Battle of Shaykan, 1883

By John Pezzola

The Battle of Shaykan occurred from November 3 to 5, 1883, involving Egyptian forces led by Colonel William Hicks Pasha, a former British Army officer. They faced the self-proclaimed Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad, and his followers, who had initiated a jihad against the Egyptian government. The engagement took place in a wooded area of Shaykan (Kashgil) near the village of El Obeid in Kordofan, Sudan. The outcome was a complete annihilation of Hicks’s forces, which included European officers on his staff. Only about 500 Egyptian troops managed to escape back to Khartoum, while one-third of the Egyptian soldiers surrendered but were later freed. Unfortunately, all the officers perished in the battle. Notable non-combatant casualties included journalists Edmund O'Donovan and Frank Vizetelly.

Following this defeat, the Mahdi's forces grew stronger, attracting more followers and establishing El Obeid as their operational base. The rebellion eventually spread to the Red Sea coast and continued until the Battle of Omdurman in 1898.^[1]

In 1881, the Mahdi began assembling an army in Kordofan and Darfur. In response to this emerging threat, 4,000 Egyptian troops were dispatched to arrest the Mahdi. Unfortunately, they were ambushed near El Obeid and were utterly defeated. The equipment and weapons left on the battlefield were subsequently captured by the Mahdi’s forces, facilitating their growth. By 1883, the British government estimated the Mahdi’s army at approximately 200,000, although this figure was widely regarded as an exaggeration. The Governor of Egypt, Rauf Pasha, believed that the Mahdi Rebellion required a military response, even though he lacked support from English advisors. To address this, Rauf Pasha began raising an army, which was to be led by retired British Colonel William “Billy” Hicks. Hicks had a distinguished military career, having participated in the Indian Mutiny and the Abyssinian Expedition. He was tasked with commanding a force made up of Egyptian fellahs who had been imprisoned following the Urabi Revolt. However, Hicks faced significant challenges, including low morale among his troops, who were more inclined to engage in minor skirmishes than to confront the Mahdi’s forces in a major battle.^[2][3]

By April 29, 1883, Hicks’s troops encountered a portion of the Mahdi’s army near Fort Kawa along the Nile. By late summer, rumors circulated that the Mahdi was besieging El Obeid, a town initially established by the Egyptians that later became Kordofan's capital. Despite the Egyptian government's eagerness to act, Hicks harbored reservations about the plan. Meanwhile, Tawfiq and his advisers, under pressure from a series of defeats, appealed to the British government for assistance. The liberal faction of the British Parliament was reluctant to engage in colonial affairs. In this context, Hicks was appointed to lead the Field Force with the goals of recapturing El Obeid and capturing the Mahdi. He faced significant challenges, including a hostile environment, an expanding jihadist army, and an unenthusiastic Egyptian force, all compounded by logistical difficulties. It became evident that he needed to reorganize his troops before any major operations could commence.^[4][5]

As the Mahdi's Army continued to grow following previous victories, it took advantage of the weaponry left on the battlefield. In December 1881, a force of 1,400 Egyptians was defeated at Fashoda, followed by another Egyptian force of approximately 4,000, which was defeated southwest of Kordofan. By September 1882, the Mahdi's Army had successfully captured El Obeid, despite facing Egyptian defenders armed with Remington rifles. The Mahdi's forces effectively besieged the garrison, leading to its surrender by January 1883. At that point, they acquired significant weaponry, including 6,000 Remington rifles and five Krupp artillery pieces. The Army of the Mahdi exhibited qualities of a professional fighting force. The Mahdi organized his troops into units called Standards of Rayya, each led by a Khalifa. These Standards consisted of three tactical elements: a Reconnaissance Force, an Attacking Force, and a Jihadiyya, which comprised the Rifle Force.^[6]

The mounted Reconnaissance Force had several responsibilities, including cutting supply lines, maintaining communications, engaging in skirmishes, disseminating propaganda, and conducting scorched-earth operations. The Attacking Force, although primitive in armament, was mostly composed of swords and spears and included cavalry troops, numbering approximately 50,000 to 60,000. The Jihadiyya primarily consisted of Black troops armed with captured Remington rifles and numbered around 7,000.^[7]

Tawfiq and his advisers were under increasing pressure due to constant defeats by the Mahdi’s forces, leading them to seek assistance from the British government. However, the liberal faction of Gladstone's Parliament was hesitant to engage in a colonial venture. Considering this reluctance, Tawfiq turned to hiring soldiers of fortune. One such individual was 53-year-old former Indian Army Colonel William Hicks, who was appointed to lead the offensive without Gladstone's approval. Hicks, along with a staff of European officers, would form the officer corps of the Field Force. As a general officer, he was tasked with recapturing El Obeid and capturing the Mahdi.^[8][9][10]

Military historian Lieutenant Colonel Mike Snook remarked, “Hicks Pasha was no fool: even Bonaparte himself would have struggled to overcome the factors stacked in favor of the rebels.” Hicks was placed in a difficult position in Cairo, facing an unforgiving environment, an expanding army of jihadists, and a somewhat reluctant Egyptian army. Additionally, the logistical support available to him was inadequate. Hicks needed to reorganize the Egyptian army before he could carry out any military operations.^[11]

The Egyptian Army

The Egyptian government was aware of this precarious situation and deployed approximately 10,000 veteran soldiers to defend Sudan; however, many of these troops were apprehensive about the task. Hicks’s order of battle consisted of the following:^[12]

• 7,000 Regular infantry
• 500 untrained cavalry
• 400 mounted Bashi-Bazouks
• 100 chain-mailed Cuirassiers, mounted
• 4 Krupp field guns
• 10 mountain guns
• 6 Nordenfelts
• 2,000 camp-followers
• 5,500 camels
• 500 horses ^[13]

Some of the soldiers were forced to deploy to Sudan in chains, while one account describes two soldiers throwing lye into their eyes to avoid service in Sudan. Even the black Sudanese soldiers, who were considered quality troops, displayed low morale and reluctance to serve. The Egyptian government tried to improve morale by appointing a cadre of professional officers to lead them. Hicks recognized the challenges he faced and did not waste time trying to transform this disorganized group into a cohesive army. Instead, he focused on getting his men to work on target practice and tactics. When Captain Forrestier-Walker arrived from Cairo, he brought several Nordenfelt machine guns to supplement the artillery that Hicks already had. Training the Egyptian force proved to be a challenging task.^[14]

When the guns were attempted to be brought into action, dire confusion reigned. Men ran against each other; the ground was strewn with cartridges; hoppers were placed anywhere but where they ought to have been. No one appeared to have the slightest knowledge of how to feed, aim, or discharge the pieces. Hicks stated that “he had never seen such a disgraceful thing in his life.” Colborne went on to talk about the “bad Gippy rifle practice - how they leaned backward to fire instead of forwards, the jerking of triggers, the loose-holding of the rifles, and the tendency to fire into the air.”^[15][16]

Hicks’s Command of an Eclectic Army

To achieve a level of success, Hicks needed to surround himself with a diverse group of well-trained officers. This included Colonel Freiherr Gotz von Seckendorf, who was German, two Austrian captains, and a Balkan officer. In addition to Hicks, there were five English officers and his chief surgeon, Georghis Dimitrious Douloughliu, who was Greek. Arthur Farquhar, a Coldstream Guardsman, served as Hicks’s close confidant and chief of staff. However, the most dependable of them was Major Edward Evans, who was fluent in Arabic.

Hicks’s sergeant major was a man named Brady, and his commander of mounted forces was an Austrian officer named Herlth. Unfortunately, Hicks faced significant challenges. Most of the officers did not possess the necessary caliber to accomplish the mission, and a language barrier existed, as some of them did not speak English. Hicks had to supervise his own officers, who sometimes failed to perform their duties. They were often found to be unreliable, leading Hicks to reduce one officer in rank from Captain to Lieutenant, yet this did not improve the situation.

Every day, Hicks struggled with endless inefficiency and lack of discipline. “It is no good giving orders,” he reported. “It is no use trying to put things straight. They promise to do what you direct without the slightest intention of acting, and are utterly indifferent, and not in the least ashamed when you find them out.”^[17]

Hicks was an experienced former sapper who had served for thirty-four years in India and had seen action during the Indian Mutiny. He immediately instituted a rigorous training program, but equipment drills continued to end in confusion. His force also included motivated but undisciplined irregulars, including Bashi-Bazouks and chain-mailed Sudanese cavalry. Correspondent Frank Power of The Times described them as “a cowardly, beggarly mob.”^[18][19][20]

Hicks faced the difficult task of training a multilingual, undisciplined army while lacking reliable intelligence about his enemy. Even so, he prepared for an offensive to recover lost territory in Sudan. Aware of the risks posed by his unreliable force, Hicks knew his irregular troops were poorly equipped and lacked the motivation needed for a campaign in such harsh conditions. To reduce these weaknesses, he organized his army into a large hollow square, supported by two smaller squares on the flanks. These heavy formations advanced only a few miles each day. To improve morale and strengthen their defensive position, Hicks issued iron caltrops that could be scattered in front of the troops to slow enemy charges.

Initially, Hicks’s training was successful in battle; he repelled an attack at Al-Marabi and again at Jebel Ain, where his army was organized in a hollow square supported by Nordenfelt machine guns, rocket tubes, and howitzers. In both engagements, Hicks’s forces delivered several volleys into the advancing Mahdi warriors, resulting in hundreds of casualties on the enemy side. This success boosted the morale of Hicks’s army; however, clearing the province of Kordofan of the Mahdi and his followers would prove to be a challenging task. Hicks was acutely aware of the vulnerable state of his army and stated, “I shall have over 21,000 men on the two rivers,” adding, “and I would give everything for two brigades of English, German, or Indian troops.” Correspondent Frank Power noted a gloomy atmosphere among the soldiers as they began their march, reporting that there were approximately 9,000 infantry present—a number that a small enemy force could easily rout.^[21]

Power expressed his lack of confidence in Hicks’s troops, observing that although the cavalry was large in number, they appeared inexperienced and would likely struggle against the Mahdi’s forces. He remarked, “I pity Hicks. He is an able, good, and energetic man, but he must deal with wretched Egyptians, who take pleasure in being incompetent, delaying, and lying.”^[22]

In September 1883, Hicks’s forces began to move west toward Kordofan. Along with Power, other correspondents included Edmund O’Donovan of the Daily News and the artist Frank Vizetelly, who was the illustrator for the London News. However, Power fell ill and had to return to Khartoum before the start of the campaign. Additionally, a group of administrators from Cairo was scheduled to assume control in El Obeid upon its capture.^[23]

Hicks’s tactical deployment consisted of mounted scouts and Cuirassiers, followed by the General Staff. The Infantry formed a large square with the artillery and Nordenfelts in the center. Behind the column was the baggage train flanked by the various detachments of cavalry. Despite some victories, Hicks’s forces struggled to engage the Mahdi decisively. The Mahdi continually retreated into the desert, drawing Hicks’s army further away from their supply base and security. As Hicks pursued the Mahdi westward under the blazing sun, temperatures soared to 125 degrees. Water became scarce, and intelligence reports were unreliable. A key element of Hicks’s transportation system was camels, which were somewhat neglected and dying in large numbers.^[24]

Upon reaching Dueim, Hicks made a critical decision to abandon his supply line connected to the Nile River, although his army was not entirely reliant on camels for transporting supplies. He also chose to take a longer route to El Obeid in hopes of finding water sources. However, this path would lead him through wooded terrain filled with scrub brush, making it ideal for an enemy ambush. Hicks’s tactical square formations typically covered about ten miles a day, facing a scorched earth policy enacted by hostile villagers who burned everything in their wake.^[25]

In contrast, Hicks’s formations lugged along, consuming precious water on the way. Hicks’s men were now feeling the pressure of the march and were well aware of the enemy’s presence—Hicks deployed scouts to look for water. One of the scouts did not return and was discovered the following day near a well with both hands severed. The army finally halted near Akila about halfway to El Obeid. There, they found an excellent source of water and took a much-needed rest. Yet danger still lurked close by for a group of soldiers who wandered away from the encampment and were found slaughtered and disemboweled. “A body of spies organized by Captain Evans, [stated] that the rebels, in numbers some 30,000.”^[26]

Nevertheless, Hicks’s situation was going to become worse. For one, it was brought to Hicks’s attention that the Egyptians did not get a sufficient supply of water, and, to compound the situation, morale was dwindling. Both soldiers and animals were succumbing to the harsh desert environment. Hicks also fended off harassing attacks by the Mahdi’s forces and observed that his poorly maintained artillery had become unreliable and prone to malfunction. Hicks also questioned the credibility of his guides, adding to the already existing animosity between the European officers and Egyptians. Despite all the problems facing Hicks, he was steadfast and determined to execute his mission. On October 4, 1883, Hicks wrote a letter to his wife which was to be his last. Hicks stated:

“There is a broad belt of impenetrable jungle along the Khor or water course we are depending upon. If this is true I don’t know what I shall do, for the Army cannot march through it. At present too I know nothing of the water supply whether there is any or not, and with the very existence of the Army, the lives of 10,000 men, dependent upon my decision and no reliable information, the anxiety is very great—almost too much. Fancy marching an Army of this strength through a country where one is entirely dependent upon pools of rainwater—10,000 men and 6,000 animals to be supplied daily and no certainty of finding a pool.”^[27]

Hicks’s Army was now forty miles outside of El Obeid and was fortunate to have come upon some water. The army halted for four days while reconnaissance patrols were deployed. Morale was suffering, and despite finding some water, there was still a shortage. Hicks had only one course of action open to him—he had to press on. Along the way, he received a letter from the Mahdi, offering mercy to anybody who would surrender and accept the authority of the Prophet. A follower of the Mahdi recalled Hicks’s defiant response: “I am Hicks: my arm is an arm of iron, and my army carries an army on its belly. If the heavens fall, I will hold them up with my bayonets, and if the earth quakes I will hold it fast with my boot.” There would be no surrender.^[28]

Moving in a great hollow square, Hicks’s force was only 15 miles from El Obeid. On November 1, 1883, the Mahdi deployed much of his army, commanded by Hamdin Abu Anja, who began to surround Hicks’s army. For two days, Hicks’s army continued to press forward toward a wooded area of dense thorny scrub called Shaykan or Sheikan. Any stragglers who fell behind were subjected to Baggara cavalry that was tracking the mobile square. At night, Hicks had his men construct zarebas and found themselves the victims of sniper fire by the Mahdi’s forces. The Mahdi’s riflemen opened a murderous fire on the Egyptian square. As the front of the square buckled and panic spread, the great mass of the Mahdi’s men struck the flanks. A desperate fight continued throughout the afternoon. By nightfall, Hicks still maintained some sort of perimeter, although bullets thudded into his massed men and animals all through the night. One of the Mahdi’s men remembered that “so fierce was the fire that all the bark was stripped from the trees and they gleamed white as if washed with soap.” Herlth’s diary, later picked up on the field of battle, gives some feeling of the depression that pervaded the army: “These are bad times; we are in a forest, the bullets are flying from all directions, and camels, mules and men keep dropping down. We are all cramped up together, so the bullets cannot fail to strike. We are faint and weary and have no idea what to do; the bullets are falling thicker.” The entry ended suddenly—Herlth had been killed.^{[29][30][31][32][33][34]}

The next morning, Hicks pushed what remained of his force into motion. His men were terrified and desperate with thirst, but somehow, he managed to get them about a mile closer to El Obeid. There, the fire of the Jihadiyya and the overwhelming pressure of the Mahdi’s relentless waves of howling spearmen brought the squares to a standstill, causing them to begin to fall apart. Thousands of warriors rushed toward the crumbling squares, spurred on by the Mahdi’s solemn assurance that “all the angels and all the jinn will fight for you. [The Egyptians’] souls are already in our grasp.”^[35]

They were. As one side of a square dissolved, some of the troops on the other faces of the square turned around and opened fire, catching the Mahdi’s people in a crossfire, but also hitting many of their own comrades across the square. The Egyptian defense fell apart amid hideous scenes of panic and slaughter. When the squares broke, many of the Egyptians took to their heels and were cut down as they ran. Some fought to the end, others tried to surrender, and a few survived by hiding under piles of their dead comrades.

“The Bugler’s Tree is where the last stand took place by Hicks and staff and those who broke from the carnage long enough to fight back-to-back. The tree itself is so named because, as legend has it, Hicks ordered his bugler up the tree to assess the situation. The report was so disheartening that the bugler was quickly shot to avoid spreading panic. The skeleton hung in the branches for years.”^[36]

The final attack took place around 06:00 hrs. “Faraj Sadik, a bugler, claimed he and survivors of two companies fled out of the zariba and escaped toward Kadara.” Some accounts state that the final destruction of Hicks’s command was around noon. In terms of the final disposition of Hicks’s forces, it is debatable. Some historians indicate that there might have been three equidistant squares with 300 yards separation and cavalry on the flanks and rear.^[37][38]

This remains debatable because, as the tactical situation deteriorated, Hicks’s army may have found it prudent to form one large square. “The only factors gained by three squares would be in forcing the enemy to break three smaller squares rather than one: In rough terrain, three smaller squares would be more maneuverable.” Nevertheless, most eyewitness reports indicate that a single large square was deployed and that the front of the square was punctured. “One account had the cavalry fighting on foot inside the square. This seems logical as cavalry outflung in that forest were vulnerable.”^[39][40]

Regarding Hicks’s demise, there are several different accounts, but they share a common theme: Hicks was brave. It is said that he was mounted on a horse, possibly a white one. One theory suggests that Hicks and his staff tried to escape from the square, but he was eventually dismounted and died with a saber in hand. Another account states that Hicks and his staff fired their pistols and broke out of the square, during which Hicks was unhorsed and became the last to die. Finally, there is an account that describes Hicks leading a charge into the oncoming Dervish mass while emptying his revolver no fewer than three times. He ultimately fought to the death using his saber. According to Mek el Tahir el Dud, "Hicks Pasha himself died fighting bravely by the tebeldi tree, and I was there to witness it."^[41]

The Hicks Pasha Expedition is considered “worse than a failure,” with consequences that extended far beyond the immediate annihilation of the Egyptian Army. Politically, the Mahdi capitalized on this defeat, receiving submissions and delegations from various Islamic nations, extending all the way from North Africa to Central Asia. As a result, most of Sudan came under the control of the Mahdi, significantly strengthening his position and influence in the region.^[42]

Show Notes

© 2026 John Pezzola

John Pezzola is a veteran of the United States Army. He currently teaches 7th-grade U.S. History and is an Assistant Professor of Military History at American Military University.

* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent those of MilitaryHistoryOnline.com.