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 (1939-1945) WWII Battles
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OpanaPointer
St. Louis, MO, USA
top 10
E-9 Sergeant Major
Posts: 817

Re: Dec 7, 1941 related question
Posted on: 1/19/2018 8:28:59 PM

Quote:

Quote:
The Quarterly Schedules of Operations were "distressingly available" according to testimony at the Hearings. Even without seeing the schedules Takao could tell the IJNHQ that a weekend was ideal to hit the Fleet.
--OpanaPointer


Yes, indeed the port schedule was apparently routinely posted in the local papers. My point was the usual assumption that the fleet was always in port on Sundays or weekends is not strictly true. The Japanese simply chose the convenient weekend when they were scheduled to be in port.

--richto90

I wasn't going into such fine detail, but yeah. The point was that they knew when to strike based on Kimmel's operational priority.

richto90

top 25
E-6 Staff Sergeant
Posts: 453

Re: Dec 7, 1941 related question
Posted on: 1/19/2018 10:07:17 PM

Quote:
It was definitely Cmdr. Taylor, William E. G.
--OpanaPointer


Damn, I never realized Taylor was Eagle Squadron.

OpanaPointer
St. Louis, MO, USA
top 10
E-9 Sergeant Major
Posts: 817

Re: Dec 7, 1941 related question
Posted on: 1/19/2018 11:34:59 PM
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Testimony.html

Killroy63
Pinson, AL, USA
top 50
E-4 Specialist
Posts: 89

Re: Dec 7, 1941 related question
Posted on: 1/20/2018 12:32:28 PM
rich-

Gen. Short replied to the infamous "war warning" telegram by informing Gen. Marshall and others in Washington that his command was being put on alert to prevent sabotage and that he was "liason[ing] with Navy".

Obviously, Short made a crucial mistake in not placing his entire command on a much higher alert than he did, but Washington deserves some blame for not noticing his inadequate preparations and directing him to do more. Short was completely unambiguous when ti came to informing Washington of his preparations. Why did no one there notice?

richto90

top 25
E-6 Staff Sergeant
Posts: 453

Re: Dec 7, 1941 related question
Posted on: 1/20/2018 1:39:22 PM

Quote:
rich-

Gen. Short replied to the infamous "war warning" telegram by informing Gen. Marshall and others in Washington that his command was being put on alert to prevent sabotage and that he was "liason[ing] with Navy".

Obviously, Short made a crucial mistake in not placing his entire command on a much higher alert than he did, but Washington deserves some blame for not noticing his inadequate preparations and directing him to do more. Short was completely unambiguous when ti came to informing Washington of his preparations. Why did no one there notice?
--Killroy63


Indeed. The initial reaction to the Navy and Army war warnings of 24 and 27 November from Short was to put the Hawaiian Department forces into the field, which is where they were, engaged in training until Friday-Saturday, 5/6 December. The weekend stand down was intended as a rest before going out into the field again. The problem was Short principally reacted to the separate War Department G-2 warning directed specifically to Hawaii, also on 27 November "Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform commanding general and Chief of Staff only." His reply on 28 November was "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy." Then, also on 28 November, Short received two more cables from the Adjutant Generals office, emphasizing the need to protect against sabotage, which he again replied to, assuming they were follow ups to his initial reply. Short emphasized he had placed Alert 1 into effect, but the provisions of Alert 1 were dated as of 5 November and simply codified SOP's that had been developed since July. Critically, it remains unclear if the War Department actually understood that "Alert 1" was a lower level of alert than 2 (intended to repel surface and air bombardment) and 3 (intended to repel invasion).

No one noticed because there were no specific rules for designating a threat hierarchy - no DEFCON 1, 2, 3, etcetera. Essentially both ends of the communications chain read into the various messages what they thought was meant and never asked for clarification, which is a classic and common critical thinking failure.

richto90

top 25
E-6 Staff Sergeant
Posts: 453

Re: Dec 7, 1941 related question
Posted on: 1/20/2018 1:45:00 PM

Quote:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Testimony.html
--OpanaPointer


Yeah, thanks for highlighting my own critical thinking fail. I always heard the story of the "Eagle Squadron guy" and looked into the backgrounds of the various Army Air Corps guys involved, but never thought to look at what the Navy guy's background was.

OpanaPointer
St. Louis, MO, USA
top 10
E-9 Sergeant Major
Posts: 817

Re: Dec 7, 1941 related question
Posted on: 1/20/2018 2:49:10 PM

Quote:

Quote:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Testimony.html
--OpanaPointer


Yeah, thanks for highlighting my own critical thinking fail. I always heard the story of the "Eagle Squadron guy" and looked into the backgrounds of the various Army Air Corps guys involved, but never thought to look at what the Navy guy's background was.

--richto90

They's a sneaky bunch, just ask any chief.

John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre, PA, USA
top 15
E-8 Master Sergeant
Posts: 790

Re: Dec 7, 1941 related question
Posted on: 1/24/2018 2:12:15 AM
OpanaPointer & Rich,

I didn't really intend for this to be a defense of Kimmel and Short or a rehabilitation of their reputations. I agree they made mistakes and that those mistakes were made more glaring by events and hindsight and was only pointing out my belief that the entire chain of command and civilian leadership made mistakes not to mention a isolationist public majority. My biggest question is how do the mistakes Kimmel and Short make lead to their fate while MacArthur gets a CMH and theater command for his.
---------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country.
"to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"


OpanaPointer
St. Louis, MO, USA
top 10
E-9 Sergeant Major
Posts: 817

Re: Dec 7, 1941 related question
Posted on: 1/24/2018 5:24:13 AM
Good question.

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