By James Bowden, M.A.

Introduction

Examination of regimental histories, and battle accounts from the American Civil War, and examination of African Zouave antecedents reveals that the American Zouaves, Union or Confederate, were not a militarily effective force, except within very limited roles. In most instances, they demonstrated far less battlefield effectiveness and suffered fewer combat casualties than many non-Zouave units, reflecting an unwillingness to engage the enemy as directly as sister regiments posted to their immediate left and right. The ineffectiveness of the Zouaves principally stemmed from issues of their composition as a force, failure to employ small unit tactics on the battlefield, and meeting the same measures of effectiveness as other peer-non-Zouave units when fighting in company level actions. These areas demonstrate that the Zouaves were more a phenomenon of popular image, rather than providing credible service on the battlefield.

In military organizations there are weapons or roles which rise in favorability and preferred participation, others tend to acquire lower, less well-received status and can become the equivalent of social pariahs, being rejected and socially isolated from other core elements. In Medieval Outremer, the highly socially desirable and highly valued corps were the knights, while the archers occupied the lowest social strata of not just the military organization, but the society around them. This was in contrast to the archers performing the essential roles of castle security and, in later nomenclature, special operations. Similarly, in the late 18th century, infantry corps remained at the forefront of the military organization while the artillery was initially shunned and the artillerymen reduced to isolation within their ranks. This despite a highly effective means of repelling infantry assaults by opponents as well as opening new ground for their forces. In the case of the Zouaves, they enjoyed a high social status and favorability in the military and general American social milieu but the evidence suggests that this was in contradiction to their overall battlefield performance.

The abundance of Zouave units in both the Union and Confederate Army and the space allowed for this study have narrowed the ability to give all details regarding the number of Zouave units considered in this research. Thus, while a number were viewed, this paper will narrowly examine four largely representative regiments, two Confederate and two Union. Those regiments are the 114th Pennsylvania Volunteers (Company A and then Regiment), Collis’ Zouaves, the 9th New York Volunteers, Hawkins Zouaves, the 4th Alabama Infantry Regiment, Zouaves, and the 15th Alabama Infantry Regiment, Eufaula Zouaves.

Literature Review

The main method of research was to use regimental histories, often residing in archives, as well as other archival resources which revealed details not provided in some secondary volumes, even when considering the regiment’s history. Indeed, there is widespread data on the Zouaves but the nature of this is deceptive, the majority of the information that is subject to easy retrieval is both redundant and often laced with inaccuracies and anachronisms which deserve not only closer examination but also in some cases censure.

The sources available for the different units is of variable quality and there are not unit histories available for all units on the primary source level. For the Union Zouave units considered, the book 9th N.Y.V. Hawkins Zouaves Their Battles and their Marches served to clarify the history of this unit. Written by J.T.H. Whitney in 1866, the book is a mixture of diary entries that appear to have been written out in more narrative form and orders reproduced in part or whole. This history was the earliest history to be authored and published of those regiments that were studied. This therefore tends to help support the accuracy and clarity of recollection of details and further archival research has added support to the narrative.[1]

For the 114th Pennsylvania Volunteers, there is only a secondary source available, written by Edward J Hagerty and entitled, Collis’ Zouaves: The 114th Pennsylvania Volunteers, the book presents a detailed examination of the regiment, based in orders and diaries extracted from the soldiers as well as commanding officers of the regiment. Hagerty’s account of the regiment is somewhat incomplete, the majority of the narrative is well-structured and informative but he often leaves out details in the most important instances or fails to offer interpretation on key events. In order to overcome some of these deficiencies access to his primary sources was sought, however, they are housed in physical form in the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Collection. Some post-bellum records exist on the website in the form of microfilm, but the majority of the records are inaccessible apart from physical presence. Additional resources with the National Archives and Records Administration were sought but with the unprecedented winter weather during the research period, accessing these records was not possible.[2]

In regard to the southern regiments, the 4th and 15th Alabama regiments, the Alabama Archives and History website was the main source for these regiment’s histories. Their titles are History of Fourth Regiment Alabama Volunteer Infantry C.S.A. Army of Northern Virginia and History of the Fifteenth Alabama Infantry Regiment. Both of the authors served in these regiments. Both volumes were written at later times and it is not clear precisely how much time had elapsed between events and writing the histories. This poses challenges as the mediation of time can impact the clarity and precision of the material and how it is interpreted. The history concerning the 4th is primarily written from a first-person, concurrent narrative style, yet is also infused with some elements of later letters exchanged in which the author admits to having his recollections challenged or affirmed by surviving commanders of both Confederate and Union armies. Additional material was provided by Antietam National Battlefield and the archival department at that location. Some of this information hints at some discrepancies between the later written material and this falls mainly in the area of killed and wounded in each action. The primary history portrays a unit that received very little in the manner of combat deaths but a letter emerging from the Sharpsburg battle indicates that there were several deaths even in battles before and that they may have engaged in some Zouave manner combat.[3]

There is no single source which clarifies all of Zouave tactics, especially North African antecedent units, nor are there ones which treat them as a subject of special study. The best source which has been located for this was Reminisces of An Officer of Zouaves written by Jean Joseph Cler. This account clarifies many aspects hinted at in newspaper reports but also corrects some of the inherent distortions in them. The source is comprised of direct recollections of military operations against various tribes in French North Africa (Algeria). From the details of the operations, a clear understanding of Zouave tactics can be gleaned from the text, with support from other outside sources.[4]

The writings of George B. McClellan, George G. Meade, Robert E. Lee, and James Longstreet, were consulted, especially the published papers, orders, and other primary source publications. However, there were little too no references to Zouaves in these papers. This is a stark difference from the numerous times in which the artillery and the cavalry as specific units and in general, are mentioned. These omissions tend to emphasize that the Zouaves were not a tactically or strategically important arm of the American military for either the South or the North, especially at the Corps command level. Additional sources on tactics, maneuvers, and more detailed leveled studies were utilized in the research and will be noted in their appropriate places in each section.

The Process of Measuring Effectiveness

Military effectiveness has been the subject of a number of both historical as well as International Relations articles in recent years but this has resulted in some lacuna. These articles have approached military effectiveness from the perspective of measuring leadership effectiveness, the effectiveness of certain national armies vis a vis their educational and training philosophies versus outcomes, and there have been studies authored on the effectiveness of military weapons, particularly armor and other more recent technology. To this point, the only studies that have focused on personnel have been conducted on the Middle East regional level and why Arab armies appear to lack effectiveness. To this point, no studies focusing on individual corps, whether specialist or non-specialist have been located in public or research databases. This is likely because the implications for adversarial exploitation is too apparent. Thus, this study fits within an establish area of study but diverges from it by seeking to isolate the military effectiveness of a corps of troops which either identified themselves or were identified by others as an elite corps.[5]

Measuring the effectiveness of units in a military organization is a challenging prospect for modern militaries and specialists. This is because it is often difficult to identify the proper sources and methods of quantification for that subject. The means have covered mathematical analysis, textual evaluation, and some have been a mixture of approaches. Troop effectiveness most often appears to be quantified against training, both in terms of doctrine and philosophy, and then results of that training on the battlefield. This tends to be more reliable as a means given that direct correlation between the elements provided to the soldiers and the result of conduct on the battlefield can be clearly assessed. A soldier trained to defeat a tank with specific weapon will be counted as effective if he follows that training and kills the tank, he is ineffective if he does not use those weapons properly and does not kill the tank. Other means of evaluating large formations or groups soldiers, particularly the Army Group level, have been subjected to evaluation on the basis of battles won or lost and the statistical implications of these under leadership of differing nationalities. But, as stated above, apart from armored corps, smaller divisions of troops have not been evaluated. There have been no studies conducted privately or by the government and released to the public on those units which constitute or carry the reputation of being elite units. This includes SEAL Teams, DELTA Force, and Army Rangers. Due to the absence of similar studies, there have been questions as to the best methodology.

The methodology adopted in this paper is primarily historical, examination of original North African Zouaves and then comparing these to the regimental histories of American Zouaves and isolating the main areas in which they were likely meant to stand out or be seen as exceptional. These include the composition of the forces, whether they fit with the with African or American models of Zouave composition. Another means of evaluating their effectiveness is to look at their performance in two separate categories, that of performance on the battlefield in their regimental form and in their occasional roles in fighting as companies. Each of these has referential elements in the African Zouaves, upon whom they were, or claimed to be, based upon. The battlefield performance is more closely examined in light of what tactics they used on the battlefield and whether this produced a significantly better result. Some reference will also be made to casualty numbers, but this remains slightly controversial. In terms of company level performance, the examination will not only look at their performance as companies but also other non-Zouave peer- companies that performed similar roles and whether there was any correspondence or exceptionalism in terms of tactics and result.

Ineffectiveness of Composition

American Zouave ineffectiveness was centrally located in the area of their composition as a force. American Zouave units were almost wholly composed of raw recruits who had not served in the military prior to the war and had come from semi and skilled workforces in urban environments. This contrasted sharply with African Zouave units which were entirely composed of veteran soldiers whose combat experience was lengthy and well documented and had to be substantiated by trial performances before acceptance.

Selection of North African Zouaves was on the basis of application by experienced veteran troops. According to Jean Joseph Gustave Cler, who wrote a personal account of his leadership of a Zouave regiment, “Most of them, whose original entry into the service had been as volunteers, or free substitutes, having already served one term -are thus inured to the hardships which they gayly support, to the fatigues they despise, and to the dangers of battle, of which they but make sport”. He further adds that in the main recruitment drive initiated under the French government the soldiers had served in several different posts and some were retired and wished to return to service. As mentioned above, prior service was not the only basis of selection, after application and initial acceptance, these recruits had to demonstrate physical fitness that exceeded other veterans. Thus, the Zouave force was composed of veterans whose service was exceptional before entering combat.[6]

In contrast, the majority of American Zouave units were created de novo, almost none of the men had prior military experience. Of the four regiments examined only one stood out as more technically proficient on entering the service, the 9th New York Volunteers. The 114th Pennsylvania Volunteers, the 4th and 15th Alabama regiments were formed using the standard method of recruiting not only raw recruits but by drawing on elements of the immediate local community of which they were a part. The only regiment that broke this pattern, in large part but not whole, was the 9th New York Volunteers.

For those units that were organized without any prior experience, the record is clear that the men lacked substantial pre-conflict training or skills which would enable them to survive in such an environment and make a quick transition towards dealing with battlefield or camp stress. Edward J Hagerty comments extensively on the vocational background of the men who served in the 114th Pennsylvanian Volunteers. None of the men displayed prior military service, rather the initial cadre of men came predominately from unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled laborers but whose occupations were primarily based in city or urban economic roles and not suburban or farm roles where life experience would have prepared them for some of the more rigorous aspects of military life. The most common role, 115 out of 402 men, in terms of skilled labor was that of clerk. The semi-skilled workers fell into categories of glassmakers, shoemakers, and cork cutter. Unskilled labors would have been in the category of day laborer. This means that only a small percentage of the men were involved in pre-war strenuous activity on a constant, daily basis, and that the majority of the men were used to environments where stress levels were elevated for only minimum amounts of time, not likely to be exposed to noise or bursts of activity which would prepare them for the chaotic, kinetic environment of the battlefield. Being unused to such loud and changing scenes, the period of the soldier to move from initiation of the environment, initiation of the stress trigger and movement towards coping would have been substantially long at least for the first few engagements.[7]

The 4th and 15th Alabama regiments experienced high levels of insubordination, lack of discipline, and frequently suffered from those seeking to remove themselves from active combat, as will be discussed below. The majority of their regiments were organized out of their local communities, the 4th Alabama being raised in the Mobile area and the 15th being created out of the city of Eufaula. Nowhere in their regimental histories are there any indications that these men had adequate preparation. Many of the men exhibited substantial lack of camp discipline as well as issues of discipline while on duty and in the midst of battle. In the regimental history of the 4th Alabama, men on picket duty were found to have been playing cards and, on being reprimanded, openly rejected any reasons for remaining vigilant. At the Battle of Sharpsburg / Antietam, the 4th Alabama regimental history is clear that the unit sought to be as unengaged in the battle as possible, one man almost shot for cowardice for begging not be taken to the defensive line.[8]

The 9th New York Volunteers stood in contrast to these examples as they were formed from a pre-existing unit and one that was experienced in high stress environments. The 9th was formed around a nucleus of Fire Zouaves in New York City, the fire brigade being organized on the same number of men as a regimental company. The unit contained many veterans of situations that closely mirrored combat conditions, including exposure to noisy, chaotic environments, unpredictable changes, taking risks to enter into hazardous places such as buildings that were on fire, and removing people out of hostile areas. and dealing with crowds and those who were seeking to re-enter buildings. In addition, they had developed a cohesive habit as they had experience with working in a small team environment. As veterans of firefighting together, this unit understood each member of the company on a close relationship basis and they were capable of responding to crises within their own specialty but also understanding how to flow in a group.[9]

Ben Shalit, an army psychologist serving in the Israeli army authored a key study entitled, The Psychology of Conflict and Combat. This extensive study reveals several distinct and key patterns within soldier experiences. The chief finding from his work is that, veteran status or experience in high-intensity environments is a key element in combat effectiveness, not ideology or nationalism. The experience reduces the period of transition between initial stimulus and the stress response and the movement towards mental coping allowing for maximal performance. The more often this is experienced, the shorter the time period between the two events. While the psychological nature of it lacked form and definition, the French North African method anticipated this by recognizing that using veterans only for this special troop did have a performative enhancement.[10]

Shalit notes that soldiers in Lebanon were rotated in and out as entire units rather than individuals as the US did in Vietnam. He states that this had the benefit of maintaining unit cohesion of experience and combat exposure which added to the soldier’s ability to mutually support each other and prevent dilution of experience. In a chapter on aggression, he asserts that, “the German’s organization appears to be much more cohesive than the Allies-thus contributing greatly to their fighting effectiveness and their resistance to loss of fighting capacity.. group cohesiveness-with its predictive power for morale and combat effectiveness-cannot be attributed to chance”. Based on these observations he asserts that, “the more cohesive the group, the more aggressive it will become”. Therefore, it is likely that, had the regiments consisted purely of veteran soldiers with more seasoned troops replacing those losses, with fresh recruits solely being directed to newer regiments or formations, there would have been greater unit cohesion having survived common elements of severe stress and other conditions, mutually re-enforcing their performance in future combat. This would have created an attendant net rise in combat effectiveness, not just for Zouave units, but all units which fought. Their joint ability to implement lessons learned without the countervailing stress of battlefield panic by raw recruits, may have substantially increased their ability to serve as field exemplars and provided morale boosting in the midst of combat.[11]

That the French implemented methods to retain veteran experience and translate it into greater battlefield effectiveness allows us to see that it was possible to develop such a system. The essential issue then becomes why this was not put into effect in the American system and it is likely to be found in the lack of need for an army of substantial size. The French were frequently engaged in colonial warfare and had built up substantial cadres of veterans for which they could tap into in various ways. However, since war in the States had been very infrequent, the last war being the Mexican – American War of 1846-1848, there had not been a major impetus for veteran retention programs to be fostered. As a result, experienced soldiers were often returned to civilian occupations and there was a deterioration of skills and a lack of institutional knowledge.[12]

For veteran Zouave units, utilization was non-uniform in their outcomes. The 4th and 15th Alabama continued to fight as cohesive units until the surrender at Appomattox. The 9th New York

Volunteers mustered out as a regiment just a month before Gettysburg. The 114th Pennsylvania Volunteers as a regiment were removed from the front and sent to serve as the guards for the Union field headquarters. From this position, they were further detached with some units serving guard in the environs of Washington, D.C. some serving as transport guards for prisoners, and prison guards at City Point, north of Petersburg. An entry from a regimental history of the Third Cavalry Regiment, which was posted to Grant’s field headquarters post-Gettysburg, relates that the 114th Pennsylvania Volunteers may have been posted due to combat fatigue. The diary entries created by the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry do point toward the opinion that command headquarters duty was viewed as substantially lighter than regular combat duties, referring to it as a much-needed rest. Hagerty relates that specific men in command level positions viewed it as dishonorable and a place for those who had failed. There was no other documentation that supported this specific position; however, it is likely that views ran a similar spectrum.[13]

The failure to organize the Zouaves on the basis of veteran core units substantially impacted unit effectiveness by reducing the amount of experience that the unit held and the ability to maneuver in an environment where the soldier had already become desensitized to combat stress and had developed key coping mechanisms. This was compounded by distributing individual veterans and entire veteran regiments to non-combat roles which often diffused this experience even further. However, there were additional problems with Union and Confederate organization of Zouave units, particularly the area of deploying and sending them into combat in regimental formations rather than in more traditional Zouave units, the company.

Ineffectiveness in Regimental Attack Formation

American Zouave ineffectiveness resulted not only by their composition but how they were deployed on the battlefield. This is one of the more complex issues when dealing with Zouave effectiveness as African units were only deployed in company level formations and were used primarily in the course of attempting to break exterior siege lines, attempting to capture cities that offered resistance. American Zouaves were primarily deployed in regimental formations regardless of their function, whether offensive or defensive. This limited their use as forces which could operate in different areas on the battlefield and engage in pinpoint attacks on vital areas of the lines, they were a broadsword rather than the knife which the African Zouaves so effectively evinced.

North African Zouave Tactics

In order to properly measure American Zouave effectiveness, it is important to establish North African Zouave, African Zouave from here, methods and tactics to reveal how American Zouave effectiveness was altered and thus reduced with the transition from company level to regimental level combat. The single best account of African Zouave training and expectation is the aforementioned Reminisces of an Officer of Zouaves. The primary element which is re-enforced in this account is that the Zouaves, while they marched and conducted general operations in regimental organization, fought their engagements in companies, in some exceptions they fought as battalions. The source is somewhat inconsistent; it appears that the majority of the battalion level formation was adopted on approach of the city, breaking into company level formations when they approached the nearest points of the siege lines.[14]

African Zouaves fought predominately with the bayonet as a principle means of taking siege works and suffered high casualty rates in the process. They also moved quickly over the ground between their initial positions and the objective. Paddy Griffin states in his work, Battle Tactics of the Civil War. He notes that, the soldiers were anticipated to march or move on the battlefield with at least 165 steps per minute. The soldiers were expected to advance against targets in loose order, essentially spread formation, and would charge forward, release a volley of fire, lay down on the ground, reload and gather their breath, and repeat the process. This was done until the troops came into direct contact with the opposing force. This was designated the ‘Zouave Rush’. This was in accordance with the announcement that the African Zouaves, especially of those mentioned in the Reminisces of an Officer of Zouaves, would be following a decree of 1845 which specified chasseur a pied, or Light Infantry tactics.[15]

American Zouave Tactics

The majority of American Zouave units fought as regimental formations, which was fundamentally unsound and reduced their effectiveness. This was due to their being placed within mass formations rather than disbursed, nimble units that could traverse the battlefield and engage in small unit tactics. These could have supported the regimental advances and, as stated above, pierced the lines at select points, allowing follow-on units to exploit these gaps. Instead, they were placed either in defensive positions near or at fence lines or they were sent in formation against these fences and stonewalls. The only unit which displayed Zouave methods on a battlefield and suffered a high combat casualty rate was the 9th New York Volunteers.[16]

The 9th New York Volunteers appears to have demonstrated the highest amount of combat effectiveness, being able to carry their assigned portion of the Confederate positions. The regimental history indicates that they were in a portion of the battlefield called the Cornfield and surmounted a wall which the 9th New York approached at a steady pace and successfully took at bayonet point. This was the limit of their Zouave tactical display; they did not lie down in the grass nor did they stand up and fire on approaching the wall. They marched en mass in standard formation, using large-scale, infantry attack formation and not the company level tactics that they routinely employed which impacted their killed and wounded ratio. In the course of this action the 9th New York suffered two hundred killed and wounded. This was the largest killed and wounded ratio of all of the Zouave units studied both at Sharpsburg and Gettysburg.[17]

The two main Confederate units studied, the 4th and 15th Alabama contained the fewest number of killed, wounded, and missing of those studies. These were posted together at the northern end of the Sharpsburg / Antietam battlefield, under Jackson’s command. The 4th fought at the Dunker Church while the 15th was deployed to the south, engaging Federal troops. Both the 4th and the 15th fought from defensive positions, holding the line against Federal advances. The regimental history for the 4th Alabama is clear that a Texas unit to their left suffered nearly 50 percent casualties while the 4th only suffered a handful.[18]

At Gettysburg, the 4th and 15th Alabama Regiments were both engaged in the battle for Little Round Top. The writer of the 4th Ala. Reg. Zouaves regimental history is clear that, once again, in this action, they sustained the fewest combat casualties despite being in some of the most active combat of the battle. The substantially lower numbers of killed and wounded may have been a result of the fact that the 4th was to the left of the 15th. The 15th would have received the brunt of the Chamberlain maneuver and many of the 15th would have been caught in the pincher between the two lines. It is also likely that, based on prior engagements, the unit did not put itself in the heart of the combat as the other regiments had, engaging in what was known as skulking in the back rather than approaching their objective with full strength or willingness. The 4th Alabama Regiment does not appear to have suffered casualties that were normative for regular, non-specially designated units.[19]

These examples demonstrate that only one of the four Zouave regiments was capable of maintaining a consistently high rate of service and battlefield performance, the 9th New York Volunteers. The reason for this variability can only be found in the prior two areas listed, the lack of veteran concentration and the failure to implement tactics which favored small unit over large unit or regimental tactics on the battlefield. But there also appears to have been an element of local training outcomes. The two least effective Zouave units came from the South and the two units that demonstrated better concentrations of soldiers appears to be those units that came from the North. only unit which appears to have performed at a relatively consistent level of performance in accordance with not only Zouave exemplars but also American regimental standards, was the 9th New York Volunteers.[20]

There is evidence that the American Zouaves could have been deployed according to the African Zouave model. In the introductory material for Infantry Tactics, for the Instruction, Exercise, and Maneuvers of the Soldier, a Company, Line of Skirmishers, Battalion, Brigade, or Corps D’Armee, an army training doctrinal manual, there appears to be an acknowledgement that there was an initial effort to adopt these chasseurs a pied methods, which were ultimately rejected in favor of regimental deployment, with the chasseur a pied method utilized by only two companies per regiment as flank skirmishers. This was in distinction to the entire regiment of Zouaves engaging as detached companies. This meant that the American military leadership was rejecting a core element of competency for these troops. It also appears that there was an acute lack of imagination to depart from standard practices and they could not escape the gravity of conformity.[21]

The lack of battlefield effectiveness can be clearly seen in these examples as extending both from a result of their composition as raw recruits and failure to parse the veterans from those, however, they were also unable to adopt the combat method which had been what made the African

Zouaves of greatest combat effectiveness, the use of them in small, disbursed units rather than large formations.

Effectiveness in Company Level Combat

The American Zouaves appear to have been more effective when they operated on the company level, rather than the regimental level, at which they were required to perform the majority of their combat engagements. The evidence points towards more effective use of men and an ability to engage with adversary units with greater flexibility when the men were not formed into masses of troops but rather loose formations, lying at the heart of the intent and operation of the African Zouave corps. However, this level of effectiveness is relative and does not appear to be a qualitative increase over non-Zouave peer-Company actions, Union or Confederate.

As pointed out above, the American Zouaves conducted the majority of their operations within the confines of the regimental system, whether in column of march or in combat on the battlefield. However, there were some exceptions to this pattern. Some regiments saw more action and were more often divided into company size corps for special duties, at which time it is clear to see that they had a higher level of performance, if not completely in the Zouave manner. There were two units which predominately used company level formations to perform their duties, these are the 114th Pennsylvania Volunteers also known as Collis’ Zouaves and the 9th New York Volunteers Hawkins Zouaves.

The 114th Pennsylvania Volunteers Company A was dispatched on several special detached service missions, mostly serving as rear-guard skirmishers or as reconnaissance. A specific early reconnaissance mission was led by a smaller portion of the company, only 20 men under the direct command of Collis. In the next action the entire company was detached to serve as support for sappers that were tasked with demolition of a bridge to halt the advance of Confederate forces under Jackson. The unit engaged an opposite Zouave company at Middletown, VA and, despite having to retreat, did mount a substantial resistance before retiring. However, on completion of this and a successful 164-mile journey brought them back into contact with the main formation under the leadership of Nathan P Banks. The Collis’ Zouaves did make use of protective cover, a stonewall. Their use of this cover and smaller size enabled them to effectively check a Confederate unit. The unit in this action did display greater flexibility and the use of special measures. This disappeared when they became a regiment.[22]

The other unit which reflected Zouave tactics on the company level to a greater degree was the 9th New York Volunteers. Archival summaries clarify, along with the regimental history, that they fought the majority of their actions in formations of companies and not as a full regiment. Of 26 total engagements, the 9th fought 15 engagements as less than a full regiment, and 13 of those 15 were with 3 or fewer companies engaged overall. The largest unit action was performed with 8 of 11 companies.[23]

In terms of using Zouave tactics, the unit stormed a Confederate fort located on Roanoke Island, constructed in a swamp with several detailed obstacles and limited entry points. In the encounter, the 9th marched through waist high swamp, laid as close to the water as possible during a cannonade, and used the bayonet on storming the fort’s glacis. In a special limited operation to Elizabeth City, N.C. only “H” and “I” companies participated in the action. In this action they were armed lightly, reflecting the African Zouave accouchement and laid down on the ground during cannonades, stood up to fire, rushed forward, and repeated the grounding move. The men successfully burned Confederate stores and returned to their camp. The 114th Regiment did lie down at Gettysburg but this was not at the direction of commanding officers. However, Zouave regiments or companies were not the only units assigned special operations and these also demonstrate this use of special tactics.[24]

The New York Times Archives contain three stories which occurred in the early months of the war and demonstrate that non-Zouave elements were equally employed. The Thirteenth Regiment of Brooklynn was deployed to recover a ship which was seized from Union forces and sailed south to the northern Virginia, Chesapeake Bay area. The operation was executed at nighttime and they were successful in returning the ship. In another instance, the Confederates seized the U.S. Arsenal and Armory in Mount Vernon, Alabama. In this action, several soldiers are described as having scaled the barracks high walls while other elements were able to break into the main doors and charge the soldiers guarding the facility. The arsenal was not seized by a Zouave unit, the men employed were a company of State Militia operating on what the newspaper described as ‘Zouave manner’.[25]

These operations, executed at the Company or below level do raise significant questions as to whether the Zouave units were better due to their organization and training as Zouaves or whether there was a natural or more ability or skill that American soldiers have at the smaller unit level. This scholar is inclined to favor a general tendency towards small unit tactics as a general phenomenon rather than a special ability restricted to the American Zouaves.

The wilderness isolation and geography of the eastern seaboard appears to have strongly influenced American means of warfare, conforming more towards guerilla and Light Infantry tactics. Topography appears to have had a strong influence on hunting and warfare. The sharp mountains and the narrow valleys tended to favor smaller, nimble units rather than expansive battlefield maneuvering, which could take place only in a limited number of places. This early adaptation to such fighting method appears first in the French and Indian War and then re-appeared in the early stages of the American Revolution, until the military was re-organized under George Washington. The American way of fighting in the early portion of the Revolution quickly suggested that guerrilla fighting would be a far more effective mode of fighting against British regular troops. The men, especially non-urban dwellers, would have perforce a much greater capability in executing these maneuver with less doctrinaire training.[26]

Further, according to Shalit, troops more strongly identify with their smallest unit possible, this is usually on the company level, though in some instances the strongest association of group identity can be as low as the squad or platoon. Given that these were not recognized categories at the time, it is likely that the troops more thoroughly understood and identified with their fellow company level combatants and that this identification increased their effectiveness. Additionally, they were more liable to have their actions and their courage, bravery more closely examined by these elements. Essentially the company level produced the most effective peer group for accountability in terms of combat performance while the regiment allowed for individual acts of cowardice and lack of aggression to be less noticeable and less subject to censure.[27]

Thus, while the Zouaves fought better in Company sized formations this was less as a result of a special emphasis on this from purposeful emulation and more a result of the unique American way of fighting which had long emphasized this through enculturation in hunting and foraging methods which lent themselves to more effective fighting adversaries who were hunting and fighting in the same environment. This means of fighting and effective combat was subsumed and eclipsed by the move towards regimental sized and then corps sized armies reflecting the general 19th century trend towards grander armies.

Conclusion

This paper has sought to evaluate the effectiveness of the American Zouaves as a corps within the militaries of the Union and Confederacy. The evidence supports that the American Zouaves were ineffective and that this stemmed from a lack of proper force composition. They were drawn from non-veteran or more highly qualified cadres of soldiers with some prior exposure to combat or rigorous duty, from being deployed on the battlefield in regiments rather than the prescribed company level formation, and company level action that matched but did not exceed, the level of company performance normally associated with non-peer Zouave company units.

The central area of Zouave ineffectiveness was in force composition. The American Zouave units did not resemble the veteran composition of North African Zouaves. This composition allowed for greater effectiveness due to cohesion through prior combat experience, being desensitized to combat conditions and thus allowing for more ability to engage the enemy despite chaotic battlefield conditions as well as a sense of cohesion. American Zouave units were pulled from entirely raw recruits and persons largely from urban working environments which did not give them exposure to the rigors of combat. Only one of the units researched, the 9th New York Volunteers, came with the veteran qualities due to their formation around the New York Fire Zouaves which had obvious exposure to harsh working environments and ones that closely resembled combat conditions. The remaining three had not been inculcated with the ability to deal with the unique stresses of combat which would have led to smoother transition from stress stimuli to coping mechanism and greater freedom to deal with the threat.

The second critical area of ineffectiveness was restricting the majority of Zouave units to regimental formations rather than retaining North African exemplars of company level combat. Battlefield performance data points to the conclusion that, as regiments, they were the least effective units on battlefields such as Sharpsburg and Gettysburg. All sources on North African Zouaves emphasize that the Zouaves preferred and most effective combat formation was as detached companies. Accounts of smaller, individual actions substantiate that they excelled when placed into minor engagements such as those around Roanoke Island and Elizabeth City, N.C.. However, this is an area of ineffectiveness or at least reduced effectiveness, accounts support the conclusion that the Zouaves often performed at the same level of effectiveness as other non-Zouave peer detached companies on special service.

Further Research

A few areas of further research still remain and there is reason to perhaps more narrowly consider the forgoing categories on their own terms. Monographic expansion allowing each of these areas to be expanded into chapter level examinations, or even a series of three journal level studies, would allow for an expansion of the number of Zouave units examined, both North and South, as well as more thorough assessment of the data. It is unlikely to change the conclusions drawn, however, the benefit would be in aiding understanding of how these were widespread phenomenon rather than isolated examples. The North African Zouaves would also prove a very fertile research area provided that the interpretational framework was degenderized and they were allowed to be examined in terms of military history.

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Show Notes

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© 2026 James Bowden, M.A.

James Bowden, M.A. is a research historian whose primary focus is Middle Eastern military history. Holding an MA in Middle East History from American Military University he is now working on an MA in Military Operations. He has published peer-reviewed articles, articles in history magazines, and three-chapters in two books. Mr. Bowden serves as an occasional guest commentator on New Delhi TV, AL24news (Algeria), and TV Poland. He enjoys viewing movies and listening to music in his off time. 

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