The Zaporozhian Cossack Battle at Korsun
by Michael Meusz
In the mid 17th century unrest in the steppes of Ukraine was on the rise. The
Polish-Lithuanian empire dominated an area from Warsaw to Moscow, and the
Ukrainians were tired of their exploitation and abuse. At the little town of
Korsun, virtually in the middle of nowhere, an army of Zaporozhian Cossacks
supported by Crimean Tatars overwhelmed a Polish army sent to crush them, and
started a revolutionary fire that would sweep across the steppes and make
Ukraine a nation.
Click Image to Enlarge
|Historical Atlas of Ukraine (Cossack State
From the book: "Ukraine: A Historical Atlas" By Paul Robert Magocsi Pub 1985
The Zaporozhian Cossacks were not your typical disorganized horde or "cannon
fodder" as described during Napoleonà´©me. These Cossacks were defined by
their horsemanship, proficiency with the saber and their level of organization
during time of oppression. An analogy could be made between the Zaporozhian
Cossacks and the American Indians. They knew the terrain, and how to use it to
ambush or evade their enemies. They were very religious in there belief in God.
The Zaporozhianà·¥re known for their exceptional honesty. "According to the
Catholic priest Kitovich, in the Zaporozhian Sich "(meaning-"clearing beyond
the rapids") one could leave his money out in the street, not worrying that it
would be stolen".(1) With this reputation, ità®¯t surprising that the
Polish crown hired them to maintain order within the vast open spaces of the
The weaponry of the Zaporozhianà£¯nsisted of mainly muskets, swords and
knives-often acquired from raids on traveling caravans between the Tatars and
Turks or between Polish regions. The Zaporozhian musket did not have a bayonet,
so a five-foot lance was also carried. Cannons were of small caliber and
portable enough that they can be carried by horses within the army. Both wheels
and the cannon itself could be easily mounted on the backs of horses and
carried to battle with ease. The typical cannon in those days would cost the
Zaporozhian Cossack 442 head of cattle and one cannon ball with powder a mere 9
heads of cattle. So, purchases of such magnitude would typically be done by
other means such as gold, food or trade of nobleman from raids. It would be
very difficult to herd some 4,500 cattle to a stronghold for an exchange of 10
cannons and munitions.
The dress of the Zaporozhianà·¡s light. To keep cool during hot summer days
loose baggy pants were worn. They were colorful varying from red, blue, black,
or yellow. They were matched with an off white loose shirt over top. At times a
vest or light jacket accompanied the look. This was complimented with a large
sash around their waste. The sash color typically depicted a rank within the
Cossack order. Black being the most common and Red being one of nobility or
stature within the group. This light clothing made the Cossacks very agile when
in combat or conducting duels. The Cossackà·¯uld shave their heads only
leaving a long lock of hair to one side depicting the brotherhood of the
Zaporozhianà¡®d dawning of the long burly moustache. A symbol to which today
distinguishes the true Zaporozhian Cossack from other Cossacks. (See figure 1).
The Cossack army typically fought with their men in a mass, formed around a
unit called a mobile camp. Zaporozhianà·¯uld fight by surrounding themselves
with a moving perimeter of wagons. At every other wagon a small cannon was
positioned for support. The cannons were not only small but could be moved
around quickly and easily to other wagons. Within the mobile camp were the
Cossack foot soldier armed with musket, pike or swords. Mobile reserves were
formed from the different groups of cavalry armed with sword, lance or pistol.
The way the Cossack mobile camp would operate is that the entire camp would
move in unison. They would approach their enemy, using the wagons as both a
shield and to move the artillery closer to fire as opportunities presented
themselves. As the mobile camp moved closer to a charge range, certain wagons
would be pulled away and the cavalry and/or foot would then proceed to attack.
If the attack was unfavorable to the Cossacks they would simply retreat back
into the mobile camp and the wagons would close like doors to a fort. The
Cossackà·¯uld then immediately take up a defensive position. As the enemy
would approach they would unleash a hail of cannon and musket fire. If the
enemy retreated then the wagons can be pulled away at any point within the
perimeter and another attack could be launched. (See figure 2).
|Figure 2: Cossack Mobile camp.
Illustrations from "How Kozaks Fought " by C. Mitsik, I. Cteshenko, C.
Plokhi Pub. 1990 ( In Ukrainian)
The Polish army had numerous functions throughout the steppes such as squashing
local rebellions, escorting nobility and guarding caravans between regions.
Polish domination became very harsh and punishment came quickly. It was not
uncommon for peasants to be slain or beaten. To appease such concerns to local
nobility in Ukraine the Polish crown would hire Cossacks as mercenaries and
attach them to their army. They were given the task to help the Poles in
maintaining order throughout the steppes. These were known as registered
Cossacks. Allowing the presence of Cossacks ensured some stability. Registered
Cossacks were not only paid but had an opportunity to own land and be given
recognition when retired from service.
Bohdan Khmelnitsky, a young lieutenant was a wealthy landowner who kept to
himself. However, he was not isolated against the harsh Polish rule under the
local regent Czaplitski. In a retaliatory raid, the regent ordered his troops
to punish several local peasants by burning their homes and taking their
livestock. This incursion was to subdue recent Cossack raids within the area.
But the raid fell upon Bohdan Khmelnitskyà¬¡nd. Czaplitskià´²oops burned
his farm, killed his son and abducted his wife. (This story sounds similar to
the movie "Gladiator") Khmelnitsky sought justice through the Polish
governmentà£¯urts but was rebuked and rejected for his claim. He escaped and
found refuge in the Zaporozhian Sich along the Dnepro River where he once
learned all the ways of the Cossack in his earlier career.
"The basis of authority in Zaporozhye was peace, fellowship of Cossacks. When
there was a need to solve some important issues, kettledrums summoned all the
Cossacks to the Sich square, where Rada (Council) or the Host Council would
take place. During Rada every Cossack, regardless of his rank or means, could
openly tell his opinion and had a right to vote. But after the decision was
taken by the majority of votes, every Zaporozhian and all the hosting generals
had to abide by it." (2). Thus through the Rada, Khmelnitsky became the Hetman
of the Cossacks. He successfully rallied for Cossack support in 1647 and raised
an army of over 20,000 Cossacks. His cause was not only for revenge but also
for the social and religious persecutions of all Cossacks. His political savvy
even won him favor with the Crimean Khan, Tuhai-Bey, he convinced Tuhai-Bey
that the Poles were going to attack and force the Tatars out of the Crimea.
Khmelnitsky would send the Khan gifts of wine, mead, gold, and cattle to
persuade Tuhai-Bey to become an ally. For Tuhai-Bey too disliked the Polish
crown. With this the Khan gathered over 20,000 Tatars to support the
Zaporzhianà©® their quest for revenge. And the battles to follow would catch
the Polish Crown by surprise.
On the morning of May 26, 1648 near the town of Korsun, The Polish Grand-Hetman
Mukola Pototcki had learned of the death of his son, Stephan Pototcki, at the
battle of Yellow River two weeks before. Worse, 6000 Registered Cossacks
defected to Bohdan Khmelnitskyà¡®d 40 Polish Nobles and other leaders were
taken prisoner. The Cossacks taunted and starved the nobles to gain valuable
information, and later sell them to the Tatars as slaves. Later on the morning
of the 26th, M. Pototcki camped across the River Rosh just 10Km east of Korsun.
His encampment across the Rosh gave his army some terrain advantage if
attacked. Pototcki knew that a large force was moving from the south and
Pototcki was desperately reorganizing and gathering other Polish troops within
On the Cossack side, Khmelnitsky knew he had to make another strike in order to
maintain his momentum. He sent forward a detachment of 6,000 Cossack cavalry
6Km ahead of his main 20,000-man force. The Khan, Tuhai-Bey, broke up his
20,000-man army into three cavalry detachments and then proceeded to move
Northeast of Korsun. Hidden, Tuhai-Bey hoped for surprise. M. Pototcki reviewed
his situation and decided to split his army in two giving of 1200 horse and
10000 foot to one of his Nobles and keeping some 8000 for himself. But before
the command was issued. The Tatars began moving into position (See Map 1). At
that time a small Cossack scouting detachment of 50 men arrived and formed up
in front of the Polish army.(3)
Khmelnitskyà¡in force was still 12 kilometers away. The Polish army began
forming a defensive camp surrounded by wagons. In the middle of all the
maneuvering the skirmishing Zaporozhians would disperse and begin taunting the
Polish nobles. They would yell out insults to them, such as: "You cavaliers
ride on asses as your mighty steeds!" or called them "cowards hiding behind
For the Polish nobleman to tolerate such insults was a fate worse then death.
The Cossacks would begin laughing at them, egging them on to come out and
conduct personal duels or jousts. Some Cossacks would dance in front of the
Polish army and roll around on the ground laughing at the Poles. Some would
play flutes or parade around taunting the soldiers. The Cossacks would display
their derriere and whistle at the Polish Cavaliers. Some Poles found this so
insulting that few did break ranks to go forth and honor the duel set forth
only to be killed quickly by the Cossacks swordsmanship. Not only did this
become a morale booster for the Cossacks but a demoralizing scene for the
The insults and thirst for revenge from the loss at Yellow River finally caused
the Polish Nobles to move their troops to attack the skirmishing Cossacks. A
volley of musket fire failed to scatter the Cossack rabble-rousers. The forced
Polish response led to the morning attack of three detachments of the Tatar
cavalry from the west of Korsun. As the Tatars closed, the Cossack skirmishers
withdrew allowing the Tatars to fire their bows. The first volley proved
deadly, striking down hundreds of Polish foot and cavalry. The Polish nobles
would then fill the ranks and begin firing into the oncoming Tatar cavalry. But
the gunfire did not stop the Tatars. The Tatars engaged the Polish foot and
began fighting man to man. Some Poles were purposely decapitated and Tatar
soldiers would place the heads on their lances to display their prize. Also,
during the frenzy of the fight some would toss the heads back into the Polish
lines to demoralize the troops.
By midday there was no clear victor until Khmelnitsky arrived on the
battlefield. He moved his mobile camp east of the main Polish army, across the
Rosh River, and began engaging the Polish right flank. This was far too much
for the Polish army to endure. They were now facing a force twice their size.
Immediately Pototcki ordered his wagons to be moved to force a breakout. They
maneuvered the wagons such to create a corridor for the soldiers to move north
into the cover of woods. By late afternoon the entire Polish army successfully
moved into the wooded area. It was a short triumph. Tatar and Cossack soldiers
harassed them continually, both sides, now exhausted after a day of fighting,
settled in the wooded area north-east of Korsun. Fighting slowed with the
exception of some minor skirmishes entering into the evening hours.
Unknown to Pototski one of Khmelnitskyà§¥neral, Maxim Krivonic (means -
Crooked nose), took 6000 Zaporozhians with their artillery at midday and made
his way north, guessing correctly that if the Polish army withdrew, he would
cut off their escape route. By early evening Krivonic was able to place guns on
an embankment and through the night harass the Polish position by lobbing
shells into the woods. The cannon fire kept the Poles on edge and further
demoralized the remaining army.
On the morning of May 27, 1648 the Polish army tried to attack the embankment
to make way for another breakout, with a plan to take the high ground. Yet the
Cossacks and Tatars resumed their assault. Khmelnitsky began his attack in line
formation and harassed the right flank while the Tatars harassed the left
flank. Krivonic supported both assaults and rushed his Cossacks in a pincer
maneuver to deliver the final blow. (Map 3) It did not take long to smash
through the Polish wagons and lines. causing the Polish army to rout,
essentially eliminating the Polish army as a fighting force. Both Cossacks and
Tatars captured weapons, food and clothing within the camp. Some Polish
soldiers were killed when they offered to surrender.
Mukola Pototcki and many Polish noblemen were killed that day. Those that did
survive were put into chains. The Polish Corp was decimated after the second
day. Some 8,500 massacred and the rest routed. The Zaporozhian Cossacks and
Tatars sent a chilling message to the Polish crown, forecasting a change in
balance. Bohdan Khmelnitisky became a hero to the Cossack, and the victory
lured peasants to join the ranks of the Cossacks. The Zaporozhian and Tatar
armies, strong and well supplied, soon became unstoppable.
The revolution had received such a momentum that it was difficult to stem it.
It would take several more years of fighting and negotiations before Poland
would finally recognize Cossack independence and to restore ancient privileges,
bestow Cossack independence, and recognize Khmelnitsky as Hetman.
The battle cemented Khmelnitsky as one of the fathers of the Ukrainian nation.
His Campaign freed Ukraine from Polish domination, and, in the process,
fulfilled his quest for personal revenge. Although stability in Ukraine would
take many more decades, the birth of a nation had begun.(4)
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|Figure 4: Map 1 Opening battle (North
is top of page)
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|Figure 5: Midday Battle Near Korsun
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|Figure 6: Second Day Battle Near Korsun
Copyright â°°2 Michael Meusz
Written by Michael Meusz. If you have questions or comments on this
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