the rebels advance, in this case Brokenbrough’s brigade. One could play on words here and say that Brokenbrough’s troops were indeed broken ! When hit in the flank, they ran or surrendered very quickly. Their loss in killed and wounded I will check when I get home, but I’m sure that the casualties were very light for a command that had been engaged on both days i and 3. I think some of the Carolinian, Mississippian and Tennessean folks who have resented the kudos given to Pickett’s Virginians have enjoyed some hisotriographical schadenfreude when pointing out that it was the much vaunted Virginians who cut and run !

Regards, Phil
---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

Phil andrade
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Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/30/2018 2:52:01 PM
Back in London, I can use my John and Travis Busey book on the confederate casualties at Gettysburg to check my statements.

I was right.

Longstreet’s corps returned a total of 7,536 casualties ; the actual total was 7,994. The shortfall was 5.7%. Good staffwork apparent here....did this give Old Pete a clearer picture of the damage suffered on Day Two and increase his reluctance to support the advance ?

Ewell’s corps returned 5,937 casualties : the actual total was 6,475. The shortfall was 8.3%. A disparity, but nothing too significant .

AP Hill’s corps returned 6,735 casualties : the actual total was 9,292. The shortfall was 27.5%. That’s something truly serious with dire consequences in choice of deployment.

Here’s the record for Pickett’s division....

Kemper’s brigade suffered a loss of 582 killed and wounded from a total of 1,733 present. That equates to 33.5%. These casualties do not include unwounded prisoners .

Armistead’s command suffered 904 killed and wounded from a strength of 2,071; a rate of 43.65%.

Garnett’s brigade lost 738 killed and wounded from 1,685 present : a rate of 43.8%.

Total unwounded prisoners from the entire division amounted to 695 in addition to the killed and wounded. Close to three thousand casualties in all.

The significantly lower rate of bloodshed sustained by Kemper’s command is intriguing, and suggests that I might be right to attribute it to the beating it took from yankee artillery at long range before the advance began. The men were, perhaps, too shaken up to take the fight to closer quarters, as did the other two brigades.

Here’s the astonishing contrast that Brokenbrough’s demoralised troops give us : engaged on both days One and Three, their killed and wounded amounted to only 191 from a strength of 1,031 : a mere 18.5%. Perhaps they had been too roughed up at Chancellorsville to recover morale.

Regards, Phil

---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom,
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Posts: 78

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/31/2018 5:41:12 AM

Quote:
Nick,

Weren’t the SHSP the main conduit for Lost Cause polemics ?

By their reckoning , Longstreet was the villain of the piece.

Did Longstreet account for his refusal to pitch Hood and McLaws into the fray with Pickett ?

Regards, Phil
--Phil andrade


Yes Phil, their side of the story, if you want to know about anythying in the WBTS from their viepoint, thats where you look, every casualty report your posting is from the SSHP, yes l/street reputation was destroyed post war by J Early etc, only 5% of SCV were represented at l/street fuuneral. Longstreet argued Hood Mclaws were in need of rest, badly damaged and needed to secure the flank, which was why lee gave him authority to call anything he wanted from Hill.

We know lee gave the following order "The batteries were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and support their attacks closely."

However Major Eshleman reports: "It having been understood by a previous arrangement that the artillery should advance with the infantry, I immediately directed Captain Miller to advance his and Lieutenant Battle's batteries. Captain Miller, having suffered severely from the loss of men and horses, could move forward only three pieces of his own battery and one of Lieutenant Battle's section. Then, with one piece of Major Henry's battalion, under the direction of Major Haskell, he took position 400 or 500 yards to the front, and opened with deadly effect upon the enemy. With the exception of these five guns no others advanced."

Pickets report of the battle was orderd destoyed by Lee, except for the casualty returns, we do not know, but can aduce it was because l/street did not use the arty to support the attack, nor send in the 5 brigades of supports present and waiting to go in, as he had decided it would fail, he said before during and after the fact, and Picket put the blame on l/street.

GENERAL,--You and your men have crowned yourselves with glory; but we have the enemy to fight, and must carefully, at this critical moment, guard against dissensions, which the reflections in your report would create. I will therefore suggest that you destroy both copy and original, substituting one confined to casualties merely. I hope all will yet be well. I am, with respect,
Your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE, General.

It is perfectly apparent that General Lee attributed the defeat of Pickett solely to the failure of the batteries to advance as ordered, he says so in his report.

Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom,
top 50
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Posts: 78

Re: Lanchester and G/Burg
Posted on: 7/31/2018 5:42:42 AM

Quote:

Quote:

Quote:


No its an explanation of the effect of the CS barrage, which was to achieve what a box barrage is intended to achieve by design. Since both sides did it here, no one raises the point of the US counter firing over the CS guns and hitting unitended targets due to the same problem with restting the guns, and other engments its a common event in the WBTS, but due to the posistion of the tubes firing it created a box barrage effect on those it was placed.
Your the one who did that, so yep.

--Nick Spencer


No, it didn't, but if you want to have WW1 artillery tactics 50 years early, have fun.
--Jim Cameron


Your clearly reading impaired. I wrote "It was a box barrage, people just did not know it was".

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