By Pete Bublitz

The Preluding Months

In the early morning hours of August 19, 1942, a fleet of up to 250 ships supported by over 70 Allied Air Force squadrons was carrying a force of 6,000-plus men across the English Channel towards the areas that surrounded the city of Dieppe, a port town located in the Pays de Caux region of northeastern France. They would be transported to their target beaches with anticipation from their superiors of delivering a series of damaging blows to the German fortifications in and around Dieppe. But as the minutes approached 0400 hours (4 a.m.), a German convoy approaching from the north would be the first blow to unravel the entire operation. Nine hours later, the convoy would return to its homeports in defeat with high casualty counts. In the years after D-Day up to the present, historians and military officials agreed that Jubilee, as the operation was codenamed, was one of the Allies’ greatest military blunders of World War II. The truth is, Jubilee was turning into a blundering operation long before it was executed, due to a series of planning mistakes, miscalculations, and changes made in the weeks and months leading up to August 19th.

With a majority of Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans under occupation during the opening three to four months of 1942, the most significant focus of western military action by the Third Reich by early ’42 had been shifted toward the deserts of North Africa through the success of Erwin Rommel and his Afrika Korps. Aside from ongoing conflict with national resistance and partisan groups throughout the western countries, the only major blows to be inflicted upon Fortress Europe by land-based Allied forces were strategically minor yet effective commando raids up and down the Atlantic coastline.

Only in Eastern Europe did the advance of Nazi Germany’s armed forces meet an influx of military action that would eventually bring them to a complete standstill during that period. Beginning in the early summer and lasting well into the late autumn of 1941, Soviet Russia had become the latest witness to former peacetime ally Germany’s notorious blitzkrieg tactics and strategies when Operation Barbarossa was initiated in June of ’41. The 6th German Army had undergone few to no delays and met light resistance as it moved deeper and deeper into Russia. Upon reaching the outer boundaries of Moscow and Leningrad in the north, however, the Germans would be stopped dead in their tracks by a combination of the unfriendly December weather and immediate Soviet counteroffensives that showed the resilience of Soviet troops. These factors in their halt would cause the Germans to redirect their advance away from the chief northern cities to the industrial centers around the Caucasus regions in southern Russia by the time spring of 1942 began.

The Soviet Outcry

Because the German armies continued to carve out territories deep within the U.S.S.R, Premier Josef Stalin was still struggling against the Nazi war machine pounding outside his gates nearly four months after the Operation Typhoon offensive against Moscow was ended. Despite managing to eliminate the supply resources, bases, and hostels that would have been made available to the Germans through his ‘scorched earth’ policy, the only available area of resources left unscathed was the Caucasus region around the Volga River. And although a Soviet counteroffensive would proceed to push the Germans away from Moscow until the end of April, it would merely redirect them further to the south where the mountains of the Caucasus loomed. In addition, the mass purges that had been ordered by Stalin would limit the availability of his own military staff as well as the manpower of his armies. Still, Allied aid was being sent to the U.S.S.R from the west. While the Russians continued to be pushed back by the Germans, the U.S. and Britain had enacted a military aid programme in October ‘41 that would deliver mobile vehicles, aircraft and other weapons and equipment.

As time passed, however, Premier Stalin became intent on asking for more than additional supplies fro, the Western Allies. What he most sought was relief from the massive German force that spanned the front. Likely believing that Russia was being under looked during its conflict, Stalin would begin to rebuke his western Allies for what he called inaction. His high disdain for them had become so built up that by late February of ’42, he would resort to the level of adding injury to insult by publicly declaring his willingness to take up possible negotiations with Germany. Although it is not fully known why, Stalin probably made this statement to garner an effective response from the Western Allies that would motivate them enough to take action in fulfilling what Stalin wanted. If the statement were for this purpose, then Stalin would be successful in causing responsive actions (Villa 8).

The Responses of April

The statements, as it turned out, would bring about declared actions and responses on both sides of the war. In Nazi Germany, Fuhrer Adolf Hitler had suspected what Stalin had intended for his speech and declared late in March that the statements would sway the Western Allies to immediately act in aiding Russia by refocusing and committing their troops and strategies to the execution of more raids and other operations along the coasts of Western Europe. Therefore, he would send out an order for all German troops stationed along the occupied coasts to be put and remain in an indefinite state of high alert and readiness (Villa 8).

What Hitler had suspected, unbeknownst to him, was proceeding to be verified across the English Channel as well as the Atlantic. In Great Britain, the Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) under Lord Louis Mountbatten and its planning staff were busy trying to figure out what actions could possibly be taken to aid the Soviet Union, an issue that was continually pressured on them by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the British War Cabinet. Its work pace would increase when, on April 18, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov called for opening up a second front in the West during his visit to London. Sensing that a higher demand for more raids would be recommended, Captain John Hughes-Hallet, a planner for COHQ’s Naval wing, took to compiling a list of chief occupied locations along the coasts; locations which would serve as possible targets for an upcoming series of raids. The first of these of raids would have been scheduled to take place during the final weeks of May. Although understanding that more raids needed to be carried out in the upcoming months, Hughes-Hallet knew early that a number of minor raids would not be enough to relieve the Soviet Union. Only an action much larger than a single set of raids would be impacting enough to bring about this relief (Villa 9).

On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, in the United States, the staff leaders of the American Armed Forces were also directing concern towards taking action to remove some of the pressure off of Russia. Despite being dedicated to fighting the war on at least two fronts in two theaters, a group of top U.S. military officials who viewed Hitler’s Third Reich to be a greater threat than Imperial Japan and that coming to the assistance of the U.S.S.R was to be the first and top priority of the war in Europe. Chief among them was General George Marshall, who agreed that opening up a Western front was the best and only means of meeting this sole objective. Yet Marshall also believed that this front could be opened up through one strategy effective enough to do this: a cross-Channel invasion undertaken by Allied forces by early 1943. It was estimated, and intended, that a major invasion would deter German focus away from the Russia via this new front. It would not, as planners decided in the upcoming months, be the main invasion but instead a preliminary mass raid to test out the factors and obstacles of a major invasion, including new military technologies and enemy defense capabilities. It would serve as what planners called a “reconnaissance-in-force” that would precede the actual invasion of Western Europe.

Thus, General Marshall traveled to Great Britain to discuss this possible strategy with Mountbatten and Combined Operations. By the time he arrived, COHQ had run low on acceptable targets for Allied raids. During his stay in England from April 4 to April 19, Marshall would manage to convince Mountbatten to refocus planning for a combined-force raid that would be much larger in scale as well as manpower than an average raid. Lord Mountbatten expressed eagerness over this possibility and immediately put the COHQ planning staff to work on possible invasion strategies (Black 2-4). Hughes-Hallet’s list was again consulted, and it had been decided during the last days of April, by the COHQ staff, that a combined-force invasion would be undertaken at the small port town of Dieppe. The decision to attack Dieppe originated from two proposed plans. The first plan centered on landing flank attack troops at the neighboring towns of Puits, one and a half miles east of Dieppe; Pourville, two and a half miles west of the town; and Varengeville, three miles west of Pourville. The second plan called for paratroopers to be dropped on Varengeville and Berneval, a town four miles east of Puits; it also involved flanking attack forces that would be landed at Puits and Pourville. On the 25th of April, members of COHQ’s Planning Staff decided that the second plan would be chosen for consideration. (Buckley 230).

The Haste of May

After being analyzed, plan number two of the pair was chosen for a number of reasons the planners believed were accurate. Chief among these was the matter of Dieppe being held by what COHQ officials believed to be a weak German division with a scarce number of men; German reinforcements would be too slow to reach the defense positions in time; and that having men from the flanking positions advance towards Dieppe would take up too much time. These observed factors confirm the planners’ belief that a full frontal assault on Dieppe coupled with flank attacks at neighboring areas on both its sides would overrun and knock out the main defense forces stationed there and withdraw before German reinforcements arrived.

Around the time this plan was agreed upon, the military force that would carry out the attacks was already being put together. The COHQ staff would select three high-ranking men to head the wings of the assault: Capt. John Hughes-Hallet would serve as commander of the naval forces, Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory would command the supporting Air Force squadrons, while Major General John Hamilton Roberts was selected to serve as commander of the combined military force involved in the operation. Making up the ground forces were a combination of British Commandos, Canadian infantry, and U.S. Rangers (Ford 17).

Even though the plan was still in the process of being fully detailed in terms of strategy and tactics, by early May the British War Cabinet was breathing down the necks of Mountbatten and COHQ, mainly because the Soviets were continuing to breathe down the Cabinet’s neck. Rushed by repetitive demands for layouts of the plan, on May 11th Mountbatten presented the plan to the Cabinet’s Chiefs of Staff Committee before it could be thoroughly detailed. Rushing through the plan themselves, the Committee would approve the operation and assign it with the codename Rutter on May 13th. In addition to this, it was decided that Operation Rutter would be carried out some time during the latter weeks of June. (Buckley 230-231).

The Changes and Setbacks of June and July

Long after it was approved, however, the plans for Operation Rutter were still undergoing alterations in terms of military involvement. The idea of paratrooper usage for flanking attacks had been dropped in favor of landing commandos at the outlying areas that surrounded Dieppe. It was also originally intended for a pre-raid naval bombardment to take place during the morning hours before the troops were landed. Due to peer pressure over the claimed possibility that a heavy bombardment would create major setbacks such as alerting the enemy too early and the destruction of key roads and buildings before they could be secured, Mountbatten would relent this strategy. On June 5, during his visit to the United States, Mountbatten made the decision to cancel the originally scheduled bombardment. On the issue of landing times, planners decided that simultaneous landings would become too condensed and decided push the main assault time back half an hour after the flanking attacks began. These required changes convinced the Planning Staff to reschedule Rutter for no earlier than July 4th and no later than July 8th (Villa 10-13).

The days leading up to the first week of July saw the relocation of ground troops from their previous training locations to their departure ports in southern England where they’d embark for the operation. During that first week, however, the Allied forces would be hampered by ongoing weather woes. Well into July 8th and the days that followed, ongoing rainfall and storms would leave the fleet docked. During that week the operation’s secrecy would receive an additional sting much greater than the first. On July 7th, a reconnaissance plane from the Luftwaffe spotted transport ships in the Solent docks and dropped two bombs on the H.M.S. Astrid and H.M.S. Josephine Charlotte. The bomb dropped on the Astrid never went off, but the one dropped on Josephine Charlotte exploded in the crew’s quarters and killed more than fifteen sailors (Mellor 23). Though little damage was done, the attacks convinced COHQ that what the Germans observed would likely hint them to an upcoming invasion and therefore cause them to double their forces and prolong their state of high alert. As a result of this problem, coupled with continuous bad weather, COHQ decided to cancel Rutter indefinitely and send the troops back to their original training posts.

Only one week after its cancellation, Mountbatten and COHQ were already proposing to have the raid revived and rescheduled. Although reviving and carrying out the raid would be more risky at the moment than it was one month prior, the Chiefs of Staff Committee was easily convinced enough to decide, on July 20th, that the raid was back on schedule. They would rename the entire operation Jubilee, which was the codename for Dieppe itself. With the scheduled date, August 19th, a go, Combined Operations would issue a preliminary order for Operation Jubilee on July 31st for all troops to be put on alert until further notice. On the 17th of August, the troops would again be transported to their assigned ports of departure, where they would embark with the naval convoy towards their intended destination in the early evening hours of August 18th (Ford 11).

The Players and the Stage

While the plan that revolved around the Dieppe raid was still in its early organization stages, assembling the ground forces was still being discussed in terms of which units it would consist of. After deliberation among COHQ planners head military officers, it was decided that the attack force taking part in the ground operation would be an made up of volunteers from the Canadian Army, Commando Battalions, and soldiers from select Allied forces, including the 1st U.S. Ranger Battalion, British Secret Service, and No. 10 Inter-Allied Commando. On the other side of the channel, the German troops of the 302nd Division were proceeding to build up their available reserve presence as well as defense fortification throughout the area. At the same time, numerous heavy artillery and anti-aircraft gun emplacements were set up throughout the towns and elevated areas that surrounded Dieppe, as well as Dieppe itself, to support the defense lines that overlooked the beaches along the Channel coast and ports.

The Canadian Involvement

As of late April, when a plan to raid Dieppe was decided upon and authorized, the two main Canadian divisions stationed in England were the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions. Commanding 2nd Division was Major-General John Hamilton Roberts, while Lieutenant-General R.G.L. McNaughton would head 1st Division. Over time, however, McNaughton would be promoted up to Commander of all Canadian forces in England. Originally formed from national volunteer militias and sent to Britain and Iceland for training during 1939-1940, the two divisions’ total manpower would increase due to the passing of the National Resources Mobilization Act in the summer of ’40. The Mobilization Act would affect the Canadian military’s servicemen capacity through the extensive conscription of Canadian men between the ages of 21 and 42. With the whole of 2nd Division brought together in England by April of ’42, it would be stationed at Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery’s South Eastern Command (Villa 212-213).

When it came time for COHQ to consider what forces could be used for the main attack on Dieppe, the final decision was left to Montgomery and General Bernard Paget. After deliberation, the two agreed that Canadian troops from South Eastern Command would be the best bet for this part of the raid. With encouragement from Lt.-Gen. McNaughton, Gen. Paget gave the order to assign Major-Gen. Roberts’ 2nd Division with the assault. Roberts, in turn, selected six infantry regiments from the Division’s 4th and 6th Canadian Brigades. Chosen from Brigadier Sherwood Lett’s 4th Brigade were:

• the Royal Regiment of Canada, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas Catto;
• the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry under Lieut.-Col. Robert Labatt;
• and Lieut.-Col. Fred Jasperson’s Essex Scottish Regiment.

The 6th Brigade, commanded by Brig. William Southam, would provide:

• Lieut.-Col. Dollard Menard’s Fusiliers Mont Royal Regiment;
• the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Alfred Gostling;
• and the South Saskatchewan Regiment under Lieut.-Col. Charles Merrit (Ford 25).

Roberts also selected the 2nd Division’s 14th Canadian Tank Battalion, under the command of Lieut.-Col. John Andrews, for involvement in the main attack. Nicknamed the Calgary Tanks, 14th Battalion was intended mostly to provide heavy armor support for the Canadian infantry troops landing at and around Dieppe. The following regiments and ancillary units from other brigades and divisions, supporting the two Brigades, included:

• selected units from the Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (the Black Watch), from 2nd Division’s 5th Brigade;
• a unit from the Canadian 1st Army Tank Brigade;
• the Toronto Scottish Machine Gun Regiment, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Guy Standish Gostling (Alfred Gostling’s brother);
• units from the three Royal Canadian Artillery Field Regiments of 2nd Division;
• three companies from the Royal Canadian Engineers under Major B. Sucharov;
• the 2nd Provost Corps;
• the 11th Field Ambulance Brigade; and
• the Canadian Corps of Signals (Mellor 14).

With the roster for the Canadian targets in place, on May 8th the Canadian brigades had received orders to begin training for the upcoming operation. During the remainder of May and most of June, the regiments’ units would undergo necessary preparation at the Isle of Wight, located off England’s southern coast, for their objectives during Rutter. In addition to standard military training (weapons training, endurance marches, etc.), some of the units would also receive commando-style training for certain special tasks. These tasks included cliff-climbing, street fighting, deployment from landing craft, and unarmed hand-to-hand combat. Once training was completed, the men were transferred to specific naval ports where they would remain stationed until they were to embark for Operation Rutter (Mellor 16-18).

Due to COHQ’s decision to cancel Operation Rutter, the men of the Canadian 2nd Division were sent back to a South Eastern Command different from the one before they left. General Montgomery left S.E. Command to take control of the British 8th Army in North Africa, though prior to his departure he urged to no avail for COHQ to consider planning new attack at a different location instead of refocusing on Dieppe. With the operation back on, renamed Jubilee, and “Monty” gone, S.E. Command was assigned to Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar, who was Commander of the Canadian I Corps at the time. All the pieces being in place, the regiments would be transferred back to their embarking ports for the operation and shipped out to Dieppe on August 18th (Ford 16).

The Presence of Commandos

As France proceeded to fall under Nazi occupation during the summer of ’40, the major British armies were struggling to recuperate enough to continue the war. Still, Churchill vowed to keep Britain fighting beyond Britain itself. This earnestness would about the creation of the Commandos: British Special Forces assigned with delivering blows to new German fortifications along the West European coasts. On the 23rd-24th of June 1940, at the French town of Boulogne, Commando units would introduce a new method of warfare to the Germans: the amphibious raid. The impact of this Commando raid would influence a long series of raids over the next two years. From the small islands of Spitzbergen (17 Aug.-8 Sept. 1941) and Lofoten (4 March; 26 Dec. 1941) off of northern Norway to the Vichy French town of Bayonne along the southern Biscay Bay coastline (5 Apr. 1942), special Commando forces had managed to achieve tactical success by at least briefly disrupting German resources and defenses if not completely damaging them. Most of all, the raids disrupted the chance of an entirely Phoney War in Western Europe (Ladd 15-29).

By the time plans for Operation Rutter had been approved in May of ‘42, Commandos had become the most frequent source of Allied ground warfare in Western Europe. They would also achieve their greatest acclaim one and a half months prior, when units of the 2nd Commando undertook the St. Nazaire raid on March 27th-28th, 1942. The successful execution performed at St. Nazaire would lead many to call it the greatest amphibious raid of the war in West Europe. Recognizing their success, COHQ planners found it necessary to have Commandos involved in the upcoming raid on Dieppe. Therefore, it was decided that Commandos would be used instead of paratroopers for the flanking attacks. A total of three separate Commando units were to undertake separate tasks during the raid. Selected by COHQ were:

• 3 Commando, commanded by Lieut.-Col. J.F. Durnford-Slater;
• 4 Commando under Lieut.-Col. Lord Lovat; and
• Lieut.-Col. J. Picton-Phillip’s Royal Marine A Commando, aka the Royal Marines.

Two out the three units, 3 and 4 Commando, would undertake flanking attacks while the Royal Marines were to be involved in the main attack at Dieppe’s beaches (Ford 25, 31).

The Commandos would immediately begin their extensive training for the operation once they had been given their assignments. 4 Commando would partake in training at Weymouth, 3 Commando would train for the operation in Sussex, while the Royal Marines trained at the Isle of Wight with the Canadians. During their training, the men would closely analyze Intelligence reports and reconnaissance pictures taken of the area and immediately work on a strategy plan of attack for their assignment. Once organized, the men would undergo daily speed-marches and repetitive assault simulations until they had it down perfectly. These training rehearsals would continue on and off until the time came in mid-August for them to embark on their mission. When it did, they would reach the epitome of their training on the other side of the English Channel (Ford 24).

The Minor American Force

The trip made to England by General Marshall would not only result in the consideration of opening a second front. On April 15, it was proposed that a group of twelve U.S officers, twenty NCOs, and forty privates be selected to train with British Commandos in order to create the blueprint for a larger American commando unit. In addition to this group, it was proposed, another twenty officers and forty NCOs be trained so that they can be sent back to the states to train more men. Lord Mountbatten also proposed that up to eight officers from the U.S. armed forces serve as an American activities staff for COHQ. Upon returning to the U.S., General Marshall selected Colonel Lucian Truscott to work on Mountbatten’s staff with the assignment of selecting American soldiers to train with the Commandos for the operation. When the time came for the raid to be underway, the soldiers would be divided and serve with the separate battalions involved in Dieppe (Black 3-4).

Truscott, seeking to compile men stationed in Ireland for an American Commando unit, would be responsible for the creation of the U.S. 1st Ranger Battalion in June of ’42. They were to be trained at the Commando Basic Training Center in Achnacarry, Scotland. At this location, the Rangers were put through the same training procedures and raid preparations as regular British Commandos. As the deadline for the Dieppe raid grew close, Lord Mountbatten approached Col. Truscott on the subject of whether or not he wanted U.S. Rangers involved in the raid. Giving an affirmative yes, Truscott went ahead and selected up to 50 Rangers (six officers and forty-four lower-ranking men), for the operation (Ford, 24). Over time, the combined Ranger force chosen for the raid would be divided among the main forces taking part in what would become Jubilee. Up to 40 Rangers, four officers and 36 men, would serve with Lieut.-Col. Durnford-Slater’s 3 Commando. Meanwhile, another four Rangers were assigned to Lord Lovat’s 4 Commando. The final six Rangers would serve alongside the separate Canadian battalions. They would receive their assigned forces and continue training well into mid-August, just a few days prior to their departure (Black 29-32).

The German Buildup and the Set Stage

The order of alert issued by Hitler was to be handled under the command of General-feldmarschall (Field Marshal) Gerd von Rundstedt, the Commander in Chief who presided over all army forces in occupied Western Europe. The order would be passed down to Generaloberst (Senior General) Curt Haase’s 15th German Army, which occupied the areas from Holland’s Western Scheldt deltas to Caen, France. He would issue this order further down to the two generals commanding the areas in and around Dieppe. First there was General der Panzertruppen (General of the Cavalries) Adolf Kuntzen, whose LXXXI Corps were in charge of defending the areas all along the Dieppe coastlines. Kuntzen would finally give this order of alert to Generalleutnant (Lieutenant-General) Konrad Haase and his 302nd Infantry Division, which defended the beaches of Dieppe and the surrounding towns (Ford 18).

This order of high alert would also affect the activities of German naval forces off the West European coastlines. It also increased the monitoring of skies over the English Channel and Western Europe, underwent by specific Luftwaffe groups. Two of these groups, Jagdesgeschwaders (JG) 2 & 26, consisted of over 200 Focke Wulf FW 190 and Messerschmitt BF 109 fighters. The groups and their fighters were stationed at six air bases scattered throughout France and southern Belgium. Stationed at bases in Belgium and Holland were five Luftwaffe bomber groups: Kampfgeschwaders (KG) 2, 40, 53, & 77, and Kustenfliegergruppe (Ku) 106. These five groups possessed over 105 Dornier Do 217, Junkers Ju 88, and Heinkel He 111 bombers combined. Along with those at Dieppe, the harbors of numerous towns along the French coasts would also be put on high security alert and therefore double their defenses. After the fall of France the Germans would dedicate the towns’ harbors to serving as naval depots and landing docks. The short distance between these towns would make convoy movement, U-Boat activity, and naval patrols up and down the coastline more frequent (Franks 29, 174; Ford 30, 78).

The 302nd Infantry Division was comprised mainly of the 570th, 571st, and 572nd Infantry Regiments. The 302nd’s Artillery Regiment, Reconnaissance Battalion, Anti-tank Battalion, Engineer Battalion, and Signal Battalion would provide support to the infantry regiments. The 571st Regiment was centered in Dieppe and the areas surrounding it, while the 570th and 572nd would be stationed in the outlying areas. Haase would leave the objective of defending the Dieppe areas to the entire 571st, under the command of Oberstleutnant (Senior Lieutenant) Hermann Bartelt. The battalions that made up the 571st were stationed at separate districts inside and outside of Dieppe. The headquarters of the 571st’s 1st Battalion was located in the village of Ouville, just south of Vasterival. The remainder of the regiment was located in different parts of Dieppe itself. The headquarters of the 571st’s 2nd Battalion, along the main HQ of the 571st itself, were located at the Chateau on top of the western Dieppe headlands. The 3rd Battalion’s HQ rested on the right side of the town’s harbor, where its mouth flowed into the channel. The main HQ for the 302nd Division was suspected to be located southwest of Dieppe, in the town of Arques-la-Bataille. Still, the 302nd Division held a wide enough area to make defense setup a top priority. The manner of which the 302nd would defend its grounds was likely based on the geography and landscape of the area (Ford 31, 37-38).

The coastal edges along Dieppe were mostly steep cliffs, some of which were high enough to make climbing difficult. They would stoop down into river valleys in the areas where local rivers flowed into the sea. The three chief rivers in the Dieppe area were:

• the Saane River, which flowed between the towns of Quiberville and St. Marguerite just west of Vasterival;
• the Scie River, which was surrounded on both sides by the town of Pourville; and
• the Arques River, which flowed into the mouth of Dieppe’s port.

The towns along the coastline would be marked by mile-long beaches met by sea walls up to 150 yards in depth. Surrounding Dieppe were two more headlands that happened to spread landward. The headlands east of Dieppe looked down on the town’s main port and docks, while the western headlands rose up behind the town’s Casino. The large Casino, built for its original obvious purpose, was left abandoned when Germany invaded France during 1940. By 1942, it would be converted by German forces into a garrisoned structure for defense purposes. The Casino stood alongside numerous other buildings (including a large tobacco factory), on a beachfront called the Boulevard de Verdun. Located south of Dieppe were the Luftwaffe-occupied airfields of St. Aubin. The layout of Dieppe and the other towns would most influence how the Germans would put together their defenses (Buckley 231).

The 571st Regiment, however, had a diminished amount of manpower. Spread out thinly along the beaches of Dieppe and the neighboring towns, were the 571st’s mere total of 1500 soldiers. They were stationed not only in the towns themselves, but also in the open areas and highlands between the towns that overlooking the beaches. A garrison of only 150 men, for example, defended the beaches at Dieppe, while a smaller garrison of 50 men defended the beaches at Puits. Lacking in terms of infantry capacity, the Germans would focus on setting up extensive defense perimeters throughout the area. Around the outer borders of Dieppe, the 571st had developed an ongoing barrier made up of thick barbed wire, machine-gun pillboxes, and concrete walls. Along the town’s beaches and headlands that loomed over them were scattered additional machine gun emplacements and barbed wire entanglements. The Germans further fortified the beachfronts by barricading all roads and entries into the towns with concrete walls and converting numerous buildings along the front into defense structures (Ford 37-38).

The German command, in the months prior to August, also found it necessary to set up heavy weapon emplacements throughout the Dieppe area in order to support the infantry defense garrisons. By the time August rolled around, Dieppe was secured by just as many, if not more, heavy weapons emplacements as regimental defenses. Dieppe’s headlands held a total of seven or eight 75mm artillery guns and a maximum of ten 37mm-47mm anti-tank guns. Outside of western Dieppe and at Les Vertus (south of Dieppe), the Luftwaffe contributed two anti-aircraft batteries (one at each location). The 302nd’s Artillery Regiment would also emplace a number of heavy weapons batteries around Dieppe. South of Vasterival stood six 150mm guns, known as the Hess Battery. The Hitler Battery, which consisted of four 150mm guns, was located just west of Arques-la-Bataille. A total of sixteen 100mm howitzers would be divided among the 1st Mobile (N.E. of Appeville), 2nd Mobile (S.E. of Puits), Goering (N.E. of Les Vertus), and Rommel Batteries (S.W. of Greges). Finally, there was the Goebbels Battery, an emplacement that included three 170mm guns and four 105mm guns. With all fortifications in place, the 302nd’s troops would remain on alert for a possible Allied attack well into mid-August (Ford 31).

The Layout of the Assault 

The raid on Dieppe, during the time it was being planned, was likely COHQ’s most anticipated operation to date. This can be verified by the immense military force taking part in the attack. Men from a total of ten to twenty battalions and regiments would cross the English Channel as the ground assault force for the raid. They would be supported by both a large naval fleet and a vast number of Allied Air Force squadrons. This reconnaissance-in-force was to be undertaken for a series of purposes. This raid was intended to test numerous factors, including:

• the Allies’ ability to attack and capture a coastal port or town under enemy occupation;
• their ability in operating and handling a large amphibious force;
• the effectiveness of new weapons, equipment, and vehicles (i.e. the Churchill tank), in combat; and
• the maximum strength and capabilities of German defenses along the coastlines.

Observations made from these factors would be used to influence further planning and preparations for an even larger amphibious assault in the months and years following Operation Jubilee. Once on the other side of the Channel, the men were to land on eight separate beaches at seven neighboring towns. These towns were stretched out along an 18-20km span of coastline. The ground troops’ main tasks during the raid would be strenuous in the highest degree. Their main objectives included:

• the destruction of most or all German heavy defenses, the radar station in Dieppe, and the facilities of the St. Aubin airfields;
• the capture and evacuation of German officials and naval barges in Dieppe’s harbor; and
• the capture of 302nd Division’s central HQ, believed to be located in Arques-la-Bataille.

The beach sectors, upon which select regiments would land, would be given color codenames: Orange, Green, White, Red, Blue, and Yellow. Not only would they land in different spots, but they would be ordered to land at opposing times. These times were to take place during the dawn hours, when the sun was six to twelve degrees below horizon.

The Yellow and Orange Beaches

The two flanking attacks undertaken by 3 and 4 Commando were to take place at 0450 hours (4:50 a.m.), a half hour before the main raid on Dieppe was set to begin. To the east of Dieppe, Lieut.-Col. Durnford-Slater, his 3 Commando, and 39 U.S. Rangers under Capt. Roy Murray would land at the beaches of Berneval (Yellow Beach I) and Belleville-sur-Mer (Yellow Beach II). Each official would land with one of the two forces at the separate beaches. They were assigned with one specific task: the men who landed at Yellow Beach I were to attack the Goebbels Battery on its right flank, while those landing at Yellow Beach II were to attack the Battery on its left flank. After their targets had been disabled and their objectives accomplished, the Rangers and Commandos would be picked up by their embarkation ships and return to English ports.

Similar tactics would be used by Lieut.-Col. Lord Lovat and 4 Commando in completing their mission objectives. They were to land west of Dieppe, at the beaches of Vasterival (Orange Beach I) and Quiberville (Orange Beach II). Over 80 Commandos under Major Mills-Roberts would come ashore at Orange Beach I, while Lovat and 160-plus Commandos were to land at Orange Beach II. The Commandos at Orange I were to undertake a frontal assault on the Hess Battery, while the Battery’s rear would be outflanked by the Commandos that landed at Orange II. Once Hess Battery had been knocked out and all other objectives had been met, 4 Commando would also be evacuated and returned to England (Ford 42, 45).

Green Beach

The total Canadian landing force would be divided among three central coast towns in the Dieppe area. Two of these landings would serve as additional flank attacks that coincided with the Commando raids. At the town of Pourville (codenamed Green Beach), two assault regiments from Brig. Southam’s 6th Brigade would be disembarked. The South Saskatchewan Regiment, which the first waves at Green Beach were comprised of, was also scheduled to land at 0450 hours. Upon landing, the Regiment was to secure a beachhead along the Scie River’s banks for the waves that followed. Once secure, the S. Saskatchewan’s A and D Companies were to maneuver towards Dieppe’s western outskirts, seize the outlying radar station, and capture garrison emplacements located at Quatre Vents Farm and Dieppe’s western headlands. It was at the latter rendezvous point that the two companies were meant to link up with companies from the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (scheduled to land at Dieppe’s White Beach sector a half hour after the South Saskatchewan Regiment landed). Meanwhile, the Regiment’s B and C Companies would advance forward to secure the town of Pourville itself, and then shift to take the western cliffs looming above Pourville.

Half an hour after the Green Beach assault began, the Cameron Highlanders of Canada were scheduled to arrive on the shores of Pourville. Once landed, they would cross through the area made secure by the South Saskatchewan Regiment. Once beyond the bridgehead, its first objective was to proceed southward along the Scie River and capture the Luftwaffe airfield at St. Aubin. Because their landing would coincide with those at the main beaches of Dieppe, the Cameron Highlanders’ secondary objective was to link up with breakout companies from the Calgary Tanks prior to reaching the St. Aubin airfield and capturing. Once this was captured, the newly united force was to shift east and capture what was suspected to be the Divisional HQ of the 302nd in Arques-la-Bataille (Leasor 102-104; Ford 31, 33, & 55-56).

Blue Beach

The fourth flank attack scheduled to begin at 0450 hours would be carried out by 4th Brigade’s Royal Regiment of Canada. Accompanying the Royal Regiment would be an individual company from the Canadian Black Watch Regiment. They would land east of Dieppe on the shores of Puits (Puys), which was codenamed Blue Beach. Their main objectives were to knock out a number of defense emplacements, as well as two heavy weapons batteries, and secure the headlands east and west of Puys. Once they had gained a foothold on the beach, the troops were to breakout in three directions towards the outskirts of Puys. A main assault force was to maneuver west and attack the headlands that dwarfed the eastern districts of Dieppe. They would also destroy an Anti-Aircraft battery located near the headlands. At these headlands, once they had been secured, the attack force was to link up with the Essex Scottish Regiment from Red Beach and march into Dieppe. A second task force was to move eastward and carry out the task of disabling defense posts along the eastern cordon of barbed wire. Finally, a third task force was to progress southeast of Puys and destroy the four 100mm howitzers that made up the Rommel Battery. Like the men involved with the other flank attacks, the troops at Blue Beach were to be evacuated once their objectives had been met (Mellor 26, 50; Ford 31, 54).

The Red and White Beaches

The largest and central force of the raid was to land on the beaches of Dieppe itself. The total number of regiments landing there would be divided and assigned to a beach on each side of the town’s harbor. On the shores of Dieppe’s western district, codenamed White Beach, the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry Regiment and large companies from the Calgary Tanks were to disembark. On its eastern district shores, codenamed Red Beach, the remainder of the Calgary Tanks would be landed alongside the Essex Scottish and Royal Marines. The Toronto Machine Regiment would provide covering fire for the infantry troops, while the Royal Canadian Engineers were to clear away placed obstacles so that the Calgary Tanks could advance through Dieppe and beyond it. Standing by as a floating reserve would be the Fusiliers Mont Royal Regiment. Along with the Provost Corps, they would serve as the beaches’ main defense once they had been secured until all assault forces had been evacuated.

Upon landing at White Beach, the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry was to break up into two company forces that shifted in different directions. One force was to move eastward, meet up with companies of the Essex Scottish and Calgary Tanks from Red Beach, and then proceed south to take the town square in the heart of the city. The remainder of the R.H.L.I. would shift west around the Casino and advance toward the headlands, upon which the Chateau stood. Reaching the top, the force was to knock out what remained of three or four 75mm guns and capture the Headquarters of both the 571st Regiment and its 2nd Battalion. Once these objectives were completed, the R.H.L.I. units would again split into two groups. One of the groups was to undergo a 180-degree turnaround to link up with the landing forces that took the town square, while the second group would advance further west along the headlands to meet up with units from the South Saskatchewan Regiment. At the same time, the main assault force of the Calgary Tanks was to advance south of the original German defense perimeter, link up with the Cameron Highlanders, and take the St. Aubin airfield. From there, they were to shift east and destroy the four 150mm howitzers of the Hitler Battery. Once these were put out of commission, they were to proceed further east, capture the 302nd’s Divisional HQ, and take with them all vital German personnel and intelligence when they were ordered to be evacuated.

At Red Beach the Essex Scottish, the Royal Marines, and the remainder of the Calgary Tanks were to secure the town’s northwestern docks and transport back to the naval force with ships captured from the harbor. When the Royal Marines had reached the edge of the northern docks, they were to split up into two forces heading in opposite directions. One would proceed north to secure the beachfront’s eastern edge and link up with units from the Essex Scottish. Two other E.S. forces were to head west towards White Beach. One of these groups was to link up with the R.H.L.I. and Calgary Tank units heading toward the town square. The third group was to break off from the group heading west and move south towards the town’s peninsular area that protruded in the harbor. It would then cross a pair of bridges that connected the town’s two sides through the peninsula over to the town’s east side. Once across, the E.S. would swing northward along the east docks, capture the Regiment’s 3rd Divisional HQ, and retrieve all vital personnel and intelligence that could be taken back to England (Mellor 26, 63; Ford 30-32, 35, 61, & 64).

Support from the Seas

The Commander of the Naval Forces, Capt. John Hughes-Hallet, would control at least 237 ships during the operation. Firepower support for the amphibious troops would come from eight destroyers, one large gunboat, and numerous escort craft ranging from steam gun boats to Free French Chasseurs. The nine or ten most heavily armed ships were the HMS Locust, HMS Alresford, HMS Bleasdale, HMS Berkeley, HMS Albrighton, HMS Garth, HMS Brocklesby, HMS Fernie, ORP Slazak, and HMS Calpe. The Calpe would serve as the HQ ship for the operation’s main commanders, including Maj. John Roberts, Hughes-Hallet, Air Marshal Trafford Leigh Mallory, and numerous others. Providing the landing crafts needed for transporting troops to the shores were nine Landing Ships: the HMS Glengyle, HMS Queen Emma, HMS Princess Beatrix, HMS Prince Charles, HMS Princess Astrid, HMS Prince Albert, HMS Prince Leopold, HMS Invicta, and HMS Duke of Wellington. The nine ships would provide sixty Assault Landing Craft (LCA), eight Support Landing Craft (LCS), and seven Mechanised Landing Craft (LCM). Twenty motor launches (ML) and ten Landing Craft Flotillas were also involved in bringing troops to shore. Aside from two Landing Craft Tank (LCT) Flotillas and one Landing Craft Flak (LCF) Flotilla, there were a total of seven Landing Craft Personnel (LCP) Flotillas. Two of these would disembark men at Yellow Beach, another three would land men at Green Beach, while two would be used as floating reserves off the main Dieppe coast.

The ten capitol ships were to start a naval bombardment on assigned target towns ten to twenty minutes before the first troops landed there. Providing additional fire support were twelve motor gun boats (MGB), four steam gun boats (SGB), and seven Chasseurs from the Free French Navy. The total naval force would ship off from the ports of Southampton, Newhaven, Portsmouth, Shoreham, and Gosport, among others. The heaviest naval artillery they were equipped with, however, happened to be weapons ranging from 4in. guns to 20mm light cannons. Since the idea to execute a heavy bombardment during the preceding hours had been dropped, it would also be decided that no battleships or other large naval craft would be involved in the operation. The most effective means of a bombardment that could give the ground troops enough support would have to come from the air (Ford 25-26, 30, & 33-36).

Support from the Skies

Overlooking the Air Force branch of the operation, Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory assigned the task of providing air support to an Inter-Allied Air Force. A majority of the air power would come from the RAF’s Fighter Command Group No. 11, in the guise of forty-eight Spitfire, eight Hurricane, three Typhoon, five Boston, one Beaufighter, two Blenheim, and four Mustang squadrons (a total of at least seventy-one R.A.F. squadrons). A number of the involved RAF fighter squadrons were made up of pilots from various Allied forces including the U.S., Canada, Free French, Poland, and New Zealand. The number of pilots from each of these Allied nations was so plentiful that select squadrons were made up of pilots representing a single country of origin and original service (take the 350th Belgian and 332nd Norwegian Spitfire Squadrons, for example). Supporting the fighters was up to four B-17 squadrons from the USAAF 97th Bombardment Group.

The provided squadrons for the air assault were to embark on their missions from twenty-five Air Force bases scattered throughout southern England. Twelve of these bases resided in the areas surrounding London, while the other thirteen were located along the southern English coastlines. Since the night bombardment’s cancellation also applied to the Air Force, it was decided that bombing raids and strafe-and-run targets would be limited to the German airfields and coastal defenses around Dieppe. This air support was intended to begin around the same time the naval “bombardment” was scheduled to begin, just prior to the landing of the flank attack troops at their assigned beaches.

During the operation, the Combined Air Force would be assigned with two objectives: to serve as a source of firepower support for the ground forces and to sever the defense capabilities held by the Germans at Dieppe. The latter objective was intended to affect the degree of which the first objective would be achieved. Support from the RAF and USAAF squadrons was to be provided by carrying out numerous tasks that included:

• disabling heavy gun emplacements inside and outside of Dieppe;
• bombing German defense positions scattered along headlands around the Dieppe area; and
• knocking out major defenses along the target beaches through strafe attacks.

These tasks, among others, were to be carried out before the ground troops landed and continue while they were carrying out their own missions. When troops at the beaches had finished all of their objectives, the air squadron presence was to be elevated to its highest level of support and remain at that level until the final troops were evacuated. Attempting to meet the two aforementioned objectives, it was hoped, would bring about a third objective: to coax the majority of Luftwaffe squadrons (stationed in the regions that neighbored Dieppe), into engaging the RAF squadrons. Planners estimated the preliminary attacks made on German defenses would entice the bulk of the local Luftwaffe into air combat. Doing this was estimated to not only deliver huge losses to the number of German fighters and bombers, but also diminish the rate of casualties inflicted upon the ground forces by Luftwaffe fighter planes. How the progress of the Allied Air Force squadrons’ missions would carry out lied on the other side of the Channel they would fly over during the early hours of August 19th (Franks 15-31, 207-208; Ford 26, 36-7, & 78).

The Pre-Raid Naval Skirmish 

During the daytime hours of August 18, minesweepers from the Royal Navy's 9th and 13th Minesweeping Flotillas were occupied with the task of clearing a wide path through German minefields in the English Channel. Through this opening, the naval force that set sail later on that evening would transport amphibious troops toward their targets in and around Dieppe. The ships that carried specific troops would come from five separate ports in Southern England. From the port of Newhaven came a maximum of twenty-three Group 5 LCPs from the 1st and 24th LCP Flotillas. Four of these LCPs, however, and were forced to discontinue their mission and return to their port after suffering engine malfunctions. Serving as escort craft were the steam gun boat SGB5, the motor launch ML346, and the flak landing craft LCF (L) 1.

Aboard these ships were the men of 3 Commando, on their way towards the two Yellow Beaches of Berneval. At the edge of the group, aboard SGB5, Flotilla Commander D.B. Wyburd and Lieut.-Col. Durnford-Slater were busy trying to make out the coastline horizon six miles ahead of them. In the minutes approaching 0345 hours, however, the SGB5 noticed a convoy of small German craft approaching fast from the north. They at first believed these ships to be nothing more than tugboats undergoing routine excursions during the night; that is, until they noticed the ships were continuing to move closer. In due time, the convoy's eventual discovery of the flotilla would spell a disastrous undoing for the entire operation.

The Alerted Convoy and Unreceived Warnings

The convoy they had seen on the northern horizon, however, was not a band of small tugboats leaving a nearby harbor to undergo mine-laying procedures. It was actually a group on course to Dieppe for a number of hours. Around 2200 hours, as August 18th came to a close, a German convoy of five motor ships and three wooden submarine chasers left the port of Boulogne heading south towards Dieppe. Under the command of Oberleutnant (First Lieutenant) Wurmbach, the convoy's main intention was to transfer between the ports for safe haven. However, because von Rundstedt declared August 19th to be a specific date for high enemy alerts, it is likely that the convoy also left its homeport that night with the purpose of patrolling the French coastlines for Allied ship movement.

The appearance of the convoy may have caught the Yellow beach flotillas by surprise, but its approach had actually been detected hours before the two groups intersected. At 0130 hours (1:30 a.m.), British radar stations first spotted these ships proceeding south along the French coast. An immediate report of this surveillance was transmitted to the Jubilee naval force, although none of the ships were able to receive this message. Between 0230 and 0300 hours (2:30-3:00 a.m.), the radar stations sent a second report on their findings to the armada. This time, it managed to be picked up by the HMS Fernie and several other ships. All of these ships, however, failed to forward the received message to the HMS Calpe (the fleet's HQ ship). Thus, with little to no knowledge of the convoy approaching, the far edge of the naval force maintained a steady pace up to the moment each group's identity was introduced by means of a naval flare (Leasor 122-124; Mellor 30; Ford 30).

The Star Shell that Foiled Jubilee's Secrecy

Around 0300 hours, as they inched through the waters off Berneval's outer coastline, Lieut. Wurmbach stood aboard the convoy's lead ship when he first spotted a large group of ships several miles ahead. Their identity unknown to him, Wurmbach lit a signal beacon in order to receive a response. When none immediately came, he dismissed it as a minor setback plaguing the other fleet and decided to leave the beacon lit for a limited period or until a response had been returned. When a this period neared its limit, Wurmbach stood by his proposed dismissals and chose to wait an extended period for a return signal. By 0345 hours, when a response still did not come from the "unknown" ships, he finally deemed these dismissals unlikely and considered it possible that the ships were not from a friendly force. Taking steps of precaution, Wurmbach ordered all convoy boats to put their guns on armed alert. Once all were on complete alert, a star shell was shot into the night sky and illuminated the Allied ships in front of them.

At 0347 hours, when both groups were able to view each other under the flare's lighting, a hail of gunfire exploded from each side. Due to its position, the SGB5 was one of the first ships to be severely damaged during the ongoing naval skirmish. Its radio system had been destroyed by one of the first shots fired at it, making the ship incapable of warning the Calpe about the loss of surprise attack. It also made them unable to call for aid from the HMS Brocklesby and ORP Slazak, the two destroyers closest to Group 5. Means of communication aboard the two leading German ships had also been disabled early by immediate shelling. With only one sub chaser left and all radio systems unavailable to alert German operators, Lieut. Wurmbach made the decision to withdraw the convoy under heavy fire to the Dieppe port. There he would rush to confirm the incident (and warn of what was coming) to German officials who could see it from the headlands and beaches along the Dieppe coast (Leasor 122-124; Mellor 30-32).

The Issued State of Alert

By 0400 hours LCF 1 and ML346 had managed to enter the fray, sinking one chaser escort while setting another ablaze. Still, the two Allied escort ships would suffer as much damage and crew casualties as the SGB5 had. In addition, up to four LCPs were forced to turn back due also to severe damage and high casualty rates aboard each craft. At 0430 hours, the leaders of Group 5 (Wyburd, Durnford-Slater, and Capt. Roy Murray) decided to transfer onto one of these LCPs with the intention of reaching the HMS Calpe. There, hoping to avert the mission, they would tell General Roberts of what occurred and that the fleet's presence had been discovered. The LCPs that remained were split up into groups that clustered around the individual escort craft. Following the crippled SGB5 were five LCPs, while another three LCPs remained with LCF 1 as they followed the retreating German ships. After the four damaged LCPs turned back, however, a total of fifteen LCPs were accounted for prior to the German convoy's withdrawal. An additional seven LCPs, along with ML346, had suddenly gone missing.

Meanwhile, a Freya radar station located in Pourville happened to pick up large groups of ships unidentifiable to them. When the star shells lit up over the waters it faced and the exchange of gunfire began, the station observed that the large groups belonged to an Allied fleet. Within an hour, the station's C.O. sent out a call to the 302nd Divisional HQ at Envermeu (its actual location) stating that specific beaches along the coastline were being bombarded. Sensing that an invasion was underway, Lieut.-Gen. Konrad Haase gave the order for all stationed Army troops and Luftwaffe squadrons nearby to be put on immediate alert. He would also put on standby alert the reserve forces stationed at all inland towns, in order to make all reinforcements available in case of an overwhelming attack. To make support from artillery available, this order of alert would also be issued to the heavy gun batteries scattered throughout the area. At the Yellow Beaches of Berneval however, just as its scarce defense troops took up their posts, a total of eight Allied craft had appeared on the horizon line and were approaching the shores quickly (Leasor 126-130; Mellor 30-32; Ford 40-43).

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Show Notes

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© 2025 Pete Bublitz

Pete Bublitz, whose first and middle names are Jonathan Peter, is an undergraduate student enrolled at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan. His main school-based interest, in terms of courses, is to take up a history major among others. His personal interests include, but are not limited to, getting lost, music, comedy, and last but not least history.

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